Suchergebnisse

The religious minorities have been part of Modern Iraq since it was founded in 1921 and they can be distinguished from the majority by their customs, traditions, beliefs and histories. Moreover, historically, Iraq (and Iraqi Kurdistan) has been the cradle of most of the religious minorities in the region. Iraqi religious minorities such as Jews, Christian, Yazidis, Sabean-Mandaean, and Kākāʾi are considered the oldest communities of Iraq history. They are considered to be, in some ways, the indigenous groups of Iraq. Republican Iraq underwent a period of immense socio-political change which impacted significantly on religious minorities in particular. Over time they, and the newer religious minorities like the Bahaʾi, began to face severe discrimination, which led to their being considered inferior to the majority. This, in turn, led to occasional extreme persecution and forced displacement campaigns often undertaken by the successive Iraqi governments and subsequently by the (Muslim) majority. This study focuses on social, political and historical factors pertaining to the lives of Iraqi religious minorities, and attempts to uncover the sequence of events that led to the current phenomenon of religious minorities fleeing their home countries in order to preserve their traditions. This study is based on an analytical and descriptive method and should be considered a historical research of events in the light of available archival documents, legal sources and press articles. This dissertation is divided into ten chapters. In first and second chapters the methodological and theoretical framework applied is discussed, as well as an overview of the concept of "minority" as well as definitions of religious minorities in Iraq. Chapter three and four deal with the contextualization of the historical and socio-political frameworks that inform the background of this dissertation which relates religious minorities with their backgrounds in the period of Monarchical Iraq (1920-1958). Chapter five discusses the religious minorities during the first republic of Iraq 1958-1963. This era is significant in that it was a time of unprecedented change, one which formed the interim between the Monarchical Era and the era of the nationalists. Furthermore, the first republic is significant because it constitutes a kind of 'golden age' for all Iraqi minorities. Chapters six, seven and eight are the main focus of this dissertation. They are primarily concerned with the second republican era, which is the period of the two ʿĀrifs (1963-1968). This particular era was one of conflict which saw the emergence of subsidiary identities. Chapter six examines the rise of sectarianism and confessionalism in Iraq. Chapter seven engages with the scattered religious minorities (SRM), under the republican eras after 1963 up to the present time. This chapter introduces the situation of three scattered religious minorities throughout Iraq: the Jews, Bahaʾi, and Sabean-Mandaeans. In chapter eight, the focus shifts to the geographically-concentrated religious minorities (GCRM). This chapter deals with three religious minorities: the Kākāʾi, Christians and Yazidis, all of whom dwell in the so-called Disputed Territories, a region which is disputed by the two parties involved in the conflict in Iraq: The Central Government of Iraq (CGI) and the Kurdish Movement. Chapter nine and ten discuss the prospective dimensions of political developments in Iraq in relation to religious minorities after 1968. In chapter nine, the impact of change in the legislation pertaining to the rights of religious minorities is examined, as well as judicial rights in the Iraqi courts, with a focus on the Law of Civil Status No.65/1972 in particular. The final chapter traces socio-political developments within the religious minorities, beginning with the last Farhūd of the Jews. This period saw re-forging the case of the Iraqi Christians, the renewed controversy over Yazidi Identity among disparate Kurdish political and religious movements, and ongoing demographic change brought about by forced Islamisation in Yazidi areas. The Sabean-Mandaean minority also experienced a period of transition; their status weakened, their welfare deteriorating from that of an organized minority to one whose existence and religious identity were threatened. In the case of the Kākāʾis, this period shows their situation is in the transmission from domestic conflict to distinctive religious identity. whereas pressure on the Bahai (whose religion had been previously banned) was relaxed somewhat, allowing them a cautions sense of new-found freedom. In the conclusion, the hypotheses of this thesis are revisited to investigate what implications the research findings may have beyond the immediate historical and socio-political context of Iraqi religious minorities. Religious minorities have endured much persecution in Monarchical Iraq and thus, it is from Monarchical Iraq that this research begins before proceeding to explore the case of the minorities in Republican Iraq. The policies of discrimination in Iraq assumed many forms such as enactments and laws or governmental or administrative acts that led to division and discrimination. Although these policies of discrimination affected all segments of Iraqi society, it was particularly detrimental to religious minorities that were already suffering at the hands of the majorities. They faced an unequalled degree of religious stigmatization and discrimination. This has created a form of shared collective memory which consists of a prevailing sense of alienation, social inequality and detrimental stereotypes that is shared by all non-Muslim minorities in Iraq. It is noteworthy that, although there was