Fixing democracy: how power asymmetries help explain presidential powers in new constitutions, evidence from Latin America

This work explores the origins of presidential powers in new constitutions. Much is known about the effects of different presidential powers-less on the conditions that lead to their emergence. The text focuses on the origins of these powers. It argues that the most important predictor of whether a new constitution will expand (instead of restrict) presidential powers is power asymmetry, or more specifically, the difference in power assets between the Incumbent and the Opposition

This work explores the origins of presidential powers in new constitutions. Much is known about the effects of different presidential powers-less on the conditions that lead to their emergence. The text focuses on the origins of these powers. It argues that the most important predictor of whether a new constitution will expand (instead of restrict) presidential powers is power asymmetry, or more specifically, the difference in power assets between the Incumbent and the Opposition