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Abstract
In his provocative new book, The Tyranny of the Ideal, Gerald Gaus lays out a vision for how we should theorize about justice in a diverse society. Gaus shows how free and equal people, faced with intractable struggles and irreconcilable conflicts, might share a common moral life shaped by a just framework. He argues that if we are to take diversity seriously and if moral inquiry is sincere about shaping the world, then the pursuit of idealized and perfect theories of justice--essentially, the entire production of theories of justice that has dominated political philosophy for the past forty years--needs to change. Drawing on recent work in social science and philosophy, Gaus points to an important paradox: only those in a heterogeneous society--with its various religious, moral, and political perspectives--have a reasonable hope of understanding what an ideally just society would be like. However, due to its very nature, this world could never be collectively devoted to any single ideal. Gaus defends the moral constitution of this pluralistic, open society, where the very clash and disagreement of ideals spurs all to better understand what their personal ideals of justice happen to be. Presenting an original framework for how we should think about morality, The Tyranny of the Ideal rigorously analyzes a theory of ideal justice more suitable for contemporary times.
In his provocative new book, The Tyranny of the Ideal, Gerald Gaus lays out a vision for how we should theorize about justice in a diverse society. Gaus shows how free and equal people, faced with intractable struggles and irreconcilable conflicts, might share a common moral life shaped by a just framework. He argues that if we are to take diversity seriously and if moral inquiry is sincere about shaping the world, then the pursuit of idealized and perfect theories of justice--essentially, the entire production of theories of justice that has dominated political philosophy for the past forty years--needs to change. Drawing on recent work in social science and philosophy, Gaus points to an important paradox: only those in a heterogeneous society--with its various religious, moral, and political perspectives--have a reasonable hope of understanding what an ideally just society would be like. However, due to its very nature, this world could never be collectively devoted to any single ideal. Gaus defends the moral constitution of this pluralistic, open society, where the very clash and disagreement of ideals spurs all to better understand what their personal ideals of justice happen to be. Presenting an original framework for how we should think about morality, The Tyranny of the Ideal rigorously analyzes a theory of ideal justice more suitable for contemporary times.
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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Summary of Contents -- Contents -- Preface -- CHAPTER I The Allure of the Ideal: Orienting the Quest for Justice -- 1 Orienting to Utopia -- 1.1 Beyond the Contemporary Debate and Its Categories -- 1.2 Of Paradise -- 1.3 Climbing -- 1.4 Dreaming -- 1.5 Recommending-Rescuing Justice from Uselessness -- 2 Social Realizations and the Ideal -- 2.1 Perfect Principle Conformity and Ideal Societies -- 2.2 Justice and Its Social Realization -- 2.3 How Well Justified Are Our Principles of Justice? -- 3 Modeling the Ideal (and Nonideal) -- 3.1 Setting the Constraints Regulating Coherent Social Worlds (One Sense of Feasibility) -- 3.2 The Aim of Ideal Theory -- 3.3 Abstraction and Idealization -- 4 Two Conditions for Ideal Theory -- CHAPTER II The Elusive Ideal: Searching under a Single Perspective -- 1 Perspectives on Justice -- 1.1 Evaluative Perspectives and the Social Realizations Condition -- 1.2 Meaningful Structures and the Orientation Condition -- 1.3 Why Not Feasibility? -- 2 Rugged Landscape Models of Ideal Justice -- 2.1 Smooth v. Rugged Optimization -- 2.2 How Rugged? High-Dimensional Landscapes and the Social Realizations Condition -- 2.3 How Rugged? Low-Dimensional Landscapes the Orientation Condition -- 2.4 Ideal Theory: Rugged, but Not Too Rugged, Landscapes -- 3 The Neighborhood Constraint and the Ideal -- 3.1 Rawls's Idea of a Neighborhood -- 3.2 The Social Worlds We Know Best -- 3.3 The Neighborhood Constraint and the Ideal -- 3.4 Progressive v. Wandering Utopianism -- 4 Increasing Knowledge of the Landscape and Expanding the Neighborhood -- 4.1 Experiments in Just Social Worlds -- 4.2 Improving Predictions: Diversity within, and the Seeds of It between, Perspectives -- 4.3 Introducing Explicit Perspectival Diversity -- 5 The Limits of Like-Mindedness.
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