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How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group's value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate , may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.

How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group's value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate, may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.

How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group's value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate, may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.

How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group's value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate, may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.

How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group's value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate , may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.

How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group's value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate, may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.

How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group's value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate, may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.

Der Verfasser zeigt, dass der größte Teil der Menschenrechtsdefizite, die in der heutigen Welt bestehen, auf institutionelle Faktoren zurückgeführt werden kann - auf die nationalen institutionellen Strukturen vieler Entwicklungsländer, für die primär deren politische und ökonomische Eliten die Verantwortung tragen, wie auch auf globale institutionelle Strukturen, für die in erster Linie die Regierungen und Bürger der wohlhabenden Staaten verantwortlich sind. Es wird die These vertreten, dass die gegenwärtigen institutionellen Strukturen, wie sie im internationalen Recht festgeschrieben sind, eine kollektive Menschenrechtsverletzung ungeheuren Ausmaßes darstellen, zu der die meisten Wohlhabenden dieser Welt einen nicht kompensierten Beitrag leisten. Jede institutionelle Ordnung ist hauptsächlich im Hinblick auf ihren relativen Beitrag zur Verwirklichung der Menschenrechte derjenigen zu bewerten und zu reformieren, denen sie auferlegt wird. Es handelt sich um einen "relativen" Beitrag, da ein vergleichendes Urteil darüber vonnöten ist, wie viel besser oder schlechter die Menschenrechte erfüllt sind, als dies in realisierbaren alternativen Ausgestaltungen dieser institutionellen Ordnung der Fall wäre. Eine institutionelle Ordnung und deren Implementierung verletzt die Menschenrechte, wenn und insofern sie vorhersehbar zu einem massiven und vermeidbaren Menschenrechtsdefizit führt. (ICF2)

Das Problem der Gewaltausstrahlung im Tschetschenienkonflikt ist nach dem 'Weg zur politischen Lösung', den die russische Regierung im Jahr 2003 eingeschlagen hat, eher größer als kleiner geworden. In seinen Hauptpunkten, vor allem mit der forcierten Wahl des bisherigen Verwaltungsleiters Kadyrow zum tschetschenischen Präsidenten, erwies sich dieser Weg als Scheinlösung. Rußland definiert den Konflikt weiterhin als seine innerstaatliche Angelegenheit und weist jeglichen Ansatz zur Internationalisierung zurück. Dabei greift Gewalt mehr als zuvor über die Grenzen der nordkaukasischen Teilrepublik hinaus. Zwar steht dieser Konfliktfall mit seinem Potential für regionale Eskalation hinter Konfliktherden wie Palästina, Afghanistan, Irak und Kaschmir zurück. Aber die Vorstellung, er sei als ein innerstaatliches Problem Rußlands 'eingekapselt', ist ein Irrtum. Die Studie stellt dar, warum die Situation in Tschetschenien die internationale Politik über humanitäre Belange hinaus angeht, und setzt sich mit der im Jahr 2003 praktizierten Tschetschenienpolitik des Kreml sowie mit westlicher Rußlandpolitik in Hinsicht auf Tschetschenien auseinander.

This article explores the role of reflexivity in negotiating the researcher's positions while undertaking qualitative research in an international setting. Negotiating my positions between a researcher and a student and/or practitioner, and an insider and an outsider was complicated. This article suggests that endogenous and referential reflexivity can contribute towards reflecting a researcher's positionality and its potential influence on the research process and findings.

While the European Enlightenment marked the dawn of our modern era, marked by a belief in the rule of law to deliver security and prosperity to all people, the geopolitical reality of world order has not delivered on this promise. The case of Western Sahara, a UN declared non-self-governing territory demonstrates the negative implications for human rights where fissures occur between what Charles Taylor deemed the modern social imaginary and this global political reality. This paper explores the history of the Western Sahara conflict with respect to the UN framework of international law regarding self-determination. It concludes by offering suggestions for moving past a mere acceptance of the feasible, looking towards the ideal.