Suchergebnisse

The verdict delivered by voters in the 2015 and 2017 British General Elections and the European Union Referendum surprised pollsters, pundits, the media, and even the victors. Political choices representative of globalist outlooks saw defeat at the polls. Liberal Democratic support was below 10% and voting to remain in the EU underperformed predictions. Empirical analyses demonstrate that there is a nationalist-globalist policy divide, partially rooted in demographics and authoritarian predispositions, which go beyond traditional valence factors in explaining the recent choices of the British electorate. Moreover, this outlook influences how satisfied citizens are with the way democracy works in Britain. Nationalist viewpoints, when juxtaposed against globalist outlooks, are salient in a way they were not during the height of Thatcherism, encompass left-right economic concerns and may portend a new era in British political culture.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Chapter One: Political Choices and Valence Politics -- Chapter Two: Flawless Campaign, Fragile Victory: The 2006 Canadian Federal Election -- Chapter Three: Too Close to Call: The 2004 Canadian Federal Election -- Chapter Four: Red Voters, Blue Voters: The 2004 American Presidential Election -- Chapter Five: Doing Politics His Way: The 2000 American Presidential Election -- Chapter Six: A Big Blue Wave: The 2006 American Congressional Election -- Chapter Seven: Mulroney, Reagan, and Three Big Elections -- Chapter Eight: At the Polls? Why (Some) People Vote -- Chapter Nine: Political Choices Reconsidered -- References -- Index by Name -- Index by Subject

AbstractExisting research explains variation in trade attitudes by pitting explanations rooted in the foreign part of foreign economic policy, like nativism, against economic beliefs like a commitment to free market principles. But what happens when these factors create significant cross-pressures—how do free market-oriented nativists think about trade? We argue that nativism is a higher-order belief that constrains the relationship between lower-order economic attitudes and beliefs about international trade. We test our argument using representative samples from the United States and United Kingdom. First, we analyze observational data and find a significant interaction whereby nativism moderates the relationship between free market attitudes and beliefs that trade provides national and global benefits. Second, we report results from a survey experiment to show that a message about the long-term benefits from free trade increases support for free trade in both samples. Importantly, we also find that nativist values weaken the treatment effect in the US sample. As long as international relations scholars focus on cultural or economic antecedents on their own, we miss much about how elements in belief systems interact.

The study of foreign policy attitudes lies at the intersection of political psychology and international relations. Despite a shared interest in both fields in the psychological bases of political phenomena, research exploring the links between personality traits and foreign policy attitudes is scarce. This article pursues a set of questions intended to bring these agendas together. Do personality traits influence attitudes toward foreign policy? Are the links between personality traits and foreign policy the same, or do they differ across different national contexts? In exploring these questions, this article draws on data from a series of large-scale public opinion surveys in six western democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia.

The study of foreign policy attitudes lies at the intersection of political psychology and international relations. Despite a shared interest in both fields in the psychological bases of political phenomena, research exploring the links between personality traits and foreign policy attitudes is scarce. This article pursues a set of questions intended to bring these agendas together. Do personality traits influence attitudes toward foreign policy? Are the links between personality traits and foreign policy the same, or do they differ across different national contexts? In exploring these questions, this article draws on data from a series of large-scale public opinion surveys in six western democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia.

AbstractWhile public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the United States. Using new data, this article presents a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy‐related survey items that are analysed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). Measurement equivalence is specifically tested and a common four‐factor structure that fits the data in all four countries is found. Consequently, valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers are made. In the process, the four‐factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. The article also demonstrates the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross‐national equivalence of social science concepts.

While public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the US. Using new data, we find a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the US, the UK, France, and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy-related survey items that are analyzed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). We specifically test for measurement equivalence and find a common four-factor structure that fits the data in all four countries. Consequently, we make valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers. In the process, our four-factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. We also demonstrate the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross-national equivalence of social science concepts.

While public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the United States. Using new data, this article presents a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy-related survey items that are analysed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). Measurement equivalence is specifically tested and a common four-factor structure that fits the data in all four countries is found. Consequently, valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers are made. In the process, the four-factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. The article also demonstrates the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross-national equivalence of social science concepts.

While public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the United States. Using new data, this article presents a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy‐related survey items that are analysed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). Measurement equivalence is specifically tested and a common four‐factor structure that fits the data in all four countries is found. Consequently, valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers are made. In the process, the four‐factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. The article also demonstrates the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross‐national equivalence of social science concepts.