Aufsatz(gedruckt)2009
Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East
In: Journal of democracy, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 122-135
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Abstract
It appears that elections increase chances for a smooth transition to democracy only in competitive authoritarian regimes where political instability already exists. This essay explores the process the author calls 'competitive clientelism' whereby elections supply ruling elites in authoritarian regimes opportunities to compete over limited sets of state resources that they then distribute to local elites a structure that reduces demand for any change to democracy. Adapted from the source document.
Themen
Sprachen
Englisch
Verlag
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore MD
ISSN: 1045-5736
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