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Nothing compels the reexamination of basic constitutional postulates so much as the possibility of their peaceful revision. Hence the much-advertised United Nations Review Conference underscores the need for contrasting the theoretical structure of the Charter with the reality of the practices which have evolved within its framework. Such an effort, while it might give support to those who strive for severe alterations of the structure, may also lead to the conclusion that even though the operational practices of international organization fail to meet the specifications of the Charter, peace might be more secure in the Cold War era if it is permitted to depend on operational vagaries rather than on legal precision. What, then, is the basic theory of the Charter and what the actual practice?

The surface indices of political life in Germany suggest that that nation has embarked upon a moderate pro-European and pro-Western course, and that political extremism and nationalism have no significant appeal at the present time. Thus the elections of 1953 produced an overwhelming majority for the "moderate" parties. Neither the Communist Party nor specifically neo-Nazi formations attained significant votes or representation in the Bundestag in the election of that year. On the whole, the statements made by governmental, political, and interest group leaders have been cautious and responsible. Occasional manifestations of neo-Nazism have been local and limited in character. There is no evidence to suggest that such tendencies have widespread organized support either aboveground or underground.

It is only natural that a period anxiously seeking to wrest peace from the threat of nuclear extinction should look nostalgically to the last great successful effort to settle international disputes by means of a diplomatic conference, the Congress of Vienna. Nothing is more tempting than to ascribe its achievements to the very process of negotiation, to diplomatic skill, and to "willingness to come to an agreement"—and nothing is more dangerous. For the effectiveness of diplomacy depends on elements transcending it; in part on the domestic structure of the states comprising the international order, in part on their power relationship.

Reliable disarmament, particularly of nuclear weapons, requires inspection and control, which in turn require much mutual trust. None of this is yet in sight. Disarmament of nuclear weapons is therefore still a long way off, although a measure of conventional disarmament may be nearer.

While much is known about the impact of bombing on an economy's material ability to produce—in terms of the physical survival of resources—comparatively little thought has been devoted to the broader social consequences of truly major bombing. The social and political consequences, however, may well dominate the material or more narrowly economic ones; resources potentially of value may either remain unutilized or may be improperly or anti-socially employed, as a result of the impairment or collapse of our accepted processes of social decision. Our purpose here is to attempt to explore the social consequences of a major bombing disaster by an examination of the effects of bombing upon the organization of society, upon the distribution of political and economic power, and upon institutions relevant to the effective functioning of society. Needless to say, we can only make preliminary or tentative conjectures (or, rather, speculations), in view of the complexity of the subject and the limited degree of historical knowledge of the functioning of human societies under conditions of extreme stress. Nevertheless, it seems desirable to explore these questions—since the answers may have important implications for prewar planning designed to promote the ability of our society to cope with such disasters.

There is general agreement among Western scholars that the modern totalitarian state is distinguished in part by its possession of a unitary and systematically elaborated ideology. While it will be found that expert opinions vary considerably in regard to the importance of the role played by ideology in the origin and continuation of totalitarianism, there is little question but that the ruling power of the totalitarian society is not indifferent to the relationship between national ideology and popular attitudes. Indeed, history shows that the rulers of twentieth-century totalitarian states have devoted considerable effort to the development among their citizenries of attitudes of acceptance toward the social philosophies and goals associated with their regimes.

NO analyst of Soviet Communism has failed to express surprise that a Marxist movement should have triumphed in a prevailingly agrarian society. Equally trite has been the observation that the Russian Marxists have not been able to solve the problem of the peasant and his full integration into their socialist system. Marx was a city boy, we are told, and that is why Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has to spend his time discussing the failure of Soviet agriculture to keep up with the industrial sector of the economy. We are left with a truly confusing picture. Marxism, on its own premises designed as a movement for fully industrialized societies, comes to power or is a serious contender for power in societies that are mainly agrarian, while mature industrial countries adhere perversely to something (but something that is definitely non-Marxist) variously described as "the social welfare state," "liberal capitalism," and the like. Perhaps Marx was wrong and—for reasons unforeseen by him—his system is peculiarly suitable to what we now term "backward" countries, with predominantly agrarian economies and a low standard of living. Then why cannot Marxism solve its central problem of the agrarian economy? Or is it perhaps merely one form of Marxism—Soviet Communism—which is thus incapacitated? No wonder that scholars, first secretaries, and the rest of us tend to become confused.

HUNDREDS of books have been written to describe the ways in which particular groups or individuals have come to exercise domination over large numbers of their fellows. Despite this tempting wealth of factual material, or perhaps because of it, modern social science has very largely avoided any attempt to discover and explain, within a strictly empirical framework, what recurring patterns there may be in these myriads of events. The following pages represent a very modest effort in this direction.If there is indeed a distinguishable process of acquiring power, or, as is more likely, a series of such processes, the attempt to distinguish them must be formulated in terms of a time sequence. It should indicate the conditions in the society as a whole that lead to a concentration of power. In addition, it should indicate the sequence of stages through which the concentration takes place.

WITHIN the past year, the Italian government has revealed a ten-year program, known as the Vanoni Plan, for the development of the Italian economy. By the investment of $56 billion, the government hopes to conquer the problem of chronic unemployment and to revitalize the laggard southern regionof the country. The plan is a bold and imaginative one, replete with government controls, and probably too optimistic. Nonetheless, it has forcefully drawn international attention to Italy's basic economic problems. Hence it is opportune to examine those problems against the perspective of what has been attained by the Italian economy in the past ten years.Compared with northwest Europe, Italy has always been economically poor. Capital is much scarcer and the endowment of natural resources is much less favorable. Deposits of coal and metallic minerals are negligible or lacking, though natural gas production is growing and petroleum has recently been discovered. Arable land is poor in average quality. Only 1.78 hectares areavailable per person engaged in agriculture, one-third less than in France, while total arableland is one-quarter below France although the population of Italy is 10 per cent larger (47.1 million in 1951).