Taxation, responsiveness and accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa: the dynamics of tax bargaining

Introduction: taxation, responsiveness and accountability in developing countries --Linking taxation, responsiveness, and accountability --The extent and limits of cross-country econometric evidence --The importance of detailed country-level research --The argument of the book --Revenue, tax bargaining and the politics of development --Research strategy and methodology --Structure of the book --Statistical appendix --Linking taxation, responsiveness, and accountability: theoretical model and research strategy --The lessons of history: diverse pathways linking taxation and political change --A model of tax bargaining --Narrowing the focus and defining specific outcomes --Contextual factors affecting tax bargaining --Incorporating context and strategic interaction in the model --Conclusions --Taxation, responsiveness, and accountability in Ghana 1981-2008 --The political economy of taxation in Ghana 1981-2008 --Evidence of tax bargaining --The role of contextual factors --Conclusions --Appendix --Direct and indirect tax bargaining in Kenya 1963-2008 --The political economy of taxation in Kenya --Taxation, responsiveness and accountability in Kenya --Explaining patterns of tax bargaining --Conclusions --Appendix --The quiet politics of taxation in Ethiopia 1974-2008 --The Derg and the end of the feudal state 1974-1991 --Liberalization and decentralization under the EPRDF 1991-2008 --The dynamics of regional government taxation --Taxation, responsiveness and accountability in contemporary Ethiopia --Explaining outcomes: political, economic and social barriers to tax bargaining --Conclusions --Appendix --Understanding tax bargaining: complexity and contingency --Taxation, responsiveness and accountability: reviewing the evidence --Causal processes and outcomes --Contextual factors and tax bargaining --Conclusions --Looking forward: broader messages, policy lessons and directions for further research --A broader and more nuanced understanding of tax bargaining --From broad claims to specific policy implications --Limitations and future research.

It is increasingly argued that bargaining between citizens and governments over tax collection can provide a foundation for the development of responsive and accountable governance in developing countries. However, while intuitively attractive, surprisingly little research has captured the reality and complexity of this relationship in practice. This book provides the most complete treatment of the connections between taxation and accountability in developing countries, providing both new evidence and an invaluable starting point for future research. Drawing on cross-country econometric evidence and detailed case studies from Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia, Wilson Prichard shows that reliance on taxation has, in fact, increased responsiveness and accountability by expanding the political power wielded by taxpayers. Critically, however, processes of tax bargaining have been highly varied, frequently long term and contextually contingent. Capturing this diversity provides novel insight into politics in developing countries and how tax reform can be designed to encourage broader governance gains