GOOD GOVERNANCE AND BAD POLICY: THE PERILS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL OVEREXTENSION

In: Review of international political economy: RIPE, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 401-424

Abstract

A SIGNIFICANT ADAPTATION HAS RECENTLY OCCURRED IN THE MANDATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. WITH NO ALTERATION TO ITS LEGAL CHARTER, THE FUND HAS EFFECTIVELY BECOME THE PROMOTER OF A PUTATIVE CONSENSUS AMONG ITS LEADING MEMBER STATES ON INTRUSIVE NORMS OF INDUSTRIAL REGULATION. THIS ARTICLE DISPUTES THE HISTORICAL UNIQUENESS OF THE TURN UNDERWAY INSIDE POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS; IT DRAWS PARALLELS TO THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND TO INCONCLUSIVE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE 1940S.