Suchergebnisse

This article analyzes the manifestations of regionalism in the context of a deep socio-political crisis in Ukraine. With the development of the political crisis that followed the coup d'etat in February 2014 in Ukraine, there was a noticeable actualization of issues and problems related to regionalism, society as a whole demonstrated a request for the redistribution of powers between the power center and the regions. This is reflected in numerous initiatives of regional authorities and public organizations aimed at expanding the financial base, functions and rights of local authorities and self-government, as well as in policy documents of political forces. At the same time, in some cases, the idea of establishing a contractual relationship between the Central government and the regions was put forward, which is typical for the Federal model of government. In response to this request, the Executive branch made another attempt to implement local government reform under the slogan of decentralizing the country's state structure. Since 2014, Ukraine has developed two multidirectional trends – centrifugal and centripetal, the ratio of which will determine the dynamics and severity of political manifestations of regionalism. Despite numerous autonomist statements, Ukrainian regionalism remains within the "rigid" model formed in the post-Soviet period. The conflict in the South-East of the country and the deep involvement of the leading powers – Russia, the United States and the European Union-are the determining factor that predetermined the "freezing" of regionalization processes in Ukraine after 2014. After the signing of the Minsk agreements, the implementation of which means for Ukraine to introduce elements of Federal relations into the system of state structure, the reform of the state structure and territorial administration has become inextricably linked with Kiev's strategy towards the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass. Manifestations of regionalism were perceived by Kiev to a large extent in the context of threats to the territorial integrity of the country, which significantly limited the possibility of implementing the policy of decentralization. In addition, Russia and the United States have demonstrated in practice different approaches to the interpretation and implementation of the Minsk agreements, which has had a negative impact on the regionalization processes in Ukraine. The nature of the processes of regionalization in Ukraine allows to draw Parallels with the situation in Transnistria and around him, and to talk about common Moldovan and Ukrainian models hard regionalism, the hallmark of which is the transformation of the regionalization processes in a tool to achieve political goals of Russia and the West in conflict with the nature of their interaction on post-Soviet space.

It was reviewed the concept of the «effective control» in context of neo-institutional theory and practice of the European Court of Human Rights, through which the occupant manages the occupied territories. It was realized the comparative analysis of the three occupation regimes cases operating at the territories of North Cyprus, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. It was described the features of the effective control of occupant in classical military occupations and in occupations by proxy. It was considered the specificity of the occupation facts determination by the European Court of Human Rights: test for the effective territorial control, application of the normative model of occupation in accordance with the Hague Regulation of 1907, the use of special informational base to confirm the existence of occupation regimes at the respective territories. It was paid attention on the emphasis shifting in the modern occupation regimes from the military to the political aspect: from the direct territorial control of the occupant to the powers delegation by the puppet authorities of the local agency. The motive part of the article is based on the neo-institutional approach as the most optimal, methodological basis of the specific institutions study of the modern occupation regimes in the author's opinion. This method allows to identify and characterize the institutional impact of the occupying state on the territories controlled by such state, as directly as through the system of the local puppet authorities. This method also allows to identify and systematize the military, economic, financial and political means of influence through which the occupant provides loyalty of the local political elites and population of the occupied territories. In conclusion to this article it was defined definition of the effective control as a specific institute of modern occupation regimes with the appropriate formal and informal rules of "game" established and supported by the occupant and its agents.Key words: occupation regime, effective control, political institution, occupying state, political regime, neo-institutionalism, classical military occupation, occupation by proxy, European Court of Human Rights. ; Розглянуто у контексті неоінституційної теорії та практики Європейського суду з прав людини концепт «ефективного контролю», за допомогою якого держава-окупант здійснює управління окупованими територіями. Здійснено порівняльний аналіз трьох кейсів окупаційних режимів, що функціонують на територіях Північного Кіпру, Придністров'я та Нагорного Карабаху. Описано особливості ефективного контролю окупанта в класичних окупаціях та в окупаціях «через третіх осіб». Сфокусовано увагу на зміщенні акцентів у сучасних окупаційних режимах з військового на політичний аспект: з безпосереднього територіального контролю окупанта на делегування повноважень маріонетковим органам місцевої влади. Сформульовано визначення ефективного контролю як специфічного інституту сучасних окупаційних режимів з притаманними йому формальними й неформальними правилами «гри», що встановлюються й підтримуються державою-окупантом та її агентами.Ключові слова: окупаційний режим, ефективний контроль, політичний інститут, окупаційна держава, політичний режим, неоінституціоналізм, класична окупація, окупація через третіх осіб, Європейський суд з прав людини. Рассмотрен в контексте неоинституциональной теории и практики Европейского суда по правам человека концепт «эффективного контроля», при помощи которого государство-оккупант осуществляет управление оккупированными территориями. Произведен сравнительный анализ трех кейсов оккупационных режимов, функционирующих на территориях Северного Кипра, Приднестровья и Нагорного Карабаха. Описаны особенности эффективного контроля оккупанта в классических оккупациях и в оккупациях «через третьих лиц». Сфокусировано внимание на смещении акцентов в современных оккупационных режимах с военного на политический аспект: с непосредственного территориального контроля оккупанта на делегирование полномочий марионеточным органам местной власти. Сформулировано определение эффективного контроля как специфического института современных оккупационных режимов с присущими ему формальными и неформальными правилами «игры», которые устанавливаются и поддерживаются государством-оккупантом и его агентами.Ключевые слова: оккупационный режим, эффективный контроль, политический институт, государство-оккупант, политический режим, неоинституционализм, классическая оккупация, оккупация через третьих лиц, Европейский суд по правам человека. It was reviewed the concept of the «effective control» in context of neo-institutional theory and practice of the European Court of Human Rights, through which the occupant manages the occupied territories. It was realized the comparative analysis of the three occupation regimes cases operating at the territories of North Cyprus, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. It was described the features of the effective control of occupant in classical military occupations and in occupations by proxy. It was considered the specificity of the occupation facts determination by the European Court of Human Rights: test for the effective territorial control, application of the normative model of occupation in accordance with the Hague Regulation of 1907, the use of special informational base to confirm the existence of occupation regimes at the respective territories. It was paid attention on the emphasis shifting in the modern occupation regimes from the military to the political aspect: from the direct territorial control of the occupant to the powers delegation by the puppet authorities of the local agency. The motive part of the article is based on the neo-institutional approach as the most optimal, methodological basis of the specific institutions study of the modern occupation regimes in the author's opinion. This method allows to identify and characterize the institutional impact of the occupying state on the territories controlled by such state, as directly as through the system of the local puppet authorities. This method also allows to identify and systematize the military, economic, financial and political means of influence through which the occupant provides loyalty of the local political elites and population of the occupied territories. In conclusion to this article it was defined definition of the effective control as a specific institute of modern occupation regimes with the appropriate formal and informal rules of "game" established and supported by the occupant and its agents.Key words: occupation regime, effective control, political institution, occupying state, political regime, neo-institutionalism, classical military occupation, occupation by proxy, European Court of Human Rights.

