Buch(gedruckt)2013
Procedurally fair collective provision: its requirements and experimental functionality
In: CESifo working paper series 4541
In: Labour markets
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Abstract
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects ́costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.
Verfügbarkeit
Sprachen
Englisch
Verlag
Univ., Center for Economic Studies
Seiten
30 S.
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