Legitimate oligopolies of violence in post-conflict societies with particular focus on Liberia and Sierra Leone

In: Forschung DSF, Band 23

Abstract

"During post-conflict periods, institutions and patterns of action are challenged and renegotiated – processes that have long gone largely unrecognized. There continues to be a lack
of empirical research on the constellations of authority following the cessation of conflict.
This lack corresponds to deficiencies on the level of policy-making: It appears that Western
donors, until today, base their approaches to post-conflict reconstruction on the wholly
unchallenged assumption that the state is the only legitimate actor in this area. This research
project focused on core questions in post-conflict security provision by and beyond
the state. The central question of the project was to determine which actors (such as traditional
authorities, the remnants of state security organs, private entrepreneurs, international
peacekeeping missions etc.) provide security in a situation of fragmented authority, i.e.
sanctioning violence and crime. Moreover, the project sought to analyze under which conditions
these actors are considered legitimate by different groups within society: some
actors might protect specific groups among the population while representing a threat to
others. These questions were addressed in empirical case studies of Liberia and Sierra
Leone. The project worked under the basic assumption that oligopolies of violence exist in
periods directly preceded by conflict, comprising a limited number of actors that produce
violence and provide security, who both compete and cooperate with each other. It was
also assumed that oligopolies exhibited significant variation, with one important sub-type
being an 'oligopoly with market leader'. (...)" (author's abstract)