discrimination of religious minorities in Iraq, the nature of such discrimination was highly dependent on the political situation. This is because various Iraqi governments viewed the religious minorities differently and also dealt with them as such. Importantly, as this study illustrates, the religious minorities were not only affected by political currents but also by social and religious currents within Iraq. No radical change occurred in the thought and inclinations of the dominating powers, nor did such change occur within national movements which were in the position to influence both the ruling system and the state institutions. Besides, religious and sectarian belonging became a means upon which these powers relied to consolidate their power. No current or influential political party in Iraq to date has succeeded in establishing a nation state, nor has it succeeded in integrating the Iraqi communities to achieve equality in a manner which maintains the ethnic, religious and cultural variety within the country. Rather, policies of sectarianism have kept the religious minorities away from actual political participation in state institutions and in government. Such marginalization and political dysfunction could have been avoided if representation had been assured by virtue of population (i.e. the quota system) and not by political affiliation. However, as the historical eras show, the deep-rooted nature of such divisions and the lack of mutual trust between the different communities have led to the current long-endured conflict, which in turn has virtually fragmented all communities within Iraq. Against this historical backdrop of division and inequality, the sectarian and confessional issue quickly emerged in post Baʿthist Iraq. Indeed, all the unprecedented developments currently taking place in Iraq are tentativeness the result of the actions or the inaction of past regimes in Iraq. The various religious minorities in Iraq suffered systematic acts of oppression and extermination in different periods as follows. The ongoing oppression of the Jews ended with their exile from Iraq after two bouts of violent dispossession and killing referred to as the First Farhūd (1941-1952) and the Second Farhūd (1968-1973). Similarly, Christians were subjected to ongoing oppression and persecution. This began with a massacre which took place in 1933 and it continued until a second persecution after the coup of 1963. Their situation was not to improve in all of this time, 2003 when they were harshly targeted and eliminated from Iraq. The Yazidi also suffered, between 1935 and 1946 in particular and again after 1963. Their regions were divided between the province of Kurdistan and the central government of Iraq from 1991-2003. They were systematically targeted by Islamic groups, the most recent example of which is ISIS' invasion of Sinjar and the Plain of Nineveh and the act of genocide which they carried out against the Yazidi. Other minorities such as the Sabean-Mandaean, Bahaʾi, Kākāʾi and others have suffered a similar fate and are currently fleeing Iraq.

This book is a product of much reflection thought, and commitment to examine the gaps and gains in Kenya's democratic process. Its very title: Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections, suggests not only the difficulty of democratic arrival but also the difficulty of its measurement. It reflects on the progress that has been made and the threats inherent therein. By implication, it sits on the side of the debate that takes the view that the democratization process will not necessarily be peaceful, neat, or unilinear. The book acknowledges that the balance sheet of Kenya's democratization project demonstrates a mixed result. Whereas in the period leading up to December 2007 the 'assets' side of the balance sheet was arguably healthier, the subsequent events, and post-2007 election violence in particular, exposed huge liabilities–mostly hidden in the structural inefficiencies of the Kenyan. This binary or bifurcated reality in Kenya's democratization, and the gains and tensions inherent in it, is evidenced by several developments. First, whereas the political space has remained highly pluralized since 1991, with the holding of regular and periodic elections following the re-introduction of multi-party politics, there are a number of negative or illiberal tendencies that have accompanied this progress: consolidation of ethnic identities, political conflicts and violence, and rising impunity. These elections often turn out to be tournaments of communal values in which ethnic interests compete in pursuance of centralized political powers in search of the imperial presidency. Essentially, although the space for democracy is enhanced and the authoritarian monster tamed, elections have acted in the main as instruments of social-political exclusion rather than instruments for furthering democratic governance. Second, whereas the legalization of political parties was seen as a necessary part of the democratization process, the political parties themselves are not practising internal democracy. The quality of rules, decisions, and accountability is woefully weak; personal rule and the dominant leader culture is strong; and party institutions generally emasculated. All these account for the remarkably short shelf life of Kenya's political parties, a development that greatly undermines the consolidation and institutionalizing of democratic gains. Third, whereas the liberal environment has led to plurality of media outlets, the ownership structure, professional conduct, or content of these media houses have not necessarily passed the democratic muster. The emergence of new technologies such as cell phones and e-communication has