Das German Internet Panel (GIP) ist ein Infrastrukturprojekt. Das GIP dient der Erhebung von Daten über individuelle Einstellungen und Präferenzen, die für politische und ökonomische Entscheidungsprozesse relevant sind.
Der Fragebogen enthält zahlreiche experimentelle Variationen in den Erhebungsinstrumenten. Weitere Informationen finden Sie in der Studiendokumentation.
Themen: Sozialer Status: Oben-unten-Selbsteinschätzung auf einer Skala Leiter/ Pyramide (Experiment); Smartphone-Nutzung: Besitz von Mobiltelefon, Computer oder Laptop und Tablet Computer; Smartphone als Mobiltelefon; Smartphone Typ; genutzte Geräte für den Internetzugang; Social Media: Nutzung ausgewählter Anwendungen (z.B. Facebook, Instagram, etc.) im Internet oder als mobile App; Alleinnutzung des Smartphones oder teilen mit anderer Person; Personen, mit denen das Smartphone geteilt wird (Ehe)Partner, Kinder, andere Familienmitglieder, Freunde, Arbeitskollegen, andere); Verwendungshäufigkeit des Smartphones neben Telefonieren oder Versenden von SMS; Selbsteinschätzung der Fähigkeiten im Umgang mit dem Smartphone (Anfänger oder Fortgeschrittener); Angabe der Stundenzahl, die das Smartphone typischerweise eingeschaltet ist; Mitnahme des Smartphones außer Haus; Tragen des Smartphones unterwegs in der Hosentasche oder am Gürtel/ in einem Halter am Körper, in der Jacken- oder Westentasche, in einer Handtasche, einem Rucksack oder einer anderen Tasche, in der Hand; Orte bzw. Situationen außer Haus, wo der Befragte das Smartphone nicht direkt bei sich hat (in der Kirche bzw. in der Moschee, Synagoge oder einem anderen Gotteshaus, im Theater, Konzert, Kino und bei anderen kulturellen Veranstaltungen, in der Schule, Universität und anderen Bildungseinrichtungen, am Arbeitsplatz, beim Laufen oder im Fitnessstudio, bei anderen Sportarten (z.B. Teamsportarten), bei sehr kurzen Wegen (zum Einkaufen, etc.), anderer Ort/ andere Situation, Smartphone immer dabei); Einstellung des Smartphones in der Nacht (komplett ausgeschaltet, lautlos/ stumm/ bitte nicht stören/ Flugmodus, Smartphone bleibt eingeschaltet); Aufbewahrungsort des Smartphones in der Nacht (im Bett, in Reichweite neben dem Bett, im selben Raum nicht in direkter Reichweite, in einem anderen Raum); Aufbewahrungsort des Smartphones tagsüber zu Hause (Hosentasche oder am Gürtel, nicht am Körper, aber in Reichweite und Mitnahme bei Raumwechsel, an einem fixen Platz in der Wohnung, an einem anderen Ort).
Experiment zur Aufmerksamkeit des Befragten (Attention check): Abstimmungsverhalten bei einem Referendum über die Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands in der EU (Sonntagsfrage), wobei ein Teil der Befragten aufgefordert wurde, das Gesellschaft im Wandel-Logo anzuklicken und die Textlänge variiert wurde.
Lobbyismus: Geschätzter Einfluss von Lobbyismus auf die Klimapolitik der EU; Bewertung des Einflusses von Lobbyismus auf die Klimapolitik der EU; Einfluss von Lobbyismus auf das Maß an Klimaschutz der Europäischen Union.
Klimaschutz: Beeinflussbarkeit des Klimas auf der Erde durch die Menschheit; Zustimmung zur Aussage: weltweites Maß an Klimaschutz ist ausreichend, um die Erwärmung des Klimas einzuschränken und gravierende Auswirkungen zu verhindern; Meinung zur fairen Verteilung des Aufwands für den Klimaschutz auf die gesellschaftlichen Akteure in der EU; Zustimmung zur verschiedenen Aussagen: die meisten Bürger der EU tragen zum Klimaschutz bei, finanzielle Unterstützung von Klimaschutz- und Umweltorganisationen ist effektiv um den Klimaschutz voranzutreiben; wöchentliche Autonutzung (als Fahrer oder Mitfahrer); Häufigkeit folgender Tätigkeiten in den letzten 6 Monaten (beim Kauf eines Produkts auf dessen Nachhaltigkeit geachtet, ehrenamtliches Engagement für ein Umweltprojekt, Teilnahme an einer Demonstration für mehr Umweltschutz bzw. Klimaschutz, eigene Einkaufstasche beim Einkaufen, Petition für mehr Umweltschutz bzw. Klimaschutz unterschrieben, Spende an eine Umweltorganisation, Kauf regionaler Bioprodukte, mit dem Flugzeug geflogen, keine der Tätigkeiten); der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union (EuGH) begünstigt Maßnahmen, die die Europäische Einigung vorantreiben vs. schützt Parteien oder Gruppen, die gegen die Europäische Einigung sind; Zustimmung zur Aussage: wenn der EuGH viele Entscheidungen treffen würde, mit denen die meisten Leute nicht übereinstimmen, wäre es besser, den EuGH ganz abzuschaffen; Meinung zur Rechtsstaatlichkeit (manchmal ist es besser das Gesetz zu ignorieren und Probleme sofort zu lösen, statt auf eine rechtliche Lösung zu warten); Zustimmung zur Aussage: es ist sehr wichtig, den Ausstoß von Kohlendioxid und Schadstoffen durch Fahrzeuge zu mindern, auch auf Kosten des Wirtschaftswachstums; Bereitschaft, heute etwas Nützliches aufzugeben, um dafür mehr davon in der Zukunft zu profitieren.
