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Background: One expected consequence of population aging in Europe is the shrinkage of the labor force. Most existing labor force projections allow only inferences about the size and age structure of the future labor force. Objective: In comparison to existing labor force projections, which disaggregate only by age and sex, these projections include information about the highest level of educational attainment (tertiary vs. non-tertiary education), so that an additional level of heterogeneity in labor force participation is considered. This heterogeneity enters the projection methodology through population projection data as well as labor force participation data, since both components are decomposed in the three dimensions of age, sex, and education. Based on data from the European Labor Force Survey (EU LFS), three scenarios were designed to project the economically active population for 26 EU countries up to 2053. Results: Adding the educational dimension to labor force projections discloses a significant shift towards tertiary education degrees between 2008 and 2053. This educational upgrading of the European labor force is not driven by developments in a few large countries but can be expected to take place in each of the 26 analyzed countries. Conclusions: A better educated but shrinking labor force is likely to be able to alleviate some of the anticipated economic consequences of population aging. The presented projections of education-specific labor supply can serve as inputs into forecasts of economic growth that include educational differentials in labor productivity.

AbstractFemale labor force participation rates have been stagnating despite rising female education in sub‐Saharan Africa since the turn of the millennium. Using representative and repeated census data from a heterogeneous sample of 13 sub‐Saharan African countries, this paper analyzes female labor force participation from a demographic perspective. We show that enrollment in education is substantially higher among the most recent female cohorts than among the earlier‐born ones. The higher enrollment mechanically depresses female labor force participation, weakening the relationship between female labor force participation and education. After taking this cohort trend into account, we find a strong and positive association between female labor force participation and female education. We further find a cohort trend toward higher female employment in the nonprimary sector and a positive association between female employment in the nonprimary sector and female education. The higher investments in education by younger female cohorts, together with the demographics of sub‐Saharan African countries, have implications for a potentially arising "demographic dividend".

"Within this analysis of demographic and economic dependency ratios for 45 countries around the world, we reiterate the importance of age- and gender-specific employment levels as well as their determinants when discussing the economic challenges associated with population ageing. Building upon existing research on economic dependency, we portray and discuss cohort variation in employment and its possible effect on the challenges of population ageing, focusing on the implications of high youth unemployment, the role of changes in female employment and the evolution of retirement patterns across cohorts. The insights from our analysis reaffirm findings elsewhere that younger populations may not be as well off in the light of demographic change as an analysis of their demographic structure alone would suggest and stress the importance of considering the cohort dimension of employment in this discussion." (author's abstract)

Germany is currently among the 10 oldest countries in the world, as measured by the share of population aged 70 years and over.With the baby boomer cohorts of the 1950s and 1960s having started to reach retirement ages, a new phase of ageing is about to take place. In this debate piece, we argue that investments in human capital at any age and at any stage of the life course are indispensable for dealing with an ageing population. Investments in early education are most effective and efficient, as early skills beget later skills. We show that in an ageing society, it is most efficient to invest in children from the very beginning to develop their full human potential, and to ensure that no child is left behind. Moreover, investments in early education programmes have benefits in addition to those directly related to children, including benefits related to fertility, maternal employment and the integration of parents with a migration background. Globally, more and more countries are faced with increasing proportions of older people and decreasing proportions of working-age people in their populations. Thus, what we describe here for Germany can in many respects be transferred to other country contexts.

We contribute to this theme issue on "(Re)Thinking population geography" with a critical engagement with the concept of the demographic dividend (DD). We put the DD – a concept based on interactions between demography, development and policy making – under scrutiny and investigate in particular whether a demographization of politics, a criticism concerning political decision-making based on a reductionist use of demographic data, as described by Barlösius (2007) and Schultz (2019), is happening. Our findings, based on literature analysis and interviews with experts working in the field of development cooperation, policy advocacy and demographic research, show that simplistic demographic explanations for economic growth are appealing to political leaders and advocacy groups. In the context of the DD, demographization is being strategically used by advisors and scientists to convince and engage decision makers at all administrative levels in order to promote voluntary family planning, multi-sectoral development policies and human rights. Our research suggests that the well-established and widely used paradigm of the DD might be a prominent example of what we call positive demographization . At the same time, particularly when it comes to the politicization of the female body through demographic intervention, the concept of the DD remains potentially prone to politically motivated interpretation and use.

