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Abstract
The increasingly fraught relationship between trade and security has manifested through expanding conceptions of security to include notions of economic self-sufficiency. Some suggest that this trend will be accelerated by COVID-19 to permanently enshrine exceptionalism in trade ('pandemic exceptionalism'), arguably enabling invocations of the security exception to justify potentially protectionist measures where it is considered, by an invoking WTO Member, as necessary to protect its 'essential security interests'. This article explores the security implications of the pandemic's disruption of international supply chains and growing calls to 'reshore' production in order to examine whether COVID-19 could enable an indefinite expansion of the security exception under Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. The analysis contrasts the subjective and objective elements of Article XXI(b)(iii) to highlight the role of judicial settlement and objective determination in imposing legal limits on 'pandemic exceptionalism'.

Considers the French policy of cultural protectionism in relation to the film industry as an example of general support for the cultural exception. The elements of French film protectionism are laid out before assessing the policy intent & accomplishments. In this light, the tangible & intangible assets protected by these protectionist policies are examined. The achievement of these policies with respect to consumer interests is then looked at in terms of how they serve national identity. Following this, three arguments in favor of cultural protectionism are posited. It is concluded that the political & ethical costs of such a policy are troubling. 3 Tables, 35 References. J. Zendejas

European Law seems quite reluctant to trigger the opposite side of liberalism under the general term of protectionism. Thus, the legal and fiscal demonstrations of this type of protectionism from the EU do exist, as various in quality as in intensity, and challenge the lawyer towards the goal achieved by the sovereign entity that implements it. Willing to protect a proper and superior interest within its boundaries or willing to dominate world trade with defence instruments supporting trade war, can protectionism be lawfully based or economically and politically valuable? Is the combination possible? In a prospective way, sustainable development requirement contained in Union law, which goes increasingly relevant with regards to ecological crisis, urges the lawyer to rethink protectionism under a sustainable way that exceeds the only economical dimension. This research is dedicated to solving these hypotheses, with assumed – but nuanced – annoyance with Union law economic freedoms of movement. ; Le droit de l'Union semble fondamentalement réticent à la résurgence du pendant antagoniste du libre-échange sous le vocable générique de protectionnisme. Pourtant, les manifestations juridiques et fiscales de ce protectionnisme de l'Union existent, variées en qualité et en intensité, et interpellent le juriste quant à la finalité poursuivie par l'entité souveraine qui le met en œuvre. Volonté de protection d'un intérêt propre et supérieur à l'intérieur de ses frontières ou volonté de domination du commerce international par le truchement d'instruments de défense mis au service d'une guerre commerciale, le protectionnisme peut-il être juridiquement fondé ou économiquement et politiquement opportun ? La combinaison est-elle possible ? De manière prospective, l'exigence de développement durable intégrée dans le droit de l'Union, dont la pertinence s'affirme à la lumière de la crise écologique, exhorte le juriste à penser le protectionnisme sous un angle durable dépassant la simple dimension économique. C'est à ces ...

European Law seems quite reluctant to trigger the opposite side of liberalism under the general term of protectionism. Thus, the legal and fiscal demonstrations of this type of protectionism from the EU do exist, as various in quality as in intensity, and challenge the lawyer towards the goal achieved by the sovereign entity that implements it. Willing to protect a proper and superior interest within its boundaries or willing to dominate world trade with defence instruments supporting trade war, can protectionism be lawfully based or economically and politically valuable? Is the combination possible? In a prospective way, sustainable development requirement contained in Union law, which goes increasingly relevant with regards to ecological crisis, urges the lawyer to rethink protectionism under a sustainable way that exceeds the only economical dimension. This research is dedicated to solving these hypotheses, with assumed – but nuanced – annoyance with Union law economic freedoms of movement. ; Le droit de l'Union semble fondamentalement réticent à la résurgence du pendant antagoniste du libre-échange sous le vocable générique de protectionnisme. Pourtant, les manifestations juridiques et fiscales de ce protectionnisme de l'Union existent, variées en qualité et en intensité, et interpellent le juriste quant à la finalité poursuivie par l'entité souveraine qui le met en œuvre. Volonté de protection d'un intérêt propre et supérieur à l'intérieur de ses frontières ou volonté de domination du commerce international par le truchement d'instruments de défense mis au service d'une guerre commerciale, le protectionnisme peut-il être juridiquement fondé ou économiquement et politiquement opportun ? La combinaison est-elle possible ? De manière prospective, l'exigence de développement durable intégrée dans le droit de l'Union, dont la pertinence s'affirme à la lumière de la crise écologique, exhorte le juriste à penser le protectionnisme sous un angle durable dépassant la simple dimension économique. C'est à ces hypothèses, en contrariété assumée – mais nuancée – avec les libertés de circulation irriguant le droit de l'Union, que cette recherche est consacrée.