Twenty-five years have passed since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which led to the disruption of the regional check-and-balance system aimed at resolving national issues and political and socioeconomic contradictions. It also resulted in a number of armed conflicts, including those in the Chechen Republic, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Tajikistan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and later in the South-East of Ukraine. Immediately following the collapse of the USSR, key international actors paid special attention to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region while trying to secure own interests. This led to the further stratification of the CIS region. A "geopolitical pluralism" started to form there, marked by the fragmentation of nation-state sovereignty over the territory. The concept and policy of "geopolitical pluralism" as developed by Zbigniew Brzezinski meets the interests of the United States by making the CIS region more manageable, while at the same time making it more difficult for Russia to implement its own strategic tasks there. The key goal of Russia is the creation of an integrated economic and political union able to take a rightful place in the world. Only the development of deep and comprehensive integration with the CIS states can ensure the competitiveness of Russia's position in the world as well as the positions of its partners in the former Soviet space. The purpose of this article is to assess the level of geopolitical pluralism in the CIS space taking account of the membership of the CIS countries in international organizations and their voting on UN General Assembly resolutions. The study is based on the interconnection of quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis of international relations and world politics. During the past quarter century following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a regional system of international relations has formed in its place. Despite the fact that the CIS is a kind of linking element which unites most of the former Soviet republics, a certain competition between the new states has become the characteristic feature of the political relations in the region. The policy of the west (primarily the United States) became a kind of a branched, diversified strategy aimed at the phased development, transformation and fragmentation of the region. The diversity of foreign policy priorities among the CIS states and the presence of many actors in the region makes mutual understanding and good-neighbourliness between these countries difficult to achieve. To the contrary, this diversity seriously complicates and slows down the development of deep and comprehensive integration, making it more unstable and ineffective. © HSE, 1993-2018.

In countries of the former Soviet Union concentrated almost half of the modern Ukrainian diaspora, particularly in theRussian Federationis home to the most numerous Ukrainian diaspora in the world. A reason of appearance Ukrainian diaspora in these countries was voluntary and forced migration, and inBelarus, theRussian FederationandMoldova- factor of state delimitation.As a result of the census of population, which took place in the formerSoviet Unionafter 1989, established changes in the numerosity of Ukrainian diaspora and its settlement. Given the specificity of the countries that were part of the Soviet Union, can be identified there are four groups of countries: the Baltics, Central Asia and theCaucasus. The fourth group consists ofBelarus,RussiaandMoldova, where part of the Ukrainian diaspora are autochthonous population. Compared with other countries in the Baltics countries dynamics of decrease number of Ukrainians is lower. In spite of membership of these countries in the EU, processes of modern Ukrainian labor migration, Ukrainians are excluded from active political and public life in these countries.InCentral Asiaafter 1989 found that the rate of decrease of Ukrainian diaspora very high because of low economic development, political situation in the region, Ukrainian integration into the Russian diaspora, natural decreases. InArmenia,GeorgiaandAzerbaijanbecause of military conflicts, revolutions and low living standards number of the Ukrainian diaspora is negligible. Beside this on the Ukrainian diaspora has influence linguistic, cultural and religious distance from the titular ethnic groups. InBelarus, the Ukrainian diaspora lives mainly inBrestregion and major cities. Ukrainian diaspora inMoldovais living mainly in the northern parts of the country and Transnistria. In theRussian Federationit is the Ukrainian ethnic territories and major cities, in which directed the flows of Ukrainian labor migrants. The reasons for reducing the number of Ukrainian diaspora were military conflicts, low life, and the unstable political situation that led to the re-emigration toUkraineor other countries. Among other reasons, it should be noted assimilation, a natural decrease in the number of Ukrainians. ; Около половины украинской диаспоры проживает в странах бывшего СССР, поэтому актуальной задачей является исследование современного состояния украинской диаспоры. По этнокультурным критериям программ переписей населения, которые проводились в странах бывшего СССР, установлены численность украинской диаспоры, особенности расселения в отдельных странах. Поданы среднегодовые темпы уменьшения численности украинцев, выделены основные ареалы обитания украинской диаспоры. По последним результатам переписей населения составлена карта современного расселения украинской диаспоры. ; Близько половини української діаспори проживає у країнах колишнього СРСР, тому актуальним завданням є дослідження сучасного стану української діаспори. За етнокультурними критеріями програм переписів населення, які проводилися у країнах колишнього СРСР, встановлено чисельність української діаспори, особливості розселення в окремих країнах. Подано середньорічні темпи зменшення чисельності українців, виділено основні ареали проживання української діаспори. За останніми результатами переписів населення складено карту сучасного розселення української діаспори.

