Regulation of Sponsors in China: Political Will, Regulators' Desire and Market Demands
In: Hong Kong Law Journal 48 (1) 2018
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In: Hong Kong Law Journal 48 (1) 2018
SSRN
In: Market Integration: The EU Experience and Implications for Regulatory Reform in China; China-EU Law Series, S. 165-180
In: Land use policy: the international journal covering all aspects of land use, Band 139, S. 107071
ISSN: 0264-8377
In: Habitat international: a journal for the study of human settlements, Band 131, S. 102728
In: Environmental science and pollution research: ESPR, Band 28, Heft 37, S. 51453-51470
ISSN: 1614-7499
In: IJDRR-D-22-01527
SSRN
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 234-248
ISSN: 1467-8683
AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueThe Chinese government regulates on the adoption of cumulative voting (CV) in order to protect minority shareholders by allowing them to elect a dissident director. However, adopting CV may deter potential acquirers, reducing the effectiveness of corporate takeover as a governance mechanism. Even worse, lacking enforcement of CV adoption allows firms to adopt CV when they need to deter potential acquirers.Research Findings/InsightsFirst, we find CV adopters have better governance overall, but also have tightened control such as higher ownership concentration. This evidence hints that when a firm adopts better governance to signal the market, it may tighten control in other ways such as increasing shareholder power and adopting CV. Second, we distinguish the role of CV in investor protection by examining its competing effects on tunneling and antitakeover. We find that CV does not reduce tunneling but lowers the probability of CEO turnover and of the firm becoming a takeover target. These results indicate that CV is used as an antitakeover measure in family‐controlled listed companies. Finally, we find that adopting CV has no impact on company performance.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur evidence sheds light on the incentives embedded in the ownership structure that can determine the governance mechanism in family firms.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsSince 2002, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission requires firms with a controlling shareholder holding more than 30 percent of shares to adopt CV. Our study shows that this policy has unintended consequences and does not always protect minority shareholders.
In: Journal of development economics, Band 160, S. 102979
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Nanyang Business School Research Paper No. 22-26
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In: Children and youth services review: an international multidisciplinary review of the welfare of young people, Band 128, S. 106184
ISSN: 0190-7409
In: Children and youth services review: an international multidisciplinary review of the welfare of young people, Band 127, S. 106073
ISSN: 0190-7409
In: Environmental science and pollution research: ESPR, Band 28, Heft 30, S. 41255-41267
ISSN: 1614-7499
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of developmental and physical disabilities, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 339-354
ISSN: 1573-3580
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