Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper assesses the causal impact of the European Union (EU) cohesion policy, aimed at reducing the regional divide within the EU, on interpersonal income inequality in receiving areas. We leverage a severe contraction of financing, which took place in an Italian region in 2007, and adopt a difference‐in‐discontinuity empirical design to show that the Gini index (of income) at the municipality level goes down because of the end of the policy. The improvement is due to the move of top earners towards the centre of the distribution. The reduction in the Gini indicator is confirmed even if we resort to a region‐level analysis. Our results suggest that from a policy perspective, reducing spatial inequality might come with the cost of worsening inequality across individuals.

The paper estimates the political connection premium for Italian cities tracked during the second half of the 1900s, when the role of the state in the economy was very widespread. It leverages the peculiar features of the gridlocked political landscape in place between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin wall, during which most influential politicians remained in charge for a very long time. We compare connected cities - small areas surrounding birthplaces of both prime ministers and leaders of the parties in power - with very similar, but unconnected municipalities, and find that politically connected cities gained a population premium of 8% over 40 years. When the connection ends, the difference in growth rate fades away. We document that birthplaces of powerful politicians benefited from both infrastructure investments and the location of plants by state-owned enterprises. Not surprisingly, the connection favored industrialization, raised employment and wages, but crowded out private entrepreneurship. Finally, our empirical evidence indicates that agglomeration economies in treated municipalities were not higher, thus suggesting that, if anything, place-based interventions linked to political connections have not been output-enhancing from a nationwide point of view.

The paper estimates the political connection premium for Italian cities tracked during the second half of the 1900s, when the role of the state in the economy was very widespread. It leverages the peculiar features of the gridlocked political landscape in place between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin wall, during which most influential politicians remained in charge for a very long time. We compare connected cities - small areas surrounding birthplaces of both prime ministers and leaders of the parties in power - with very similar, but unconnected municipalities, and find that politically connected cities gained a population premium of 8% over 40 years. When the connection ends, the difference in growth rate fades away. We document that birthplaces of powerful politicians benefited from both infrastructure investments and the location of plants by state-owned enterprises. Not surprisingly, the connection favored industrialization, raised employment and wages, but crowded out private entrepreneurship. Finally, our empirical evidence indicates that agglomeration economies in treated municipalities were not higher, thus suggesting that, if anything, place-based interventions linked to political connections have not been output-enhancing from a nationwide point of view.

We analyze the impact of immigration on voting. Using Italian municipality data and IV estimation strategy, we find that immigration generates a sizable causal increase in votes for the centre-right coalition, which has a political platform less favorable to immigrants. Additional findings are: big cities behave differently, with no impact of immigration on electoral outcomes; gains in votes for the centre-right coalition correspond to loss of votes for the centre-left parties, a decrease in voter turnout, and a rise in protest votes; cultural diversity, competition in the labor market and for public services are the most relevant channels at work.