The Resurrection of International Law
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 17, S. 61-70
ISSN: 2169-1118
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In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 17, S. 61-70
ISSN: 2169-1118
In: In Diana Ayton-Shenker (ed.), The New Global Agenda, Lahnham: Rowman & Littlefield (2018). Chapter 2 (25-42).
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In: Transnational Environmental Law, Band 1, S. 31-41
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Working paper
In: American political science review, Band 30, Heft 4, S. 736-741
ISSN: 1537-5943
Among legal philosophers, the time-honored dispute between natural-law schools and legal positivists arouses ever new interest. On the side of the positivists, the "pure theory of law" gains more and more ground. This theory is mainly represented by Professor Hans Kelsen, formerly of Vienna, now of Geneva, and by Professor Alfred von Verdross, of Vienna. In America, systematic consideration was first devoted to it by Dr. Johannes Mattern, who analyzed Verdross's thinking; later, Dr. Josef L. Kunz, one of the foremost followers of Kelsen, took up the discussion, emphasizing the importance of the theory for a scientific basis of international law; and quite recently an article by Dr. Henry Janzen dealt with legal monism as the basis of the "pure theory of law."
In: University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 18/2019
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In: Forthcoming in the Australian Yearbook of International Law
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In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 85, Heft 4, S. 613-645
ISSN: 2161-7953
The development of feminist jurisprudence in recent years has made a rich and fruitful contribution to legal theory. Few areas of domestic law have avoided the scrutiny of feminist writers, who have exposed the gender bias of apparently neutral systems of rules. A central feature of many western theories about law is that the law is an autonomous entity, distinct from the society it regulates. A legal system is regarded as different from a political or economic system, for example, because it operates on the basis of abstract rationality, and is thus universally applicable and capable of achieving neutrality and objectivity. These attributes are held to give the law its special authority. More radical theories have challenged this abstract rationalism, arguing that legal analysis cannot be separated from the political, economic, historical and cultural context in which people live. Some theorists argue that the law functions as a system of beliefs that make social, political and economic inequalities appear natural. Feminist jurisprudence builds on certain aspects of this critical strain in legal thought. It is much more focused and concrete, however, and derives its theoretical force from immediate experience of the role of the legal system in creating and perpetuating the unequal position of women.
In: Cambridge studies in international and comparative law, 146
World Affairs Online
In: International affairs: a Russian journal of world politics, diplomacy and international relations, Heft 1, S. 161-167
ISSN: 0130-9641
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 398-406
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 699-703
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 653-664
ISSN: 2161-7953
If we ask ourselves what it was that secured to the world since the time of the Reformation a fair measure of peace and security, the answer will surely lie in the fact that a firm conviction pervaded all minds of the sacredness and sanctity of territory. It was not a reasoned conviction: no conviction based on reason is of compelling force. Its force lay in the fact that an invasion of territory deprived the invaded party of reason: it was a touch on a nerve, which would provoke an automatic violent reaction: its consequences were incalculable. It is these irrational urges which lie at the base of all our reasoning and assumptions. In this case, it was not so much that an invaded state would feel stung to resist the invader, however hopelessly; it was rather that an invaded state could not but resist—had no idea of not resisting.
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 33, Heft 3, S. 545-549
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 565-580
ISSN: 2161-7953
"The preamble of a statute," says Justice Story, "is a key to open the mind of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and the objects which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the statute."
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 14, Heft 1-2, S. 313-318
ISSN: 2161-7953