John Rawls et les alternatives liberales a la laicite

In: Raisons politiques: études de pensée politique, Heft 2, S. 101-125

Abstract

Rawls distinction between "comprehensive" philosophical, moral and religious doctrines on the one hand, and "political" conceptions on the other hand, means that, in a secular State, citizens of faith are not allowed to use directly their religious arguments in the political sphere as this would threaten the equal dignity of their fellow citizens' conceptions of the Good. But what about a philosophical doctrine such as secularism or laicity? The logical consequence of Rawls's distinction is that every citizen, religious or secular, has to use public reasons in the political debate in application of his duty of civility. This raises the problematic issue of a liberal conception of secularism. In a Public Reason Revisited, Rawls paradoxically claims that the secular State cannot be defended on the basis of secularism. This essay proposes to explore this liberal alternative to secularism, concerned with the plurality and equal dignity of comprehensive reasonable doctrines. Adapted from the source document.