weakened state control of information; allowed citizens unhindered access to information; and permitted intense, unregulated citizen dialogue. However, the emergence of these technological choices or opportunities has not necessarily improved the quality of the democratic discourses, even though the space for engagement has increased. Fourth, whereas Kenya's disciplined forces have maintained a fairly respectable distance from politics, generally, and Kenya's Preface democratization process in particular, this distance was completely eliminated in 2007/2008. The long term political impact of this 'return' to the civilian arena remains unknown, particularly given the ethnicization of politics and by implication security. Fifth, whereas the gender discourses have more or less been settled in favour of the argument for the added value for greater women participation in politics, Kenyan politics remains remarkably 'un-gendered' particularly with respect to representation. This publication shows that culture is a double-edged sword capable of both hindering or facilitating women's access to political power. The 2007/2008 cataclysmic events provided a fitting context for examining or auditing Kenya's democratization process. This book, therefore, was inspired by the desire to record, archive, analyse, and interpret that sad but immensely significant occurrence in Kenya's democratic, nay, political evolution: the 2007 general elections; the violent social convulsions it subsequently generated; the deeply hidden social-political divisions it brought to the fore; and the resultant constitutional and institutional architecture of governance it created–the Grand Coalition Government. However, because of the contaminated and disputed nature of the results of that election, as affirmed by the Independent Review Commission of Kenya (IREC) or the Kriegler Commission, this publication has used the ECK data mainly to assist in scholarly inquiry. Its use in this volume should by no means be read as a validation of the figures, but rather as reference data (of whatever remains of the 'official results' of the 2007 general elections) to assist in analyzing that indelible mark in Kenya's political life. The sheer size and length of this publication speaks to its own scholarly ambition: to undertake and provide, all under one roof, a scholarly inquiry into all the key elements, issues and driving forces in the 2007 general elections and its aftermath. We are under no illusion that this is a 'catch-all' publication and, quite importantly, are acutely aware that there are issues that should have merited attention here but which, for various reasons, have not. However, we remain confident that this publication sets the stage as a veritable volume of reference for future work on the 2007/2008 political events in Kenya. In undertaking this project, we were persuaded that it is important for scholarship, policy, and advocacy to provide and benefit from local perspectives to the 2007/2008 political events. This is because much of the scholarship on Kenya's democratic transition is foreign in character and, while useful, some miss out on the nuances and hidden meanings that characterize local political experience. This publication attempts to cure that problem.

1Human rights — Genocide — Definition of genocide — Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 — Actus reus of genocide — Mens rea — Specific intent to destroy protected group — Dolus specialis — Proof — Whether existence of intent can be inferred from pattern of conduct — Relationship between genocide and other violations of humanitarian law and human rights — Ethnic cleansing — Responsibility for genocide — Whether genocide established in principal claim — Whether genocide established in counter-claim — Armed conflict in territory of Croatia in 1991-95 — Whether breaches of Genocide ConventionInternational Court of Justice — Jurisdiction — Scope — Consent to jurisdiction — Basis for jurisdiction — Article IX of Genocide Convention — Court confined to disputes regarding genocide — Whether dispute between Parties falling within Article IX of Genocide Convention — Respondent raising preliminary objections relating to jurisdiction of Court and admissibility of Application — Whether Court having jurisdiction to entertain Croatia's ApplicationInternational Court of Justice — Jurisdiction — Scope — Basis for jurisdiction — Article IX of Genocide Convention — Whether Court having jurisdiction — Respondent's first preliminary objection — Capacity to participate in proceedings before Court — Articles 34 and 35 of Statute of Court — Whether Parties satisfying general conditions — Whether Respondent having access to Court on basis of Article 35(1) of Statute — Admission to United Nations on 1 November 2000 — Whether Respondent acquiring status of party to Statute of Court on 1 November 2000 — Whether Court "open" to Respondent — Issues of jurisdiction ratione materiae — Declaration and Note of 27 April 1992 — Nature and effect on position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to Genocide Convention — Whether declaration having effect of notification of succession to treaties — Whether Respondent party to Genocide Convention, including Article IX, at date of institution of proceedings until at least 1 November 2000 — Whether Court having jurisdiction to entertain Croatia's ApplicationInternational Court of Justice — Jurisdiction — Scope — Basis for jurisdiction — Article IX of Genocide Convention — Whether Court having jurisdiction — Respondent's second preliminary 2objection — Issues of jurisdiction ratione temporis — Whether claims based on acts and omissions which took place prior to 27 April 1992 beyond jurisdiction of Court and