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"The Vlaams Belang (VBel), and its predecessor the Vlaams Blok (VB), originally emerged out of Opposition among some Flemish nationalists to the pragmatism of the Volksunie (VU) on the issue of the territorial organisation of political authority in Belgium. The VB in its earliest incarnation thus espoused an uncompromising position on Flemish independence as its raison d'être. By the 1990s, however, the VB had supplemented its territorial demands with rhetoric typical of the radical right, characterised by opposition to immigration and Islamophobia. It was this, rather than the party's nationalist positions, that provided the Basis for rapid and substantial electoral growth, making the VB a highly relevant actor in Flemish and Belgian politics. Contrary to other case studies included in this volume, however, electoral success has not translated into office success; the refusal of other political forces to cooperate with the VB has excluded the party from power. The party's policy impact thus relates to its blackmail potential, with its strategy of protest from the Opposition having indelibly shaped the coalition behaviour of its partisan rivals. The threat of illegalisation in 2004 that prompted the VB to change its name to the VBel did not undermine the party's relevance within the political system. More recently, however, the party's successful pursuit of vote-maximisation and policy influence has come to an end. Electoral decline since 2007 has posed new questions about the VBel's political strategy, programme and leadership. Increased competition on its autonomist flank, as well as a questioning of the value of the party's status of permanent opposition, suggest that the VBel faces new dilemmas about its political raison d'être. This chapter aims to examine the developments that have led the VBel to this point, in order to better understand what the future may hold for a party that has always been highly adept at straddling the boundary between autonomist and radical right party." (author's abstract)

An analysis of the Belgium elections of 2007, stating that winning or losing has more to do with the year of comparison than the actual numbers and percentages. The elections for Chamber and Senate were kept separate from regional elections (2006 city council and county council; 2004 European and regional elections). An analysis too of the somewhat peculiar subsequent follow-up on the elections, with an unprecedented long formation-period, and equally unprecedented disputes between Flemish and French-speaking Belgians. Tables, References. O. van Zijl

AGALEV & LCOLO, the two Belgian green parties, went into government in 1999. Although they compete in two different party systems, the complex Belgian political structure allowed them to join forces & to reach the threshold of government participation. Once in government, the attitudes & strategies of AGALEV & ECOLO differed. The results, however, are nearly the same: low impact on government policy but an expansion & broadening of the scope of their activities & their network of potential allies. Both green parties have proved that they are able to govern & that they will maintain their potential in office for the foreseeable future. 1 Table, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

The municipalities in the Capital Region of Brussels have the same legal statuts as the other Belgian municipalities. Yet the political reality is quite different, and requires a different approach. Three specific aspects of the Brussels municipalities are discussed. They are bilingual, which leads to very specific strategical problems. Moreover the power relations between parties fluctuate a lot in Brussels. And finally the small size of the Region leads to an incremental 'emptying' of a number of local competencies by the powerfull political executive of the Region.