Elite Compatibility in Foreign Aid: An Institutional Approach for Increasing Aid Effectiveness

Cover -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Idea and Goal of This Survey -- 1.2 Incentives and ODA Effectiveness -- 1.3 Elites and ODA Effectiveness -- 1.4 Research Question and Design -- 1.5 What This Survey Will Not Provide -- 1.6 The Developmentalist Paradox: A Disclaimer -- Chapter 2: The 'Elite Compatibility' Concept -- 2.1 The Old Tradition of the ODA Effectiveness Debate -- 2.1.1 Effective for What? Concepts of 'Development' -- 2.1.2 The Current Debate Around ODA Effectiveness -- 2.1.2.1 The Macro Level -- 2.1.2.2 The Micro Level -- 2.1.2.3 Concept Fashions and Effectiveness -- 2.1.2.4 'Doing Things Right' Is Not 'Doing the Right Things' -- 2.1.3 What Is Ignored -- 2.2 The Model of Extractive and Inclusive Institutions -- 2.3 Taking the Model to the Project Level: The 'Elite Compatibility' Concept -- 2.3.1 Challenges in a Typical Low-Performing Project -- 2.3.2 Elaborating the 'Elite Compatibility' Concept -- 2.4 Summary -- Chapter 3 Elites as a Focus in Development Research -- 3.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Origin -- 3.2 Current Research in the Development Context -- 3.2.1 The Micro Perspective: Elite Behavior -- 3.2.1.1 The Elite-mass Gap -- 3.2.1.2 Elite Capture and 'Participation' -- 3.2.2 Between Micro and Macro Perspective: Neopatrimonialism -- 3.2.3 The Macro Perspective: Leaders and Growth -- 3.3 Summary -- Chapter 4 Theoretical Foundation of the 'Elite Compatibility' Concept: Incentives and Incentive Compatibility -- 4.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Origin -- 4.2 Incentives in New Institutional Economics -- 4.3 The Role of Incentives and Institutions in ODA -- 4.3.1 Institutions and Development: Challenges of the Macro-Institutional Perspective -- 4.3.2 Institutions and Incentives: The Micro-Institutional Perspective -- 4.3.2.1 The Multi-level Principal-agent Nature of ODA -- 4.3.2.2 The Samaritan's Dilemma