inadmissible — Distinction between objection to jurisdiction and objection to admissibility — Whether second preliminary objection possessing an exclusive preliminary character — Whether possible to determine questions raised by objection without determining issues properly pertaining to merits — Whether Court having jurisdiction to entertain Croatia's ApplicationInternational Court of Justice — Jurisdiction — Scope — Basis for jurisdiction — Article IX of Genocide Convention — Whether Court having jurisdiction — Respondent's third preliminary objection — Whether claims referring to submission of persons to trial within jurisdiction of Court — Whether claims concerning provision of information on missing Croatian citizens within jurisdiction of Court — Whether claims concerning return of cultural property within jurisdiction of Court — Whether Court having jurisdiction to entertain Croatia's ApplicationInternational Court of Justice — Jurisdiction — Scope — Basis for jurisdiction — Article IX of Genocide Convention — Issues of jurisdiction and admissibility to be determined at merits stage — Issues of jurisdiction ratione temporis — Whether Court's jurisdiction extending to acts prior to 27 April 1992 — Whether provisions of Genocide Convention retroactive — Logic — Article 28 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 — Whether acts said to have occurred before 27 April 1992 falling within scope of jurisdiction under Article IX due to Article 10(2) of International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility — Whether acts said to have occurred before 27 April 1992 falling within scope of jurisdiction under Article IX due to law of State succession — Whether Respondent bound by obligations under Genocide Convention — Whether Court having jurisdiction to entertain Croatia's Application with respect to acts prior to 27 April 1992State succession — Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — Dissolution — Republics becoming independent States — Distinction between successor State and continuing State — Federal Republic of Yugoslavia claiming to be continuation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — Serbia and Montenegro — Republic of Serbia — Consent to jurisdiction of International Court 3of Justice — Whether Serbia sole Respondent — Treaty commitments — Genocide Convention — Whether Federal Republic of Yugoslavia party by succession to Genocide Convention — Membership of United Nations — Status and position of Respondent State in relation to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and to Genocide ConventionTreaties — Accession — Parties — Signature — Ratification — Genocide Convention — Process by which State becoming bound by treaty as successor State or remaining bound by treaty as continuing State — Signature of Genocide Convention by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 11 December 1948 — Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia depositing instruments of ratification, without reservation, on 29 August 1950 — Whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia party by succession to Genocide Convention from beginning of its existence as a State — Declaration and Note of 27 April 1992 — Nature and effect on position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to Genocide Convention — Whether Serbia party to Convention at date of Application on 2 July 1999Treaties — Interpretation — Application — Genocide Convention — Applicable law — Article II of Genocide Convention — Constituent elements of genocide — Actus reus and mens rea of genocide — Dolus specialis — Requirement of specific intent to destroy group in whole or part — Evidence — Mens rea of genocide — Meaning and scope of destruction of group — Destruction of group in part — Evidence of dolus specialis — Actus reus of genocide — Relationship between Genocide Convention and international humanitarian law — Meaning and scope of physical acts — Whether genocide established in principal claim — Whether alleged acts established — Whether falling into categories listed in Article II of Genocide Convention — Whether committed with intent to destroy protected group, in whole or in part — Quantitative element — Geographic location — Pattern of conduct — Whether genocide established in counter-claim — Whether breaches of Genocide ConventionInternational criminal law — Genocide — Definition of genocide — Obligations under Genocide Convention — Role of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia — Proof of genocide4Evidence before international courts and tribunals — Evidence — Burden of proof — Standard of proof — Methods of proof — Relevance of findings by International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia — Whether conclusive evidence crimes committed — Whether conclusive evidence regarding attribution of actsState responsibility — Attribution — Responsibility of State for acts of State organs — Engagement of international responsibility of acts unlawful even if author of acts acting contrary to instructions or exceeding authority — International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility 2001 — Relevance — Determination of responsibility of State if genocide established — Whether genocide established — Whether breaches of Genocide ConventionWar and armed conflict — Armed conflict in territory of Croatia as it had existed within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991-95 — Allegations of acts of genocide — Whether breaches of Genocide Convention

Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) recently sent a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken urging him to get tougher on Azerbaijan for its "brazen campaign of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh." This follows an earlier statement from Cardin, shortly after Azerbaijan's September "lightning offensive" against Nagorno-Karabakh, that called for the U.S. to "halt security assistance to Azerbaijan," and increase humanitarian support for the 100,000 ethnic Armenians who fled en masse from Nagorno-Karabakh. As of this writing, neither of those things has occurred and the Biden administration has done little to address Azerbaijan's military aggression. While there are undoubtedly myriad reasons for the U.S. government's lukewarm response, one possible explanation is one of Washington's oldest pastimes: lobbying. For years, the Azerbaijan government has been financing a well connected lobbying and influence operation in the U.S. that has worked diligently to keep U.S. military assistance flowing and to ensure that policymakers turn a blind-eye to the country's consistent human rights violations.As documented in a just released Quincy Institute brief, The Lobbying Battle for Nagorno-Karabakh, the government of Azerbaijan has spent millions of dollars on registered lobbyists and much more on illicit influence operations that have helped foster and maintain support for Baku across Europe and the U.S.The End of Nagorno-Karabakh"The United States will not countenance any action or effort – short-term or long-term – to ethnically cleanse or commit other atrocities against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh," was an assurance from then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Yuri Kim in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 14.
Just five days later, the U.S. did exactly what Kim said it would not, standing idly by on September 19 as Azerbaijan launched an "anti-terrorist" operation against what remained of Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the ethnic cleansing of over 100,000 of its residents as they fled to the neighboring Republic of Armenia.
The territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh — the mountainous breakaway region internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but self-governed by Armenians — now appears over as the de facto officials announced that all institutions will be dissolved on January 1, 2024. These developments followed what had been a year of Azerbaijani escalation against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper, including an Azerbaijani blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh which lasted almost 10 months and saw the territory's food, medical, and energy supplies all but run out. When Baku launched its military assault, Washington and Brussels were only able to muster strongly worded statements, but no meaningful reaction.The Azerbaijan LobbyDon't count out Azerbaijan's influence operations in Washington for helping to thwart what should have been a stronger response on Capitol Hill and in the White House. The government of Azerbaijan has spent over $7 million on lobbying and public relations firms registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) since 2015, according to OpenSecrets. Chief among the Azerbaijan lobby's hired guns is BGR Government Affairs, one of Washington's top lobbying firms, which is contracted to serve as a liaison for the Azerbaijan Embassy in the U.S.
FARA filings reveal that the firm contacted congressional offices more than 1,000 times on Azerbaijan's behalf in just the first half of 2023, and that their work included efforts "to ensure there were no negative Azerbaijan amendments on the National Defense Authorization Act" and "fair language for Azerbaijan" in the appropriations process. More generally, BGR "educated policymakers in Congress about the important role Azerbaijan plays as a key security partner of the United States."
In 2018, BGR signed an agreement with another lobbying firm — Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell, and Berkowitz — to aid its efforts on behalf of the Azerbaijan Embassy. An analysis of that firm's FARA filings shows that they've been laser focused on the State, Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, which is responsible for, among many other issues, determining how much U.S. military assistance flows to Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Overall, it would seem both firms have been successful at allowing Azerbaijan to dodge criticism and continue to receive millions of dollars in security assistance every year.
Most notably in 2023,the Azerbaijan Embassy hired The Friedlander Group, whose namesake Ezra Friedlander has been a prominent American-Israeli lobbyist for years, rubbing shoulders with a number of top policymakers, including former President Donald Trump. When he was hired by Azerbaijan he immediately put his connections to work, according to his firm's FARA filing, securing meetings with dozens of congressional offices, including even a face-to-face meeting with Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.).
This is just the tip of the iceberg for Azerbaijan's influence operations in the U.S. As documented by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), the Azerbaijan government has a history of laundering its influence in Europe and the U.S. The "Azerbaijani Laundromat," as described by the OCCRP, was "a complex money-laundering operation and slush fund that handled $2.9 billion over a two-year period through four shell companies." This 2012-2014 scheme which involved funneling government funds through shell companies, included payments to several pro-Azeri Americans, one of whom later pleaded guilty to concealing the fact that a congressional trip to Azerbaijan he'd helped organize was secretly funded by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR).
