Green's Rights Recognition Thesis and Moral Internalism
In: The British journal of politics & international relations, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 5-17
Abstract
T. H. Green claimed that 'rights are made by recognition. There is no right but thinking makes it so'. This 'rights recognition thesis' is widely rejected. I argue in this article that, so far from being an idiosyncratic doctrine of 19th-century British Idealism, the rights recognition thesis implies a compelling conception of rights, & one that, surprisingly, is more in tune with contemporary meta-ethics than are many contemporary rights theories. Green's moral theory, I argue, is a form of the widely embraced doctrine of 'moral internalism'. Such internalism, conjoined with a generally embraced analysis of rights, leads to some version of the rights recognition thesis. 17 References. Adapted from the source document.
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Englisch
ISSN: 1369-1481
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