Game theory

I.Static games of complete information --1.Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium --2.Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium --II.Dynamic games of complete information --3.Extensive-form games --4.Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions --5.Repeated games --III.Static games of incomplete information --6.Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium --7. Bayesian games and mechanism design --IV.Dynamic games of incomplete information --8.Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection --9.Reputation effects --10.Sequential bargaining under incomplete information --V.Advanced topics --11.More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance --12.Advanced topics in strategic-form games --13.Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium --14.Common knowledge and games --Index.