Azerbaijan's often illicit influence operations in Europe have dubbed it "caviar diplomacy," given the country's repeated attempts to bribe European officials with all manner of luxury goods, including caviar. At least one investigation resulted in FBI agents raiding the home of the co-chair of the Congressional Azerbaijan Caucus, Henry Cuellar (D-Texas), in January 2022.Armenian Influence in the USArmenians have also sought to influence the U.S. public debate surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this has been done at a significantly smaller scale than their Azerbaijani counterparts, and the main actors of Armenian lobbying efforts in the U.S. have been the estimated one to two million diaspora Armenians in the U.S.In the early 1990s, during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. achieved its first major political victory via Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which explicitly prohibited the vast majority of U.S. assistance from the Act to post-Soviet Azerbaijan until Baku "cease[es] all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh." However, in 2002, as the "Global War on Terror" was heating up, Azerbaijan was granted a waiver for Section 907 that has allowed over $160 million of U.S. security assistance to flow to the country ever since. Nevertheless, during the war in 2020, Armenians boycotted lobbying and PR firms working for Azerbaijan and, in 2021, President Joe Biden recognized the systemic mass killings of Armenians during World War I as genocide, a long-standing priority of the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. More recently the Senate unanimously passed the "Armenian Protection Act," that would cut off aid to Azerbaijan for at least two years. For Armenians, these developments are viewed as too little too late, however, as Azerbaijan has already achieved what it wanted in Nagorno-Karabakh with little international pushback. This result is likely due in no small part to Azerbaijan's concerted influence operations in the U.S. For years, the lobbyists on Azerbaijan's payroll have worked to keep U.S. military assistance flowing to the country and to tip the scales of U.S. support in their favor. While they may not have "won" this influence battle they have no doubt done enough to keep the U.S. on the sidelines of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Editor's Note: Artin Dersimonian was an intern at the Armenian Embassy in Washington in 2018. The Terjenian-Thomas Assembly Internship Program at the Armenian Assembly — which is mentioned in the QI brief on which this article is based — facilitated Dersimonian's internship with the embassy.

Aus der Sicht der einzelnen Bürgerinnen und Bürger bietet der Besitz mehrerer Staatsangehörigkeiten sicherlich eine Reihe von Vorteilen. Für den Nationalstaat allerdings stellt sich die Lage anders dar: Denn hinter jeder weiteren Staatsbürgerschaft steht die Gesetzgebung eines anderen souveränen Landes, in die er sich nicht einmischen kann. Dies gilt trotz voranschreitender Integration auch für die EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Treten über Fragen der Mehrstaatigkeit bilaterale Spannungen auf, ist der Spielraum für eine Konfliktbeilegung äußerst begrenzt. Das zeigt sich am Beispiel der neuen EU-Mitglieder Ungarn, Slowakei, Rumänien und Bulgarien, wo sich nationale Divergenzen um Staatszugehörigkeiten sogar erst nach deren EU-Beitritt zugespitzt haben. Während Ungarn mit dem Doppelpass seine Minderheit im Ausland politisch an sich binden möchte, nutzen Rumänien und Bulgarien dieses Instrument darüber hinaus zur Anwerbung von qualifizierten Fachkräften aus den Nachbarländern.

Das damit verbundene Konfliktpotential haben EU-Kommission, Rat und EU-Parlament im Vorfeld der Erweiterungsrunden 2004 und 2007 völlig unterschätzt und daraus bislang kaum Lehren für die laufenden Beitrittsverhandlungen gezogen. Sie verkennen, dass die massenhafte Vergabe von Staatsbürgerschaften an Minderheiten im Ausland den EU-Nachbarschaftsraum nicht nur ökonomisch schwächt, sondern auch politisch destabilisiert. So werden zum Beispiel mit dem EU-Beitritt Kroatiens 2013 auch circa 660000 bosnische Staatsbürger mit einem zweiten kroatischen Pass zu Unionsbürgern. Damit entsteht eine rechtliche Ungleichheit unter den Bosniaken, die Tendenzen der Desintegration und des Staatszerfalls zusätzlich verstärkt. Eine solche Entwicklung kann nicht im Interesse der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten sein. (Autorenreferat)