Suchergebnisse

Most high-profile disasters are followed by demands for an investigation into what went wrong. Even before they start, calls for finding the missed warning signs and an explanation for why people did not "connect the dots" will be common. Unfortunately, however, the same combination of political pressures and the failure to adopt good social science methods that contributed to the initial failure usually lead to postmortems that are badly flawed. The high stakes mean that powerful actors will have strong incentives to see that certain conclusions are-and are not-drawn. Most postmortems also are marred by strong psychological biases, especially the assumption that incorrect inferences must have been the product of wrong ways of thinking, premature cognitive closure, the naive use of hindsight, and the neglect of the comparative method. Given this experience, I predict that the forthcoming inquiries into the January 6, 2021, storming of the US Capitol and the abrupt end to the Afghan government will stumble in many ways.

President Trump and IR theory / Robert Jervis -- What is IR theory good for? / Michael N. Barnett -- Why Trump now : a third-image explanation / Randall L. Schweller -- The Donald versus 'the blob' / Stephen M. Walt -- Has liberal internationalism been Trumped? / Joshua Busby and Jonathan Monten -- Down but not out : a liberal international American foreign policy / Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner, and Dustin Tingley -- Does structure Trump all? : a test of agency in world politics / Brian Rathbun -- Liberal internationalism, public opinion, and partisan conflict in the US / Robert Y. Shapiro -- Trump against American exceptionalism : the sources of Trumpian conduct / Stephen Wertheim -- This is what nationalism looks like / Thomas W. Zeiler -- The appeal of 'America first' / John A. Thompson -- The waning of the post-war order : historical reflections on 2016 and the emergence of a twenty first-century world order / T.G. Otte -- The failed promises of 1989 and the politics of 2016 / Jonathan Sperber -- Trump's ascendancy as history / Ryan Irwin -- Assessing Trump's emerging counterterrorism policy / Daniel Byman -- The 'global order' myth / Andrew J. Bacevich -- Donald Trump and NATO : historic alliance meets a-historic president / Stanley R. Sloan -- The art of the bluff : the U.S.-Japan alliance under the Trump administration / Jennifer Lind -- Latin America : asymmetry and the problem of influence / Tom Long and Max Paul Friedman -- Historical legacies of United States policy in the Middle East / James R. Stocker -- Donald Trump and the Middle East / F. Gregory Gause, III -- U.S.-Russia relations unhinged / Robert Legvold -- The view from the Asia-Pacific : loose nukes and loose cannons / Priscilla Roberts -- The future of the Atlantic alliance under President Trump / William R. Keylor -- The United States and the global human rights order / Mark Philip Bradley -- Donald Trump and the irrelevance of human rights / Samuel Moyn -- Donald Trump and the "paranoid style" in American (intellectual) politics / Leo P. Ribuffo -- Leaking about Donald Trump in the age of fake news / Sam Lebovic -- Why does Donald Trump have so much trouble with the truth? / John Schuessler -- Is Donald Trump Jimmy Carter, or is he Kaiser Wilhelm II? / Nancy Mitchell -- Aristocracy, oligarchy, and Donald Trump / Arthur Eckstein -- Trumpism, history, and the future of US foreign relations / Frank Ninkovich

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- PART I. Political Psychology -- 1. Understanding Beliefs -- 2. The Drunkard's Search -- PART II. Heuristics and Biases -- 3. Representativeness, Foreign Policy Judgments, and Theory‑Driven Perceptions -- 4. Prospect Theory: The Political Implications of Loss Aversion -- PART III. Political Psychology and International Relations Theory -- 5. Signaling and Perception: Projecting Images and Drawing Inferences -- 6. Political Psychology Research and Theory: Bridges and Barriers -- 7. Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash -- 8. Identity and the Cold War -- PART IV. Psychology and National Security -- 9. Deterrence and Perception -- 10. Psychology and Crisis Stability -- 11. Domino Beliefs -- 12. Perception, Misperception, and the End of the Cold War -- Index