Due to its importance to food security and employment, the agricultural sector is a source of international conflict and inherently vulnerable to shocks and insecurities in the past and present. Accordingly, nation-states view respective domesticagricultural sectors as an exception, which meritsprotectionism and which needs protection from the rigors of free market forces and international competition withoutincurring heavy social, economic and political costs. For that matter, states traditionally impose protectionist measures to guard domestic agricultural sectors from external shocks. Paradoxically, the implementation of widespread protectionist measures has led to increasing volatilities in the supply and demand of agricultural commodities, e.g. by causing subsidized surplus stock (Friedmann 1982: 86). Against the backdrop of deep structural frictions and the implementation of pervasive protectionist measures, intergovernmental organizations aim to liberalize the global governance of trade in agriculture.

ABSTRACTDiscriminatory protectionist policies in the 1930s are assumed to have led to a collapse of multilateral trading patterns. This paper examines the trends in bilateralism during the interwar period for a sample of ten countries. The findings show that, with the exception of Germany between 1934 and 1938, the level of bilateralism fluctuated but did not see a significant trend increase in the period of increased protectionism during the 1930s.

Binding minimum wages of whatever form not only cost jobs, they also frequently fail to achieve their generally socio-politically motivated objectives. The introduction of a minimum wage for some postal services and the decisions made by the coalition committee in June 2007 therefore constitute economic policy failures of a grand scale. The negative employment effects of binding minimum wages are well documented in the literature. Specific exceptions do not alter this. This negative verdict also applies to the implicit minimum wages that already exist in Germany. The law on the posting of workers as the vehicle to introduce a minimum wage constitutes a protectionist measure and gives rise to diverse evasive reactions. The recommendation is: hands off the minimum wage.

Most favoured nation (mfn) clauses, extending the benefits of the most favoured nation to the treaty partner, have existed since at least the 11th century. From the 18th century on, mfn clauses were frequently included in trade agreements. The widespread use of the mfn principle has furthered the equal treatment of nations and created prosperity and peace. In the multilateral framework of the World Trade Organization (wto), the mfn principle is a cornerstone, with only few exceptions to it. This article reviews the development of the mfn clause in major trade agreements in relation to historical events from 1648 onwards. The aim of this study is to determine what the consequences of protectionism, measured by unequal treatment of trading partners and protectionist policies has been in the past.

The primary objective of most trade agreements is to restrain members' use of trade policies for protectionist purposes. But it would be pointless to restrict the application of border instruments without regulating the possible use of domestic policies for protectionist purpose. To this end, most agreements include an obligation for National Treatment (NT) of foreign products. The NT provision in the GATT appears in Art. III, which applies to most government actions that have impact trade. It requires that imported products be treated as favorably by domestic policy as similar, indigenous products. This study offers suggestions based on legal and economic analysis about how this vaguely-formulated provision ought to be interpreted. The study first examines the purposes of Art. III, as it appears from an economic point of view, as well as from its negotiating record. It also examines the case law, arguing that the absence of a coherent methodology implies that it is often unclear whether case law interpretations of the key terms promote the intended objectives of the provision. The study then identifies two alternative approaches that might be used to interpret Art. III, and its interplay with the general exceptions clause in Art. XX GATT. The first approach only requires that the products are in sufficiently close potential or actual competition in the market, in a case where an imported product is given a less favourable treatment than a domestic product. The second approach requires additionally that the importing country has no policy rationale other than protectionism for treating the two products differently. The main difference between the two approaches is that under the former, the protectionism test occurs if/when an Art. XX exception is requested, while the latter approach mandates that the protectionism test should be performed as part of the evaluation of the alleged violation of Art. III. As discussed in the study, the second, and favored, approach provides a more permissive regime for domestic policy instruments.

