The Illogic of American nuclear strategy
In: Cornell studies in security affairs
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In: Cornell studies in security affairs
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of Cold War studies, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 198-214
ISSN: 1531-3298
Abstract
This interpretive essay explores the multiple, changing faces of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. When SALT I was being negotiated in the early 1970s, it was generally viewed as the product of contemporary arms control theory that stressed the value of crisis stability. The U.S. national security adviser at the time, Henry Kissinger, justified the talks in those terms while also positioning them as part of a broader attempt to forge a détente with the Soviet Union. But after the Cold War ended, Kissinger claimed that he had really been engaging in a holding operation to buy time for the U.S. government to rebuild support for a more assertive policy. Declassified documents reveal that he and President Richard Nixon hoped that technological innovations would yield military and political advantages. The two of them believed that previous administrations had failed to overcome dangerous military vulnerabilities and that the United States could get a better deal because the USSR was more anxious for an agreement than Nixon and Kissinger were. In the end, however, this did not prove to be the case, and SALT was little different from the sorts of policies Nixon and Kissinger had scorned. But SALT I was a centerpiece of détente and a symbol of U.S. and Soviet leaders' recognition that each side had a legitimate interest in the other's military posture.
In: Journal of Cold War studies, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 159-162
ISSN: 1531-3298
Most high-profile disasters are followed by demands for an investigation into what went wrong. Even before they start, calls for finding the missed warning signs and an explanation for why people did not "connect the dots" will be common. Unfortunately, however, the same combination of political pressures and the failure to adopt good social science methods that contributed to the initial failure usually lead to postmortems that are badly flawed. The high stakes mean that powerful actors will have strong incentives to see that certain conclusions are—and are not—drawn. Most postmortems also are marred by strong psychological biases, especially the assumption that incorrect inferences must have been the product of wrong ways of thinking, premature cognitive closure, the naive use of hindsight, and the neglect of the comparative method. Given this experience, I predict that the forthcoming inquiries into the January 6, 2021, storming of the US Capitol and the abrupt end to the Afghan government will stumble in many ways.
BASE
In: Comparative strategy, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 218-219
ISSN: 1521-0448
In: Intelligence and national security, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 222-225
ISSN: 1743-9019
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 135, Heft 2, S. 313-325
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Security studies, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 434-456
ISSN: 1556-1852
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 135, Heft 2, S. 313-325
ISSN: 0032-3195
World Affairs Online
In: Nationalities papers: the journal of nationalism and ethnicity, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 697-699
ISSN: 1465-3923
In: Annual review of political science, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 1-19
ISSN: 1545-1577
Throughout my life, politics and political science have been intertwined. I handed out leaflets for Adlai Stevenson at age 12, participated in protests at Oberlin and Berkeley, and, as I developed professional expertise, worked with national security agencies. Conflict has been a continuing interest, particularly whether situations are best analyzed as a security dilemma or aggression. In exploring this question, I was drawn into both political psychology and signaling, although the two are very different. I have continued to work on each and occasionally try to bring them together. My thinking about strategic interaction led to a book-length exploration of system effects, a way of thinking that I believe is still insufficiently appreciated in the discipline and among policy makers. My research continues to be stimulated by both developments in the discipline and unfolding international politics.