Clients and constituents: political responsiveness in patronage democracies

This text provides a theoretical and empirical examination of constituency service in developing countries. The predominant view of distributive politics in 'patronage democracies' emphasizes the partisan targeting of pork and clientelism. In contrast, this work demonstrates that high-level legislators in India and other contexts often provide direct, nonpartisan assistance to individual constituents. Under what conditions do they provide constituency service, rather than engage in partisan bias? The text shows that the uneven character of access to services at the local level - often because of biased allocation on the part of local intermediaries - generates demand for help from higher-level officials, and also creates incentives for those politicians to bypass intermediaries by providing direct assistance.

This book provides a theoretical and empirical examination of constituency service in developing countries. The predominant view of distributive politics in "patronage democracies" emphasizes the partisan targeting of pork and clientelism. In contrast, this book demonstrates that high-level legislators in India and other contexts often provide direct, non-partisan assistance to individual constituents.

Introduction: representation, distribution, and constituency service -- Political responsiveness in a patronage democracy -- The provision of constituency service -- Clients or constituents? A theory of assistance in patronage democracies -- Access to services in a patronage democracy: the case of india -- Partisan targeting and local distributive politics -- Local blocking and appeals for assistance -- Partisanship, the personal vote, and constituency service -- Which politicians respond? -- When is responsiveness partisan bias? -- Constituency service in comparative perspective -- Constrained accountability in patronage democracies.