Recent economic sanctions imposed by the EU and US on Russia in relation to the Ukrainian conflict revived a discussion concerning the security exception clauses in international law. These clauses permit a particular state to take action aimed at protection of its national security that might be otherwise inconsistent with its substantive treaty obligations. Taking into account the ambiguity of such clauses, the question arises as to how to verify whether the adopted sanctions are indeed introduced with national security in mind and not to pursue pure protectionist aims. This article examines the national margin of appreciation from the perspective of its suitability as a standard of review for sanctions introduced under umbrella of the security exception provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Since this doctrine was developed in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights both academics and practitioners alike are undecided as to its application in international trade and investment law disputes. In search of inspiration for an appropriate standard of review, the article briefly analyses recent Court of Justice of the European Union cases dealing with the security exception provisions. Drawing from the analysis of the relevant case-law of the international tribunals, the research points out that despite its frequent use by the European Court of Human Rights this doctrine remains vague, which, in turn, makes it hard to transplant to international economic law. The author concludes that the abstract contours of the national margin of appreciation doctrine, combined with diverging goals of the European Convention on Human Rights and world trade systems, make it unsuited for review of economic sanctions.

Labor governments since the early 20th Century have consistently attempted to boost business profits. The way they have done so has changed but their policies have been consistently shaped by both the shifting requirements of Australian capitalism and the ALP's nature as a capitalist workers party. From the 1940s until the early 1970s, Labor advocated a program of Keynesian and protectionist economics. As the economics profession turned against protectionism, the Whitlam Government sought to integrate Australian capitalism more closely with the global economy. The Hawke and Keating Governments went much further in opening the economy, deregulating, privatizing and corporatizing than their conservative predecessor. In most areas, with the notable exception of industrial relations, they generally acted in line with the new, neo-liberal orthodoxy in economics. The logic of the Rudd and Gillard Governments' responses to the global economic crisis, invoking a mixture of neo-liberal and Keynesian precepts, like the economic policies of its Labor predecessors, can only be grasped in terms of the ALP's distinctive material constitution.

Labor governments since the early 20th Century have consistently attempted to boost business profits. The way they have done so has changed but their policies have been consistently shaped by both the shifting requirements of Australian capitalism and the ALP's nature as a capitalist workers party. From the 1940s until the early 1970s, Labor advocated a program of Keynesian and protectionist economics. As the economics profession turned against protectionism, the Whitlam Government sought to integrate Australian capitalism more closely with the global economy. The Hawke and Keating Governments went much further in opening the economy, deregulating, privatizing and corporatizing than their conservative predecessor. In most areas, with the notable exception of industrial relations, they generally acted in line with the new, neo-liberal orthodoxy in economics. The logic of the Rudd and Gillard Governments' responses to the global economic crisis, invoking a mixture of neo-liberal and Keynesian precepts, like the economic policies of its Labor predecessors, can only be grasped in terms of the ALP's distinctive material constitution.

"Since the founding of the Latin American republics, and probably in the future will continue in the same way, the history of the region has been characterized by the permanent traffic between the application of policies and economic models of state-protectionist and liberal orientation. Bolivia could not be an exception, its economic history also shows this swing change. From time to time, the pendulum orientation of economic policy varies between estatismoproteccionismo and liberalism. In our country since 2006, the pendulum has swung toward estatistaproteccionista policy, shifting to liberalism, which is implemented with enthusiasm and assuming you are innovating when in fact the only thing that changed are the historical contexts, actors and decision makers. Estatistasproteccionistas that implemented the plans, programs and projects from the forties to mid-eighties of the twentieth century, have died, and liberals who emerged in the second half of the 1980s are not the same as those who made decisions between 1900 and thirties of the twentieth century. Of course, as Keynes "In the long run we are all dead." Whereas at the moment the direction of economic policy is protectionist and statist-liberal experience is recent, the Foundation has been deemed appropriate to objectively compare the economic performance of the two models. To this end it has convened a group of economists who have significant experience in economic analysis, both in Bolivia and abroad, for the development of the work and respective comments. Addition were chosen considering their ideological orientation, among estatistasproteccionistas and liberals, so the establishment of analysts and commentators is balanced. Each work written by a professional government guidance, was commented on by another liberal. Also, articles from liberal economists were discussed by economists statist tradition ... Napoleon T. Pacheco ..."-- http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.fundacion-milenio.org/Libros/estatismo-y-liberalismo-experiencias-en-desarrolo.html&prev=/search%3Fq%3DEstatismo%2By%2Bliberalismo%26biw%3D1456%26bih%3D754 (translation as viewed on June 6, 2014)