In countries of the former Soviet Union concentrated almost half of the modern Ukrainian diaspora, particularly in theRussian Federationis home to the most numerous Ukrainian diaspora in the world. A reason of appearance Ukrainian diaspora in these countries was voluntary and forced migration, and inBelarus, theRussian FederationandMoldova- factor of state delimitation.As a result of the census of population, which took place in the formerSoviet Unionafter 1989, established changes in the numerosity of Ukrainian diaspora and its settlement. Given the specificity of the countries that were part of the Soviet Union, can be identified there are four groups of countries: the Baltics, Central Asia and theCaucasus. The fourth group consists ofBelarus,RussiaandMoldova, where part of the Ukrainian diaspora are autochthonous population. Compared with other countries in the Baltics countries dynamics of decrease number of Ukrainians is lower. In spite of membership of these countries in the EU, processes of modern Ukrainian labor migration, Ukrainians are excluded from active political and public life in these countries.InCentral Asiaafter 1989 found that the rate of decrease of Ukrainian diaspora very high because of low economic development, political situation in the region, Ukrainian integration into the Russian diaspora, natural decreases. InArmenia,GeorgiaandAzerbaijanbecause of military conflicts, revolutions and low living standards number of the Ukrainian diaspora is negligible. Beside this on the Ukrainian diaspora has influence linguistic, cultural and religious distance from the titular ethnic groups. InBelarus, the Ukrainian diaspora lives mainly inBrestregion and major cities. Ukrainian diaspora inMoldovais living mainly in the northern parts of the country and Transnistria. In theRussian Federationit is the Ukrainian ethnic territories and major cities, in which directed the flows of Ukrainian labor migrants. The reasons for reducing the number of Ukrainian diaspora were military conflicts, low life, and the unstable political situation that led to the re-emigration toUkraineor other countries. Among other reasons, it should be noted assimilation, a natural decrease in the number of Ukrainians. ; Около половины украинской диаспоры проживает в странах бывшего СССР, поэтому актуальной задачей является исследование современного состояния украинской диаспоры. По этнокультурным критериям программ переписей населения, которые проводились в странах бывшего СССР, установлены численность украинской диаспоры, особенности расселения в отдельных странах. Поданы среднегодовые темпы уменьшения численности украинцев, выделены основные ареалы обитания украинской диаспоры. По последним результатам переписей населения составлена карта современного расселения украинской диаспоры. ; Близько половини української діаспори проживає у країнах колишнього СРСР, тому актуальним завданням є дослідження сучасного стану української діаспори. За етнокультурними критеріями програм переписів населення, які проводилися у країнах колишнього СРСР, встановлено чисельність української діаспори, особливості розселення в окремих країнах. Подано середньорічні темпи зменшення чисельності українців, виділено основні ареали проживання української діаспори. За останніми результатами переписів населення складено карту сучасного розселення української діаспори.

In countries of the former Soviet Union concentrated almost half of the modern Ukrainian diaspora, particularly in theRussian Federationis home to the most numerous Ukrainian diaspora in the world. A reason of appearance Ukrainian diaspora in these countries was voluntary and forced migration, and inBelarus, theRussian FederationandMoldova- factor of state delimitation.As a result of the census of population, which took place in the formerSoviet Unionafter 1989, established changes in the numerosity of Ukrainian diaspora and its settlement. Given the specificity of the countries that were part of the Soviet Union, can be identified there are four groups of countries: the Baltics, Central Asia and theCaucasus. The fourth group consists ofBelarus,RussiaandMoldova, where part of the Ukrainian diaspora are autochthonous population. Compared with other countries in the Baltics countries dynamics of decrease number of Ukrainians is lower. In spite of membership of these countries in the EU, processes of modern Ukrainian labor migration, Ukrainians are excluded from active political and public life in these countries.InCentral Asiaafter 1989 found that the rate of decrease of Ukrainian diaspora very high because of low economic development, political situation in the region, Ukrainian integration into the Russian diaspora, natural decreases. InArmenia,GeorgiaandAzerbaijanbecause of military conflicts, revolutions and low living standards number of the Ukrainian diaspora is negligible. Beside this on the Ukrainian diaspora has influence linguistic, cultural and religious distance from the titular ethnic groups. InBelarus, the Ukrainian diaspora lives mainly inBrestregion and major cities. Ukrainian diaspora inMoldovais living mainly in the northern parts of the country and Transnistria. In theRussian Federationit is the Ukrainian ethnic territories and major cities, in which directed the flows of Ukrainian labor migrants. The reasons for reducing the number of Ukrainian diaspora were military conflicts, low life, and the unstable political situation that led to the re-emigration toUkraineor other countries. Among other reasons, it should be noted assimilation, a natural decrease in the number of Ukrainians. ; Около половины украинской диаспоры проживает в странах бывшего СССР, поэтому актуальной задачей является исследование современного состояния украинской диаспоры. По этнокультурным критериям программ переписей населения, которые проводились в странах бывшего СССР, установлены численность украинской диаспоры, особенности расселения в отдельных странах. Поданы среднегодовые темпы уменьшения численности украинцев, выделены основные ареалы обитания украинской диаспоры. По последним результатам переписей населения составлена карта современного расселения украинской диаспоры. ; Близько половини української діаспори проживає у країнах колишнього СРСР, тому актуальним завданням є дослідження сучасного стану української діаспори. За етнокультурними критеріями програм переписів населення, які проводилися у країнах колишнього СРСР, встановлено чисельність української діаспори, особливості розселення в окремих країнах. Подано середньорічні темпи зменшення чисельності українців, виділено основні ареали проживання української діаспори. За останніми результатами переписів населення складено карту сучасного розселення української діаспори.

This paper deals with the issue of the growing military-strategic partnership between Romania and the United States, and addresses its effects on the post-Soviet countries. After 2022, the U.S. has become increasingly interested in the Danubian theater of operations, deploying a sizeable contingent of American ground troops in Romania. Making use of its partnership with the Americans, and inspired by the successful example of Poland, the Romanian government started to modernize its national armed forces after years of technological stagnation. One can reasonably assume that the consequences of this policy could affect Moldova and Transnistria, shifting the regional balance of power in a direction unfavorable to Russia. At the present stage, however, the U.S. – authorized infusion of relatively modern Western weapons into the Romanian army is primarily aimed at offsetting the technological gap, which had formed during the Cold War years and intensified in the 1990s?2000s. The events of the 2022 Ukrainian crisis presented Bucharest with a chance to strengthen its position within the United States' strategic framework and, as a result, dramatically expanded the scope of its military and technical partnership with Washington. The Romanian leadership seems eager to capitalize on the growing American interest in the rapid and lasting takeover of the Danube theater of operations. It cannot be ruled out that this trend will affect Moldova, which maintains close political ties with Romania. The American base of operations has not shifted to Eastern Europe so far. The rear logistics command of the U. S. European Command remains in the same location it was originally established during the Cold War. The forces deployed as part of the Operation Atlantic Resolve have only slightly advanced closer to the conflict zone. That said, the experience of the Cold War and, more specifically, the deployment of American forces to provide cover for West Germany and South Korea suggests that, in order to effectively deter a would-be adversary, the rear base of operations must be located inside the confines of the potential combat theater, not outside of it. The current deployment of U.S. troops, therefore, appears to be an act of politics rather than strategy. In the eyes of Eastern European leaders, even a marginal, purely symbolic United States' military presence acts as a psychologically significant form of assurance against a hypothetical escalation vis-a-vis Moscow. At the same time, the American deployment in Eastern Europe resembles a "sanitary cordon" rather than an "iron curtain" in the sense that it is motivated more by political considerations than by strategic concerns. The fact that the recent U.S. military preparations are purely demonstrative in nature, as opposed to establishing a full-scale logistics command in a potential combat theater, means that Russia can continue to respond with similar symbolic gestures and warning signals.

