In place of inter-state retaliation: the European Union's rejection of WTO-style trade sanctions and trade remedies

Unlike many other international trade regimes, the European Union forbids the use of inter-state retaliation to enforce its obligations, and rules out the use of common 'escape' mechanisms - such as anti-dumping - between its member states. How, then, is the European legal order, with the European Court of Justice at its centre, able to be so much more binding and intrusive than the legal obligations of other trade regimes? This book puts forward a new argument for these remarkable outcomes

This book suggests a new explanation of the European Union's legal system, emphasising its break with the inter-state retaliation mechanisms and how Europe's special form of legal integration is facilitated by intra-industry trade, parliamentary forms of national government, and European welfare states.

Unlike many other international trade regimes, the European Union forbids the use of inter-state retaliation to enforce its obligations, and rules out the use of common 'escape' mechanisms - such as anti-dumping - between its member states. How, then, is the European legal order, with the European Court of Justice at its centre, able to be so much more binding and intrusive than the legal obligations of other trade regimes? This book puts forward a new argument for these remarkable outcomes.