COMMITTEE POWER, STRUCTURE-INDUCED EQUILIBRIA, AND ROLL CALL VOTES

In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 36, Heft 16, S. 1-30

Abstract

USING THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE-INDUCED EQUIILIBRIUM, THIS ESSAY DEVELOPS A SIMPLE BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF ROLL CALL VOTING. THE MAIN RESULTS ARE (1) IF SOME COMMITTEES ARE PREFERENCE OUTLIERS RELATIVE TO THE LEGISLATURE AS A WHOLE, THEN ROLL CALL DATA ARE LIKELY TO BE ARTIFICIALLY UNIDIMENSIONAL. (2) THE UNIDIMENSIONAL BIAS PERSISTS EVEN AS THE DIMENSIONALITY OF THE POLICY SPACE BECOMES LARGE. (3) EVEN IF COMMITTEES ARE PREFERENCE OUTLIERS, IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DISCOVER THIS FACT BY LOOKING ONLY AT ROLL CALL VOTES.