Исследованы обстоятельства жизненного пути, общественной деятельности в эмиграции в Болгарии и вероятной гибели осенью 1944 г. генерал-лейтенанта русской армии Н.Э. Бредова. Приведены сведения по истории русской диаспоры в Болгарии, вновь открытые архивные материалы, уточняющие события Гражданской войны на Юге России, Бредовского похода, деятельности органов военной контрразведки СССР Смерш и спецслужбы Народно-освободительной армии Югославии ОЗНА на территории Болгарии и Югославии. ; The circumstances of the lifepath of the participant of Russian-Japanese war and World War I, general lieuthenant Nikolay Emilievich Bredov are observed in the paper. It is underlined that he went down in history of the Civil war as a head of "Bredov's March" (an ordered retirement of his troops from Transnistria to Poland on February 1920). As a result of it, nearly 20 thousand men were saved from death. The materials of researches on Russian diaspora in Bulgaria which was one of the most representative, consisting mainly of ex-officers and rank-and-file members of White armies, and new-founded archive documents are considered. The information about N.E. Bredov's fate after the Soviet Army entered the country and the Revolution of 1944 has been verified. It remained unknown before. Any information about any repressions used against him are absent in the archives of Federal Security Service and Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russian Federation. Regarding Bulgaria as the place of concentration of Russian emigrants looking forward to continuing an armed struggle against the USSR, and as the field of active counteraction between the secret services of the USSR and Germany, the archive materials of the military counterintelligence (SMERSH) of the Soviet Army troops acting in Bulgaria in 1944 were studied. Based on the documents found, it was stated that N.E. Bredov was detained by the officers of SMERSH service of the 3rd Ukrainian forefront on the 25th of October, 1944. The record of his interrogation that took place on the 18th of November, 1944 contains the details about the events of the Civil war in the South of Russia, Bredov's March, an information about the staff and activities of one of the Russian organizations in Bulgaria Society of Russian General Staff officers. There are not any grounds for accusing N.E. Bredov presented in the considered materials, except for his acknowledgement that he and his fellows from Society of Russian General Staff officers had negative opinion about the Soviet reality. There is an information in archive documents that the SMERSH in the field work on the territory of Bulgaria and Jugoslavia collaborated with OZNA (Otdel Zaschity Naroda Department of Nation Security, special service of Jugoslavia), in particular, transported some of the arrested Russian emigrants to them. The same happened to N.E. Bredov, who was delivered to OZNA members from Vrshaz (Jugoslavia) on the 24 th of November, 1944. Taking into account the fact that OZNA practiced mass shootings without any trial at that time, one can suggest that he was executed at the end of 1944.

On 22 April, 2005, the GUUAM members (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), who met in Chisinau to mark the organization's eighth anniversary, finally crossed the Rubicon. On that day the heads of the member states made public GUUAM's political ambitions. This ended the period of "infantile disorder" and the Big Brother syndrome. The fact that Uzbekistan rejected the new policy and left the structure meant that a new international political organization appeared. President of Uzbekistan Karimov first declined to attend the summit and then denounced all the treaties the country signed when his country joined the Organization. This and other signs testify that the sluggishly developing quasi-alliance became a hyper-active political structure. In other words, GUUAM became GUAM! The Chisinau summit abounded in bold and fairly unexpected political statements, nevertheless, the members' vehement criticism of Russia's role and policy in the conflict zones in Abkhazia, the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria sounded louder than the others. GUAM, which brought together the countries with frozen conflicts on their territories, finally acquired the self-confidence needed to put an end to the conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse. Since that time, the GUAM members have been trying to convince the international community that they should be involved in the decision-making. There are too many so-called operators and actors whose status obliges them to deal with the conflicts in the Central Caucasus and the Black Sea region. To find a niche of its own and to contribute to the still absent dynamics in the settlement process, GUAM should study the menu the international organizations compiled, either on a permanent basis or sporadically, for the conflict settlement they have been following for the last 15 years. In Georgia the situation is fairly complicated: only a careful investigation will allow GUAM to identify its own conflict settlement potential. There are two smoldering ethno-territorial conflicts in Georgia, the military stages of which have become frozen. Today the conflicts can be described as stagnating. I have in mind the conflict in Abkhazia where armed confrontation ended in the fall of 1993 and in the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region where fighting stopped in the summer of 1992. Since the ceasefire, relations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi and Tbilisi and Tskhinvali can be described as "fragile stagnation." The negotiating sides regularly found themselves at a dead end; from time to time the talks were cut short because of another flare-up (this happened in May 1998 and October 2001 in Abkhazia; in July 2004 a bout of armed disorder in the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region nearly escalated into full-scale fighting). The sides signed several agreements none of them faithfully followed and accused each other of violating them. Today, the talks have been indefinitely suspended and there are no signs of their resumption.