This study of perception and misperception in foreign policy was a landmark in the application of cognitive psychology to political decision making. The "New York Times" called it, in an article published nearly ten years after the book's appearance, "the seminal statement of principles underlying political psychology." The perspective established by Jervis remains an important counterpoint to structural explanations of international politics, and from it has developed a large literature on the psychology of leaders and the problems of decision making under conditions of incomplete information, stress, and cognitive bias. Jervis begins by describing the process of perception (for example, how decision makers learn from history) and then explores common forms of misperception (such as overestimating one's influence). Finally, he tests his ideas through a number of important events in international relations from nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history. In a contemporary application of Jervis's ideas, some argue that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 in part because he misread the signals of American leaders with regard to the independence of Kuwait. Also, leaders of the United States and Iraq in the run-up to the most recent Gulf War might have been operating under cognitive biases that made them value certain kinds of information more than others, whether or not the information was true. Jervis proved that, once a leader believed something, that perception would influence the way the leader perceived all other relevant information. -- Publisher description

To say that the world changed drastically on 9/11 has become a truism and even a cliché. But the incontestable fact is that a new era for both the world and US foreign policy began on that infamous day and the ramifications for international politics have been monumental.In this book, one of the leading thinkers in international relations, Robert Jervis, provides us with several snapshots of world politics over the past few years. Jervis brings his acute analysis of international politics to bear on several recent developments that have transformed international politics and American foreign p

Preface and acknowledgements / Demetrios James Caraley -- Introduction / Robert Jervis -- American ways of foreign policy and foreign responses -- The lessons of September 11, Iraq, and the American pendulum / Christopher Hemmer -- From the "red juggernaut" to Iraqi WMD: threat inflation and how it succeeds in the United States / Jeffrey M. Cavanaugh -- The rise of a European defense / Seth G. Jones -- The neoconservative heritage and its flaws -- "The civilization of clashes": misapplying the democratic peace in the Middle East / Piki Ish-shalom -- Credibility and the war on terror / Christopher J. Fettweis -- Human rights and civil liberties -- U.S. human rights policy in the post-Cold War era / John W. Dietrich -- The rhetoric of genocide in U.S. foreign policy: Rwanda and Darfur compared / Eric A. Heinze -- Tragic choices in the war on terrorism: should we try to regulate and control torture? / Jerome Slater

To say that the world changed drastically on 9/11 has become a truism and even a cliché. But the incontestable fact is that a new era for both the world and US foreign policy began on that infamous day and the ramifications for international politics have been monumental.In this book, one of the leading thinkers in international relations, Robert Jervis, provides us with several snapshots of world politics over the past few years. Jervis brings his acute analysis of international politics to bear on several recent developments that have transformed international politics and American f.

Based on more than three decades of observation, Robert Jervis concludes in this book that the very foundation of many social science theories - especially those in political science - are faulty. Taking insights from complexity theory as his point of departure, the author observes that we live in a world where things are interconnected, where unintended consequences of our actions are unavoidable and unpredictable, and where the total effect of behavior is not equal to the sum of individual actions. Jervis draws on a wide range of human endeavors to illustrate the nature of these system effects. He shows how increasing airport security might actually cost lives, not save them, and how removing dead trees (ostensibly to give living trees more room) may damage the health of an entire forest

Based on more than three decades of observation, Robert Jervis concludes in this book that the very foundation of many social science theories - especially those in political science - are faulty. Taking insights from complexity theory as his point of departure, the author observes that we live in a world where things are interconnected, where unintended consequences of our actions are unavoidable and unpredictable, and where the total effect of behavior is not equal to the sum of individual actions. Jervis draws on a wide range of human endeavors to illustrate the nature of these system effects. He shows how increasing airport security might actually cost lives, not save them, and how removing dead trees (ostensibly to give living trees more room) may damage the health of an entire forest

Based on more than three decades of observation, Robert Jervis concludes in this book that the very foundation of many social science theories - especially those in political science - are faulty. Taking insights from complexity theory as his point of departure, the author observes that we live in a world where things are interconnected, where unintended consequences of our actions are unavoidable and unpredictable, and where the total effect of behavior is not equal to the sum of individual actions. Jervis draws on a wide range of human endeavors to illustrate the nature of these system effects. He shows how increasing airport security might actually cost lives, not save them, and how removing dead trees (ostensibly to give living trees more room) may damage the health of an entire forest.