Against Impossibility Theorems – Elinor Ostrom on Collective Action and Common Pool Resources Governance

Abstract

This paper is a short commentary on Elinor Ostrom's criticism of 'The Tradegy of Commons', which is part of her research on Common Pool Resources (CPR) institutions. She delivered an institutional theory of Common Pool Resources governance and also seriously undermined so called social paradoxes, as Olsons' logic of collective action or prisoners dilemma as a model of social situations. The core of these social paradoxes and Garett Hardin's Tragedy of Commons respectively, is an assumption of rational choice taken by an isolated, selfish and egoistic individual. In Ostroms opinion such theories are not really wrong, but are very special cases in the World of interpersonal communication, customs and institutions. Ostrom has developed an institutional analysis of CPR governance and formulated basic rules of a good and durable CPR Institution. Ostroms' works takes account of both laissez-faire and centralized, government-run allocation as the wrong approach toward management of the Commons. These analyses seem useful in Poland, where nowadays CPR governance is highly centralized.