The article deals with the historical prerequisites for the penetration of Islam into the territory of Ukraine and the formation of Islamic architecture. It was revealed that the geographical position of Ukraine contributed to the emergence of Muslims in Ukrainian lands, especially in the south, on the border of two great civilizations – Christian and Muslim. At the same time, Islam in Ukraine played a significant ethno-forming role in the life of the Turkic peoples. Evidence of the permanent presence of Muslims in Kievan Rus dates back to the 11th century, when the Pecheneg Muslim cavalry was in the service of the Kievan prince. The second period is defined as a military-colonization period, which refers to the settlement in a permanent place of the peoples who professed Islam, as well as the colonial policy of the Ottoman Empire in the Northern Black Sea region and Transnistria. The Crimean peninsula became the main area for the spread of Islam in the lands that became part of independent Ukraine, where a unique Muslim civilization was born and strengthened. With the development of migration processes, the need arose for the construction of Muslim mosques on the territory of Ukraine. And if in the XVI-XVII century. mosques were built of wood, then starting from the 19th century. - stone and brick. The first mosque in Ukraine appeared in the XVI-XVII centuries. in the city of Ostrog in Volhynia in the Tatar suburb, built by Prince K. Ostrozhsky, which has not survived. From the beginning of the nineteenth century Mosques were built in the cities of Ukraine (Kyiv, Kharkiv), and the modern history of Islam and Muslims of Ukraine begins with the acquisition of Independence. So, in 1998-2000 the prayer-Muslim complex was built in Kyiv and the Arab cultural center in Odessa (2000). In addition, Muslim mosques have been built and are being designed in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhye, Mykolaiv, Kherson regions, as well as in the cities of Kyiv, Odessa, Donetsk, etc. In order to perceive a renewed direction in the architecture of public buildings, lost in Soviet times - sacred architecture, including Muslim architecture, Muslim architecture is being formed. It is determined that the modern architecture of mosques is created on the basis of the synthesis of traditionalism and the modern creative nature of the architectural method of designing a three-dimensional image of an Islamic shrine. ; У статті розглядається історичні передумови проникнення ісламу на територію України і формування ісламської сакральної архітектури. Розглянута поява мусульман на українських землях, насамперед на південних, яка була зумовлена розміщенням України на порубіжжі двох великих цивілізацій – християнської та мусульманської. Географічне положення України визначало активну її взаємодію з мусульманськими країнами та народами. При цьому іслам у межах сучасної України відіграв значну етноформувальну роль у житті деяких народів, які сформувалися на українських землях – (кримські татари та ногайці). Свідчення про постійне перебування мусульман у Київській Русі відносяться до ХІ ст., коли на службі у київського князя була кіннота з мусульман-печенігів. Другий період визначається як військово-колонізаційний, де йдеться про осідання на постійному місці народів, що сповідують іслам, а також колонізаційну політику Османської імперії в Північному Причорномор'ї і Подністров'ї. Кримський півострів став основним ареалом поширення ісламу на землях, що ввійшли до складу незалежної України. Саме тут зародилася і зміцніла унікальна мусульманська цивілізація [1-2].

The article considers a riveted iron helmet stored in the funds of the Museum of Archaeology and Ethnography of Siberia of Tomsk State University. The headpiece was found in the late 19thcentury in the Suzunsky pine forest in the vicinity of the Osinino lake (currently - the Suzunsky district of the Novosibirsk region). The helmet has already twice been the object of scientific research (in 1888 and 2007). The present work analyzes the elements of the helmet design which have not previously attracted the attention of researchers (the system of attaching of a camail, images of dragons on a hoop, etc.), and variants of the original type of headpiece are reconstructed. The previous assumption about the dating of the helmet to the periods of the developed and late Middle Ages has been confirmed. It is established that the closest constructive analogue of the considered sample of protective weapons is the Golden Horde helmet of the end of the 13th- early 14thcenturies found on the territory of Transnistria in the Ploskaya village. The most exact analogues of phoenix images on the crown of the helmet originate from the territory of the Yuan and Minh China in the 14th-15thcenturies. Based on the analysis of the design and the decorative design system, the Suzun helmet is dated to the end of the 13th- early 15thcenturies. The most probable date for manufacturing a helmet is the mid-14thcentury. The question of the place of production of the helmet remains open. Along with Iran, it could have been forged in the urban craft centers of Central Asia or the Golden Horde. The customer and the first owner of the helmet was probably the noble warrior of one of the Chingizid states of the period under consideration. Apparently, the richly decorated headpiece continued to be used for a long historical period. On the territory of Western Siberia, it could fall in the course of military conflicts caused by the disintegration of the Golden Horde. ; В статье рассмотрен клепаный железный шлем, хранящийся в фондах Музея археологии и этнографии Сибири Томского государственного университета. Наголовье было обнаружено в конце XIX в. в Сузунском бору, в окрестностях оз. Осинина (в настоящее время - Сузунский район Новосибирскойобласти). Шлем уже дважды становился объектом научного исследования (в 1888 и 2007 гг.). В настоящей работе проанализированы элементы конструкции и декора шлема, ранее не привлекавшие внимания исследователей (система крепления бармицы, изображения драконов на обруче и др.), а такжереконструированы варианты первоначального вида наголовья. Получило подтверждение ранее высказанное предположение о датировке шлема периодами развитого и позднего Средневековья. Установлено, что ближайшим конструктивным аналогом рассматриваемого образца защитного вооружения является золотоордынский шлем конца XIII - начала XIV вв., найденный на территории Приднестровьяу с. Плоское. Наиболее точные аналоги изображений фениксов на тулье шлема происходят с территорииЮаньского и Минского Китая XIV-XV вв. На основании анализа конструкции и системы декоративного оформления «сузунский» шлем датирован концом XIII - началом XV вв. Наиболее вероятной датойизготовления шлема следует считать середину XIV в. Вопрос о месте производства шлема остаетсяоткрытым. Наряду с Ираном он мог быть выкован в городских ремесленных центрах Средней Азииили Золотой Орды. Заказчиком и первым владельцем шлема, вероятно, являлся знатный воин одногоиз Чингизидских государств рассматриваемого периода. По всей видимости, богато оформленное наголовье продолжало использоваться на протяжении длительного исторического периода. На территориюЗападной Сибири оно могло попасть в ходе военных конфликтов, вызванных распадом Золотой Орды.