We contribute to this theme issue on "(Re)Thinking population geography" with a critical engagement with the concept of the demographic dividend (DD). We put the DD – a concept based on interactions between demography, development and policy making – under scrutiny and investigate in particular whether a demographization of politics, a criticism concerning political decision-making based on a reductionist use of demographic data, as described by Barlösius (2007) and Schultz (2019), is happening. Our findings, based on literature analysis and interviews with experts working in the field of development cooperation, policy advocacy and demographic research, show that simplistic demographic explanations for economic growth are appealing to political leaders and advocacy groups. In the context of the DD, demographization is being strategically used by advisors and scientists to convince and engage decision makers at all administrative levels in order to promote voluntary family planning, multi-sectoral development policies and human rights. Our research suggests that the well-established and widely used paradigm of the DD might be a prominent example of what we call positive demographization. At the same time, particularly when it comes to the politicization of the female body through demographic intervention, the concept of the DD remains potentially prone to politically motivated interpretation and use.

The current and projected low fertility levels for Europe and the continuous increases in life expectancy imply that the region will go through an unprecedented process of population aging, leading to sizeable changes in the age structure of European societies. After reviewing the existing literature on the role played by demographic change as a determinant of economic growth and income convergence, with a focus on the European experience, we analyze the quantitative impact of the projected changes in the age and education composition of the labor force. Using newly available demographic projections, we show that the current demographic trends are expected to cause a slowdown in the speed of income convergence across European countries. Our projection exercise suggests that policies aimed exclusively at improving labor force participation do not appear to be sufficient to counteract the negative effects of aging on income convergence. Instead, we show that reducing the educational attainment gap between Central and Eastern European member states and the rest of the European Union in addition to increasing labor force participation leads to an accelerated pace of income convergence.

The current and projected low fertility levels for Europe and the continuous increases in life expectancy imply that the region will go through an unprecedented process of population aging, leading to sizable changes in the age structure of European societies. After reviewing the existing literature on the role played by demographic change as a determinant of economic growth and income convergence, with a focus on the European experience, we analyze the quantitative impact of the projected changes in the age and education composition of the labor force. Using newly available demographic projections, we show that the current demographic trends are expected to cause a slowdown in the speed of income convergence across European countries. Our projection exercise suggests that policies aimed exclusively at improving labor force participation do not appear to be sufficient to counteract the negative effects of aging on income convergence. Instead, we show that reducing the educational attainment gap between Central and Eastern European member states and the rest of the European Union in addition to increasing labor force participation leads to an accelerated pace of income convergence.

Population aging is an inevitable global demographic process. Most of the literature on the consequences of demographic change focuses on the economic and societal challenges that we will face as people live longer and have fewer children. In this paper, we (a) briefly describe key trends and projections of the magnitude and speed of population aging; (b) discuss the economic, social, and environmental consequences of population aging; and (c) investigate some of the opportunities that aging societies create. We use Germany as a case study. However, the general insights that we obtain can be generalized to other developed countries. We argue that there may be positive unintended side effects of population aging that can be leveraged to address pressing environmental problems and issues of gender inequality and intergenerational ties.

The extension of late working life has been proposed as a potential remedy for the challenges of aging societies. For Germany, surprisingly little is known about trends and social inequalities in the length of late working life. We use data from the German Microcensus to estimate working life expectancy from age 55 onward for the 1941‒1955 birth cohorts. We adjust our calculations of working life expectancy for working hours and present results for western and eastern Germany by gender, education, and occupation. While working life expectancy has increased across cohorts, we find strong regional and socioeconomic disparities. Decomposition analyses show that among males, socioeconomic differences are predominantly driven by variation in employment rates; among women, variation in both employment rates and working hours are highly relevant. Older eastern German women have longer working lives than older western German women, which is likely attributable to the German Democratic Republic legacy of high female employment.