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Abstract
When Marx dissected the capitalist economy and intervened in the international workers' movement, he did so in the service of freeing people from alien, uncontrolled power. His political project was the realisation of what he called the social republic, and his theoretical project was to identify the forces that promote or retard this political project. In order to bring out the specificity and cogency of the social-republican Marx, this essay uproots the positive-freedom reading that has overgrown the edifice of his thought. Marx certainly hoped for 'real freedom', which is a sort of self-realisation. He also hoped for a sort of collective self-determination. And he thought that collective self-determination was a prerequisite for general self-realisation. But Marx also thought that generalised freedom from domination was a prerequisite for collective self-determination.

The problem of the choice of methods of knowledge of legal reality, including criminal law and legal relations, is considered from the standpoint of the possibility of applying the tools and techniques of metaphysics – the science of being and existence. Legal reality, as an independent phenomenon genesis, attributed both to the intersubjective reality that a person is going through and so shared with other people, and to its opposite - monosubjective reality.

This essay analyzes modern and postmodern concepts of freedom and contrasts them to a Heideggerian understanding. Positive, negative, and what might be called Foucaultian or Nietzschean liberty are demonstrated to bear a common trait. In such modern and postmodern formulations, freedom is consistently identified with a form of mastery. This identification of freedom with mastery, I argue, encourages ecological abuse, supports the dangerous prerogatives of statist sovereignty, and strengthens the resilience of patriarchy. The political significance of Heidegger's alternative vision is addressed.

Philosophisch

This paper discusses certain anti-metaphysical readings of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The metaphysical and anti-metaphysical readings can be divided on the interpretations of textual fidelity. The anti-metaphysical readings can be differentiated in taking into account two different understandings with regard to Wittgenstein's pronouncement of nonsense in Tractatus. One is the logical positivists' understanding of nonsense and the other is the resolute reading of the text that emerged as an opposite to the orthodox or standard reading. The aim of discussing these anti-metaphysical readings is to highlight whether a metaphysical reading is possible.