How wars end

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER ONE: Ending Wars -- CHAPTER TWO: Bargaining, Information, and Ending Wars -- CHAPTER THREE: Credible Commitments and War Termination -- CHAPTER FOUR: Conducting Empirical Tests -- CHAPTER FIVE: The Korean War -- CHAPTER SIX: The Allies, 1940-42 -- CHAPTER SEVEN: The Logic of War Finland and the USSR, 1939-44 -- CHAPTER EIGHT: The American Civil War -- CHAPTER NINE: Germany, 1917-18 -- CHAPTER TEN: Japan, 1944-45 -- CHAPTER ELEVEN: Conclusions -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter One. Ending Wars -- Chapter Two. Bargaining, Information, and Ending Wars -- Chapter Three. Credible Commitments and War Termination -- Chapter Four. Conducting Empirical Tests -- Chapter Five. The Korean War -- Chapter Six. The Allies, 1940–42 -- Chapter Seven. The Logic Of War: Finland And The USSR, 1939–44 -- Chapter Eight. The American Civil War -- Chapter Nine. Germany, 1917–18 -- Chapter Ten. Japan, 1944–45 -- Chapter Eleven. Conclusions -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Why do some countries choose to end wars short of total victory while others fight on, sometimes in the face of appalling odds? How Wars End argues that two central factors shape war-termination decision making: information about the balance of power and the resolve of one's enemy, and fears that the other side's commitment to abide by a war-ending peace settlement may not be credible. Dan Reiter explains how information about combat outcomes and other factors may persuade a warring nation to demand more or less in peace negotiations, and why a country might refuse to negotiate limited terms