Self-Defense in International Law and Rights of Persons

In: Ethics & international affairs, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 87-91

Abstract

Part of a symposium on David Rodin's War and Self-Defense (New York: Oxford U Press, 2003) argues the despite some laudable achievements, his rejection of a plausible version of national self-defense fails. His conclusions ultimately do not hold up because of two transitions in his arguments: the move from individual to national self-defense & from the absence of world government to the illegitimacy of self-help. Focus is on liberal arguments for self-defense, whereby self-defense is the protection of vital rights or interests of individuals. Asserting that Rodin is right in rebuffing efforts to reduce self-defense to a collection of individual rights of self-defense, it is suggested that permissibility to kill in a defensive war can be rooted in a richer form of liberalism that he overlooked: self-defense wars are carried out by governments as agents of the citizens. Rodin's two reasons for rejecting the liberal view -- that it is wrong to consider humanitarian intervention & self-defense as having the same underlying rationale & use of force against a bloodless invasion is not warranted -- are countered. While Rodin sees that much of what is deemed self-defense is really law enforcement, he fails to connect the idea to the international system, which, although regulated by laws, lacks a superior authority to enforce them. Rodin asserts that under these circumstances, self-help is never justified, which is seen here as implausible. Further, Rodin's notion of proportionality means a state is not justified to defend against an invader looking to destroy the political system as opposed to the peoples; this is patently rejected. It is concluded that Rodin takes the analogy between individual & national self-defense too seriously. J. Zendejas