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ABSTRACTFirm success is often associated with the development of better products. Private firms undertake applied R&D seeking market advantage, by capitalizing on the freely accessible results of basic research. But unpatentable basic research often fails to address applied R&D open problems. What is the role of the incentives in improving the innovative performance of an economy by matching partially motivated public researchers to their mission? Sometimes government‐funded research projects are mission‐directed, and yet in many cases the public sector academics indulge in carrier‐driven research. An innovation system where, as in the United States, basic research is also driven by patents implicitly sets an ex‐post incentive to the researchers guided by invisible hand. For a public innovation system – like the European one – designing an incentive scheme to motivate public researchers is of key importance for fostering the performance of the economic system. This paper extends the Schumpeterian multisector growth model with vertical innovation by highlighting a link between the degree of 'targetness' of public research and aggregate innovation. A positive effect of social capital is also proved.

Abstract
This paper studies the long run growth implications of the presence of information acquisition and transmission costs. We assume that vertical innovation requires researchers to be informed on the current version of the product they want to improve upon; and we also assume that quasi-fixed managerial inputs are required for production in the manufacturing sector. Despite the fact the increases in total factor productivity cause R&D and managerial quasi-fixed labor costs to decrease in the same way as variable labor costs, the presence of these costs is sufficient to rule out the strong scale effect at all levels of the intertemporal returns to ideas. More importantly, the upper bound of long run growth rates crucially depends on information transmission costs.

"Advanced Macroeconomics covers selected topics in advanced macroeconomics at the undergraduate level and bridges the gap between intermediate macroeconomics for undergraduates and advanced macroeconomics for postgraduates. By building on materials in intermediate macroeconomics textbooks and covering the mathematics of some classic dynamic general-equilibrium models, this book will give undergraduate students a firm appreciation of modern developments in macroeconomics. This book examines the implications of government policies (such as fiscal policy, monetary policy and innovation policy) and devotes several chapters to economic growth, covering the ideas for which Paul Romer was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2018. Dynamic general equilibrium is the foundation of modern macroeconomics. Chapter 1 begins with a simple static model to demonstrate the concept of general equilibrium. Chapters 2 to 4 cover the neoclassical growth model, exploring the effects of exogenous changes in technology: an important source of business cycle fluctuations. Chapters 5 to 7 use the neoclassical growth model to explore the effects of fiscal policy instruments such as government spending, labour income tax and capital income tax. Chapter 8 develops a simple New Keynesian model to analyse the effects of monetary policy. Chapter 9 begins the analysis of economic growth by reviewing the Solow growth model. Chapters 10 to 12 present the Ramsey model and introduce different market structures to the model to lay down the foundation of the Romer model. Chapter 13 incorporates an R&D sector into the Ramsey model with a monopolistically competitive market structure to develop the Romer model of endogenous technological change. Chapters 14 to 15 examine the implications of the Romer model. Chapter 16 concludes this book by presenting the Schumpeterian growth model and examining its different implications from the Romer model."

This paper responds to the comment of Di Tella and Dubra (2013). We first clarify that the model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) admits two distinct types of multiplicity: one that is at the core of their contribution, and a separate one that is at work in Di Tella and Dubra's example. We then proceed to show how Alesina and Angeletos's results are robust to alternative specifications of the voting mechanism.