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Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1 -- Unemployment Insurance: Actions Needed to Ensure Consistent Reporting of Overpayments and Claimants' Compliance with Work Search Requirements* -- Abbreviations -- Why GAO Did This Study -- What GAO Recommends -- What GAO Found -- Background -- UI Program Administration and Funding -- Work Search Requirements for UI Claimants -- Process for Identifying Work Search Overpayments in State Benefit Accuracy Measurement Audits -- Reported Causes of UI Improper Payments -- Trend in Reported Work Search Overpayments -- Conducting More Work Search Investigations Is Associated with Lower Estimated Work Search Overpayment Rates, as Is the Use of Formal Warnings -- Investigating Claimant-Reported Job Contacts Is Associated with Lower Work Search Overpayment Estimates, but the Extent to Which States Verified Contacts Varied -- Frequent Use of Formal Warnings Is Associated with Reporting Lower Work Search Overpayments, but DOL Recently Determined Their Use Is Legally Impermissible -- Higher Percentages of Claimants Required to Search for Work Are Associated with Higher Work Search Overpayment Rate Estimates -- Selected States Used Multiple Approaches to Address Work Search Overpayments, but Cited Challenges Verifying Claimants' Work Search Activities -- DOL Monitors States' Work Search Overpayment Rate Estimates and Provides Assistance, but Lacks Clear Procedures on Work Search Verification -- DOL Monitors States' Work Search Overpayment Rate Estimates and Has Identified Strategies and Provided Tools to Help States Reduce Their Rates -- DOL Directs States to Investigate a Sample of Claimants' Work Searches, but Has Not Clarified Procedures on Verifying Work Search -- Conclusion -- Recommendations for Executive Action -- Agency Comments.

Unemployment insurance (UI) provides temporary income support to workers who have lost their jobs and are seeking reemployment. This paper reviews the origins of the federal-state UI system in the United States and outlines its principles and goals. It also describes the conditions for benefit eligibility, the benefits themselves, and their financing through the UI payroll tax. The UI system is complex and includes many interested parties, including employers, worker advocates, state UI administrators, and the federal government. These parties' differing views have led to controversies over benefit eligibility, adequacy, and whether the states or federal government should bear primary responsibility for UI. The Great Recession caused most states' UI trust funds to become insolvent and has led to renewed debate over the structure and financing of the system.

The introduction of social insurance in Britain stemmed ultimately from Beveridge's and others' desire to abolish poverty. Beveridge failed to understand that social insurance is incompatible with private insurance markets, and especially unemployment insurance.

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interaction between the political decision about the level of the unemployment insurance and the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism which may generate multiple stady-state equillibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with high unemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist with an American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnover and low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model features two distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and duration rates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interaction between the political decision about the level of the unemployment insurance and the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-state equilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with high unemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist with an American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnover and low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model features two distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and duration rates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

First published in 1986, Insurance for Unemployment proposes a radical approach to the reform of unemployment and social insurance. The book develops the ethical, economic and actuarial case for the proposed reforms, whereby the individual pays the contributions which reflect the unemployment risk that he wishes to insure. Such ideas provide a libertarian alternative to the social security systems that have been adopted by most countries in the world based on Beveridge's conception of social insurance, and the book provides an original basis for privatising unemployment insurance. Conventional

This paper examines the optimal time-consistent unemployment insurance policy in a search economy with incomplete markets. In a context of repeated choice without a commitment device, we show that the optimal replacement rate depends on how frequently in time the policy can be revised. The exact relation is dependent on the political process: if the utilitarian welfare criterion is used, the optimal rate is higher the shorter the choice periodicity. Self-insurance reduces the need for the public scheme but mostly because the policy cannot be changed often enough. The comparison with an economy where a commitment device is assumed shows that the commitment rate is close to time-consistent rates with very long choice periodicities. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.