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Abstract
Fifty years into the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime, the risks of nuclear war, terrorism, and the threat of further proliferation remain. A lack of significant progress towards disarmament will cast doubt upon the viability of the NPT. By recognizing that certain fissile materials are essential to every nuclear weapon and that controlling their usage provides the foundation for international efforts to limit their spread, this book presents a comprehensive framework for nuclear disarmament. Based upon phased reductions, Shea provides a mechanism for the disposal of weapon-origin fissile material and controls on peaceful nuclear activities and non-explosive military uses. He explores the technological means for monitoring and verification, the legal arrangements required to provide an enduring foundation, and a financial structure which will enable progress. This book will be invaluable to professional organizations, arms control NGOs, government officials, scientists, and politicians. It will also appeal to academics and postgraduate researchers working on security studies, disarmament diplomacy and the politics and science of verification.
An overview -- Introduction -- Eliminating existing nuclear weapons and weapon capabilities -- A new institution to encourage and verify nuclear disarmament -- The technical basis for nuclear disarmament verification -- INDA inspections -- Sustainable disarmament -- Preventing rearmament -- IAEA disarmament missions -- Building the nuclear disarmament regime -- Suggested confidence-building measures for the nuclear disarmament regime.
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Cover -- Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Abbreviations and acronyms -- Glossary -- Part I An overview -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 General considerations -- 1.2 Two TPNW problems -- 1.2.1 Time-bound disarmament -- 1.2.2 Financing disarmament -- 1.3 Theater-centric verification -- 1.4 Institutional verification arrangements -- 1.5 Coping with nuclear weapon secrecy -- 1.6 The process of nuclear disarmament -- 1.7 Elimination or conversion of a nuclear weapon complex -- 1.8 Additional confidence building measures for the nuclear disarmament regime -- Notes -- Part II Eliminating existing nuclear weapons and weapon capabilities -- 2 The international nuclear disarmament agency -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The nuclear disarmament council -- 2.2.1 Responsibilities -- 2.2.2 Nuclear disarmament councilors -- 2.2.3 Standing committees -- 2.3 INDA secretariat -- 2.4 INDA Nuclear Disarmament Institute -- 2.5 INDA Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development Center -- Notes -- 3 The technical basis for nuclear disarmament verification -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Fission and fissile material -- 3.3 Fissile material in nuclear weapons -- 3.4 The Trilateral Initiative -- 3.5 Decision factors affecting the verification of classified fissile material -- 3.5.1 Information security -- 3.5.2 Disarmament value -- 3.5.3 Degree of assurance -- 3.5.4 Susceptibility to cheating -- 3.5.5 Practicality and affordability -- 3.6 Candidate verification methods for classified forms of fissile material -- 3.7 Chain of custody monitoring -- 3.8 Development and production of INDA verification & monitoring equipment -- Notes -- 4 INDA inspections -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Fissile material-related inspection activities
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