The main factors and prerequisites ofUkraine's cooperation are enlightened; the role of Black sea region forUkraineand other international actors is reviewed. Therefore, the importance ofBlack seacoastal area is growing nowadays because of its natural resource potential and transit position. There are lots of factors and prerequisites forUkraine's cooperation with countries of Black sea region, among them historical, social-economic, political, cultural and religious factors, conflict situation and transit position ofUkraine. Historical factors and prerequisites are in common historic background, which influence on present development and cause common problems.Economic-social diversity of region causes lots of problems, but also a background for mutual cooperation between countries ofBlack searegion. Different levels of economic-social development, different international specialization of countries (agriculture, industry, fuel and energy) create basis for economic and trade cooperation. Also states have common social problems. Due to economic-social cooperation,Ukraineis able to resolve existing problems. Politically this region is also diversified. Some states pursue policy directed at Euro-Atlantic integration, moreover, 3 of them are members of EU and NATO (Greece,Bulgaria,Romania). Simultaneously, some countries have opposite political vector (Armenia,Azerbaijan,Georgia).Ukrainehas special interests in this field of cooperation in the case of adopting practice of EU integration and democratic standardization.Conflict situation is a very special common feature of most countries of Black sea region: Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia,South Ossetiaconflicts, the Kurdish problem.Ukraine's territory also suffered from external aggression (Donbas,Crimea). All these facts raise up the issue of mutual cooperation betweenUkraineand countries of region aimed at settlement of all disputes and solving conflicts. Cultural and religious factors and prerequisites are in great cultural and religious multitude among countries of region andUkraine. All states are multi-national and multi-religion. There is a clash of civilization in the region, between western and orthodox,Turkeyis separate civilization. According to such cultural and religious variety, there is a field for cooperation betweenUkraineand other states of region targeted to monitoring and prediction of possible crisis.The Black sea region is situated on crossroads of transport routes andUkrainehas a special role in the region. However, despite some shortcomings in transit service ofUkraine, its importance is in a central position within the transport and energy sector and the interest of international actors in cooperation with it in this regard. That is whyUkraine's cooperation with countries of the region in the transport and energy sectors is important and necessary nowadays. ; Изучено современное геополитическое значение Черноморского региона для Украины и других государств мира. Рассмотрены предпосылки и факторы сотрудничества Украины в Черноморском регионе, в частности влияние социального и экономического развития, исторического прошлого, культурно-религиозных факторов и особенностей, географического и транзитного положения на состояние современных межгосударственных отношений в пределах Черноморского региона и роли этих отношений для Украины. Проанализированы перспективные направления международного сотрудничества Украины в Черноморском регионе в процессе реализации национальных интересов. ; Вивчено сучасне геополітичне значення Чорноморського регіону для України та інших держав світу. Розглянуто передумови та чинники співробітництва України у Чорноморському регіоні, зокрема вплив соціального та економічного розвитку, історичного минулого, культурно-релігійних факторів та особливостей, географічного та транзитного положення на стан сучасних міждержавних відносин у межах Чорноморського регіону та ролі цих відносин для України. Проаналізовано перспективні напрями міжнародного співробітництва України у Чорноморському регіоні у процесі реалізації національних інтересів.

The main factors and prerequisites ofUkraine's cooperation are enlightened; the role of Black sea region forUkraineand other international actors is reviewed. Therefore, the importance ofBlack seacoastal area is growing nowadays because of its natural resource potential and transit position. There are lots of factors and prerequisites forUkraine's cooperation with countries of Black sea region, among them historical, social-economic, political, cultural and religious factors, conflict situation and transit position ofUkraine. Historical factors and prerequisites are in common historic background, which influence on present development and cause common problems.Economic-social diversity of region causes lots of problems, but also a background for mutual cooperation between countries ofBlack searegion. Different levels of economic-social development, different international specialization of countries (agriculture, industry, fuel and energy) create basis for economic and trade cooperation. Also states have common social problems. Due to economic-social cooperation,Ukraineis able to resolve existing problems. Politically this region is also diversified. Some states pursue policy directed at Euro-Atlantic integration, moreover, 3 of them are members of EU and NATO (Greece,Bulgaria,Romania). Simultaneously, some countries have opposite political vector (Armenia,Azerbaijan,Georgia).Ukrainehas special interests in this field of cooperation in the case of adopting practice of EU integration and democratic standardization.Conflict situation is a very special common feature of most countries of Black sea region: Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia,South Ossetiaconflicts, the Kurdish problem.Ukraine's territory also suffered from external aggression (Donbas,Crimea). All these facts raise up the issue of mutual cooperation betweenUkraineand countries of region aimed at settlement of all disputes and solving conflicts. Cultural and religious factors and prerequisites are in great cultural and religious multitude among countries of region andUkraine. All states are multi-national and multi-religion. There is a clash of civilization in the region, between western and orthodox,Turkeyis separate civilization. According to such cultural and religious variety, there is a field for cooperation betweenUkraineand other states of region targeted to monitoring and prediction of possible crisis.The Black sea region is situated on crossroads of transport routes andUkrainehas a special role in the region. However, despite some shortcomings in transit service ofUkraine, its importance is in a central position within the transport and energy sector and the interest of international actors in cooperation with it in this regard. That is whyUkraine's cooperation with countries of the region in the transport and energy sectors is important and necessary nowadays. ; Изучено современное геополитическое значение Черноморского региона для Украины и других государств мира. Рассмотрены предпосылки и факторы сотрудничества Украины в Черноморском регионе, в частности влияние социального и экономического развития, исторического прошлого, культурно-религиозных факторов и особенностей, географического и транзитного положения на состояние современных межгосударственных отношений в пределах Черноморского региона и роли этих отношений для Украины. Проанализированы перспективные направления международного сотрудничества Украины в Черноморском регионе в процессе реализации национальных интересов. ; Вивчено сучасне геополітичне значення Чорноморського регіону для України та інших держав світу. Розглянуто передумови та чинники співробітництва України у Чорноморському регіоні, зокрема вплив соціального та економічного розвитку, історичного минулого, культурно-релігійних факторів та особливостей, географічного та транзитного положення на стан сучасних міждержавних відносин у межах Чорноморського регіону та ролі цих відносин для України. Проаналізовано перспективні напрями міжнародного співробітництва України у Чорноморському регіоні у процесі реалізації національних інтересів.

