Aufsatz(gedruckt)2003
Sequential Contests
In: Public choice, Band 116, Heft 1-2, S. 1-18
Verfügbarkeit an Ihrem Standort wird überprüft
Dieser Artikel ist auch in Ihrer Bibliothek verfügbar: |
elektronisch
gedruckt
Abstract
We compare expected rent-seeking expenditures & efficiency of simultaneous versus sequential rent-seeking contests. We find that when two risk neutral ex ante identical agents are competing, sequential contests are ex ante Pareto superior to simultaneous contests. We then endogenize the timing decision of rent-seeking expenditures & show that with ex ante identical contestants, all subgame perfect equilibria of this game are sequential contests. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 13 References. Adapted from the source document.
Problem melden