Buch

Blunder (2018)

Britain's war in Iraq

Abstract

This work is a 'post Chilcot' history of Britain's decision to go to war in Iraq in March 2003. Deploying the large number of primary documents and retrospective testimonies of participants, Blunder reconstructs the assumptions underlying decisions, the policy 'world' that participants inhabited 2001-2003, and the way decisions were made. Contrary to much of the existing literature, this volume puts ideas in the centre of the story. As the text argues, Britain's war in Iraq was caused by bad ideas that were dogmatically held.

Keywords

Iraq War, 2003-2011, Participation, British, Diplomatic history

Sprachen

Englisch

Verlag

Oxford University Press

ISBN

9780191845758

Edition

First edition

DOI

10.1093/oso/9780198807964.001.0001

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