On September 19 and 20, the armed forces of Azerbaijan advanced on Nagorno-Karabakh, ending, within 24 hours, a so-called "frozen" conflict, the origins of which hearken back to 1988.[1] The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over this mountainous territory in 1992–94, and the subsequent stalemate, punctuated by several flashes of violence, led to over 30,000 casualties on both sides and the forced internal migration of over a million Azerbaijanis. The recent flight of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia has put additional stress on that country. While such conflicts rarely end quickly and neatly—it will take decades to tie up loose threads—there are already some lessons we can learn from the conflict.Lessons from the ConflictMultilateral efforts to resolve conflict are important. They conveyed to the leaders of the conflicting parties that the world and regional powers were watching and would hold them accountable. A negotiated resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was added to various governments' foreign policy goals. Regular visits to the conflicting parties served to discourage or delay any military planning. The groups of leaders and officials from the conflicting parties in Nagorno-Karabakh were relatively small and challenged with many issues at the same time, so whenever they had to deal with special negotiators from the U.S., Russia, France, and other countries, they had to put down what they were doing at the time.Michael Keays (far right) in Stepanakert/Khankendi, with U.S., Russian, and French peace process negotiators, September 1998.Image CreditThe interest and involvement of several countries in the region ensured that the conflict would not fade away and be forgotten; this is a feature of human behavior often referred to as "compassion fatigue." Consider the fact that, as of this article's publication, over 50 conflicts are currently active in the world—and that number doesn't consider non-state conflicts. Counting those, the number is well over 80. Most of these are in Africa, and coverage of them in the mainstream media is rare.[2] In the U.S., what should have been an obscure conflict occasionally received press coverage so that Americans beyond just the Armenian diaspora knew about it. Public interest tends to have an impact on whether governments make an issue a priority or not."Frozen" conflicts can flash at any moment. This is true especially if mediators are distracted. Back in the late 1990s, there was a view that someday, Azerbaijan would probably retake the Nagorno-Karabakh region by force with a modern, appropriately sized army purchased with oil money. This concern was allayed by the sense that the conflict would have to be resolved before oil from the region could get out to Western markets, something that seemed distant. That sense of distance fell apart when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was opened in 2006.[3] Once the oil started flowing, Azerbaijan's financial situation improved, and, not surprisingly, the country started working on building up its military capabilities. Seventeen years later, it found itself in a position to try to retake Nagorno-Karabakh militarily. It helped that it not only had the means but had the space, in the sense that Russia and the U.S. were focused on Russia's brutal war against Ukraine. What was considered by many experts a "frozen" conflict suddenly became hot, and then ended even more suddenly. The military resolution of the situation also reminds us that seemingly endless conflicts can actually end. Nagorno-Karabakh has gone the way of Tamil Tiger-occupied Sri Lanka, a conflict which also appeared irresolvable until 2009.[4]Money talks, and who your friends are matters. Azerbaijan slowly built up its army with the intent of taking back Armenian-occupied areas surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and the region itself. Azerbaijan's defense spending grew dramatically starting in 2004, from $144 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2008. In January 2009, Azerbaijan claimed it would increase its defense spending to $2.3 billion. It could do that because its economy was growing at an unprecedented rate. Smart spending is as important as being able to outspend your opponent. While Azerbaijan's armed forces decreased in terms of personnel from 2007 to 2019, its quality increased significantly, primarily due to assistance received from Turkey and Israel, but also the U.S. Azerbaijan Armed Forces 2007[5] 2019[6]Army: 85,000 56,000Air Force: 8,000 8,500Navy: 2,000 2,500Total personnel: 95,000 67,000In a war of attrition, numbers are significant, but in this case, the capabilities edge on the Azerbaijan side—largely due to training, military exercises, and technological force multipliers—proved to be the winning factor, even as it was on the offense and had to fight uphill. Turkey has been heavily involved in the modernization of Azerbaijan's military since 1992, and it started providing Azerbaijan more robust professional military education and access to joint training and exercises in 2010.[7] Israel also played a key role in Azerbaijan's military modernization. In 2012, Azerbaijan purchased $1.6 billion worth of weapons from Israeli Aerospace Industries, an additional $5 billion worth of weapons in 2016, and another $127 million worth of weapons in 2017.[8] Most of the purchases consisted of unmanned aircraft and satellite technology to improve battlespace awareness for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. All of this proved critical to Azerbaijan's victories on the battlefield in the fall of 2020, and then its retaking of Nagorno-Karabakh in September of this year. This also revealed the substantial weakness of Nagorno-Karabakh's defense forces and Armenia's political and logistical ties. Russia, Iran, and the worldwide Armenian diaspora—Armenia's allies and supporters and, through it, supporters of Nagorno-Karabakh—proved incapable of defending those trying to tear the region away from Azerbaijan. The wealth and generosity of your allies matter, and in this case, Azerbaijan had the better, more capable allies. President Ilham Aliyev has demonstrated that he is not as weak as observers once worried he was after the 2003 death of his father, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan's security and negotiating position are much improved now.Occupying another country's land is costly and usually ends badly. Armenia had external support from its wealthy and politically influential diasporas located in the U.S. and France, among other places. These communities did a lot to keep up the dream of an independent so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ("Artsakh," according to Armenians) alive—even at one point by financing the construction of an impressive highway linking Yerevan with Stepanakert/Khankendi—but enthusiasm, the leveraging of sympathetic politicians in important countries, and money to build roads and churches rarely change the conditions on the ground that matter in warfare. In fact, these factors can intensify the desire of refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homeland, and push for the chance to do so. Immediate LessonsBeyond the key takeaways above, we should consider three more ideas as we reflect on Azerbaijan's recent military operation in its Nagorno-Karabakh region.First, this is an opportunity for the U.S. and allies to reach out to Armenia to help it to process what just happened and support the displaced. Russia and its peacekeepers standing between the Azerbaijanis and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians clearly failed to stop Azerbaijan's offensive. Russia and Iran are increasingly becoming pariah states, given their aggression against Ukraine and Israel, respectively. They are on self-defeating trajectories. Armenia should be encouraged to further orient itself westward.Second, the inaction of Russia's peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani forces advanced might suggest to outside observers that Russia is distracted and stretched to the limits by Ukraine. In other words, Russia's ongoing occupation of parts of Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and its troops in Transnistria without the government of Moldova's consent, while long-standing, might be worth pushing against, as Russia may not be as strong as we have long believed. At least it could be perceived that way after what just transpired in Azerbaijan. This bears further analysis. In the meantime, if the U.S. and other Western countries have not yet done so, they might consider cautioning the Moldovans and Georgians not to test Russian resolve, given Mr. Putin's likely, unpredictable, and escalatory reaction to a testing of perceived Russian vulnerability. And the U.S. and others should keep an eye on Transnistria and the occupied territories Russia has been expanding in Georgia. Several recent and upcoming events concerning Moldova could provoke incidents, including the November 5 local elections, the potential parliamentary approval of Moldova's National Security Strategy (which lists Russia as its main external threat), the EU's decision about whether formal accession talks with Moldova can begin, and the renewal or expiration of the OSCE mandate in Moldova by the end of the year. It is worth remembering that Moldova is neither a member of NATO nor the EU and is not far from the Ukrainian port city of Odesa. Russia has been repeatedly targeting Odesa with missiles and drones, possibly as part of a larger effort to take Ukraine's entire Black Sea coast and link Russia up with Transnistria to Ukraine's west.Third, if the U.S. and its allies and partners have not yet done so, they should make it clear to Azerbaijan that they will be watching them in the post-conflict period. As the saying goes, they should "trust but verify." They should also warn Azerbaijan not to take military action to establish a land bridge between Azerbaijan proper and the exclave of Nakhchevan, an act which would require the seizure of Armenian territory.Michael C. Keays is a senior diplomatic fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center. While the author is on detail from the State Department to the Kennan Institute, the views are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government or the Wilson Center.[1] Vladimir Solovyov, "Azerbaijani Control of Nagorno-Karabakh Will Not Stop Conflict in the South Caucasus," Carnegie Politika, September 28, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90655[2] Anna Marie Obermeier and Siri Aas Rustad, Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2022 (Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2023), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/conflict-trends-global-overview-1946-2022#:~:text=Despite%20the%20increase%20in%20battle,in%2038%20conflict%2Daffected%20countries[3] bp Azerbaijan (website), "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline," https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/pipelines/btc.html[4] Jayshree Bajoria, "The Sri Lankan Conflict," Council on Foreign Relations, updated May 18, 2009, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sri-lankan-conflict[5] GlobalSecurity.org (website), "Azerbaijan—Introduction," https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/azerbaijan/intro.htm[6] Edward J. Erickson, "The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art?" Military Review, August 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2021-OLE/Erickson/[7] Haldun Yalçınkaya, "Turkey's Overlooked Role in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War," GMF (German Marshall Fund), January 21, 2021, https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkeys-overlooked-role-second-nagorno-karabakh-war[8] Erickson, "The 44-Day War."

