Counterterrorism

In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 49, Heft 2, S. 183-200

Abstract

This article establishes the prevalence of deterrence over preemption when targeted governments can choose between either policies or employ both. There is a similar proclivity to favor defensive counter-terrorist measures over proactive policies. Unfortunately, this predisposition results in an equilibrium with socially inferior payoffs when compared with proactive responses. Proactive policies tend to provide purely public benefits to all potential targets & are usually undersupplied, whereas defensive policies tend to yield a strong share of provider-specific benefits & are often oversupplied. When terrorists direct a disproportionate number of attacks at one government, its reliance on defensive measures can disappear. Ironically, terrorists can assist governments in addressing coordination dilemmas associated with some antiterrorist policies by targeting some countries more often than others. 1 Table, 6 Figures, 25 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2005.]