The purpose of the research is a comparative juxtaposition of facts, assessments derived from the Ukrainian and Russian periodicals, materials of online publications concerning the causes of the Russian-Moldovan conflict in 1992. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, systematicity, scientificity, verification, authorial objectivity, as well as on the historical method and methods of analysis, synthesis and generalization. The historical method was used to study the events that took place in Moldova in 1992. Owing to the method of analysis and synthesis, the causes of the conflict itself and the proof by scientific means were identified. The method of generalization formed a general vision of the problem, the results of the study became the basis for the conclusions. The scientific novelty is that for the first time a comprehensive analysis of information and scientific research in Ukrainian and Russian historiography concerning the topic of the Russian-Moldovan conflict of 1992 was carried out, and the main reasons were also clarified and enumerated, which contributed to the development and actions of the above-mentioned conflict. The Conclusions. The main causes of the Russian-Moldovan conflict, which in fact became the first hybrid confrontation between the countries neighboring Ukraine, in the Ukrainian and Russian historiographical discourse can be considered a number of factors, including the collapse of the USSR and the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, which opened diverse new explosive situations in the territories of the former republics, including Moldova; crisis of the world political system; linguistic and geopolitical factor; economic factor. In general, the Russian-Moldovan conflict at the current stage of development of international relations is considered to be "frozen" and incomplete due to the unwillingness of the current authorities in Moldova to resolve the situation radically and the intervention and incitement of the conflict by the representatives of other states that are interested in its existence. Key words: Ukraine, Moldova, historiography, causes of the conflict, post-Soviet space, Transnistria. ; Мета дослідження полягає у компаративному зіставленні фактів, оцінок, почерпнутих з української та російської періодики, матеріалів інтернет-видань стосовно причин початку російсько-молдовського конфлікту 1992 р. Методологія дослідження базована на принципах історизму, системності, науковості, верифікації, авторської об'єктивності, а також на історичному методі та методах аналізу, синтезу та узагальнення. Історичний метод застосовувався при дослідженні подій, які відбувалися на території Молдови у 1992 р. Завдяки методу аналізу і синтезу були виокремлені причини виникнення самого конфлікту та їх доведення науковими засобами. Методом узагальнення було сформоване загальне бачення проблеми, отримані результати наукових студій стали основою висновків. Наукова новизна полягає у тому, що вперше здійснено сукупний аналіз інформації та наукових розвідок в українській та російській історіографії на тему російсько-молдовського конфлікту 1992 р., а також з'ясовано і названо основні причини, які сприяли розгортанню та дії вищезазначеного конфлікту. Висновки. Основними причинами виникнення російсько-молдовського конфлікту, який фактично став першим гібридним протистоянням між країнами, сусідніми з Україною, в українському та російському історіографічному дискурсі вважають низку чинників, серед яких: розпад Союзу Радянських Соціалістичних Республік (СРСР) та ліквідація Варшавського договору відкрили багато нових вибухонебезпечних ситуацій на територіях колишніх республік, включаючи Молдову; криза політичної системи світу; мовний і геополітичний чинники; економічний чинник. Загалом російсько-молдовський конфлікт на сучасному етапі розвитку міжнародних відносин як через небажання чвинної влади у Молдові радикально врегулювати означену ситуацію, так і через втручання тарозпалення конфлікту представниками інших держав, зацікавлених у подальшому його існуванні, вважається "замороженим" та незавершеним. Ключові слова: Україна, Молдова, історіографія, причини конфлікту, пострадянський простір, Придністров'я.