Experiment zu EU-Entscheidungen hinsichtlich einer Gesetzesreform zur Bewältigung der Luftverschmutzung mit unterschiedlichen Szenarien in Bezug auf die Umsetzung von EU-Recht in nationales Recht und die Einleitung rechtlicher Schritte gegen Deutschland durch die EU-Kommission bei fehlender Umsetzung von EU-Recht in nationales Recht.
Zufriedenheit mit der Art, wie die Bundesregierung bzw. die EU diese Situation handhabt; Verständnis des gelesenen Hergangs durch Auswahl zutreffender Antworten (die Kommission kann rechtliche Schritte gegen einen EU-Staat einleiten, der es versäumt EU-Recht umzusetzen, die deutsche Bundesregierung wird einen Gesetzesentwurf einbringen, der die jetzige Immigrationspolitik/ Politik zur Luftverschmutzung reformiert).
Parteien-Experiment: Sympathie-Skalometer für die derzeitigen, namentlich unter einem Foto genannten Parteivorsitzenden der Parteien (CDU: Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, CSU: Markus Söder, SPD: Saskia Esken, Norbert Walter-Borjans, FDP: Christian Lindner, Bündnis90/ Die Grünen: Robert Habeck, Annalena Baerbock, Die Linke: Katja Kipping, Bernd Riexinger, AfD: Jörg Meuthen); Problemlösungskompetenz der Parteien CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Bündnis90/ Die Grünen, Die Linke und AfD; Einfluss der vorgenannten Parteien auf den Gesetzgebungsprozess seit der letzten Bundestagswahl; Links-Rechts-Einstufung der vorgenannten Parteien (11-stufige Skala); Wahrnehmung der Parteien CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Bünnis90/ Die Grünen, Die Linke und AfD als zerstritten versus geschlossen (11-stufige Skala); Wahrnehmung der Aussagen der vorgenannten Parteien zu angestrebten politischen Maßnahmen als vage versus genau (11-stufige Skala); Wahrscheinlichkeit, jemals die Partei CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Bündnis90/ Die Grünen, Die Linke und AfD zu wählen (11-stufige Skala); Kenntnis der derzeitigen Parteivorsitzenden der Parteien CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Bündnis90/ Die Grünen, Die Linke und AfD; Parteipräferenz bei der nächsten Bundestagswahl (Sonntagsfrage).
Demographie: Geschlecht; Alter (Geburtsjahr, kategorisiert); höchster Schulabschluss; höchster beruflicher Bildungsabschluss; Familienstand; Haushaltsgröße; Erwerbsstatus; deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft; Häufigkeit der privaten Internetnutzung; Bundesland.
Zusätzlich verkodet wurde: Befragten- ID; Haushalts-ID, GIP; Personen-ID (innerhalb des Haushalts); Jahr der Rekrutierung (2012, 2014, 2018); Interviewdatum; derzeitiger Online-Status; Zuordnung zu Experimentalgruppen; Randomisierungen; Gesellschaft im Wandel-Logo wurde angeklickt.
Fragebogenevaluation (interessant, abwechslungsreich, relevant, lang, schwierig, zu persönlich); Beurteilung der Befragung insgesamt; Befragter hat weitere Anmerkungen zum Fragebogen gemacht.
On this shaky foundation they propound a thesis at least a little more promising. It is that America's elites have lately learned that they can conquer the world without bothering about citizens at all. 'In one public setting after another,' Crenson and Ginsberg write, 'government disaggregates the public into a mass of individual clients, consumers, and contributors,' leading to 'new and nonparticipatory ways of doing business.' Elites have exploited that development to counter a structural flaw within the old model: namely, that a mobilized citizenry cannot be controlled. With pesky citizens out of the way, the powerful can defend their interests in less risky ways--in courtrooms, 'by manipulating administrative procedures,' through privatization. Citizens are left subject to a 'personal democracy' of individual access to government services and redress--which is, to these authors, always bad. This is a bit of a creepy theory as well. Because personal democracy is not all bad, any more than their golden age was all good. Not as ridiculous as when they move on to the true villains of the piece: you and me. Their account of the post-Progressive progressives begins with a mangled and bizarre genealogy of what they think describes the 'New Politics' of the late sixties and after. In actuality, the New Politics was a failed attempt at electoral realignment--the recognition and mobilization of a potential new political majority in which a new class of humanistic professionals made up but one part, alongside minorities, disillusioned youth, the new public service unions, and so on. Crenson and Ginsberg instead remember the New Politics as a greedy, antidemocratic cartel. Post-sixties, the American government become more and more the plaything of issue-driven ideological entrepreneurs, funded by the Ford Foundation, whose only true constituency was a media elite that disastrously fell for their specious claim to speak for the 'public interest,' and whose only accomplishment was 'the delegation of government tasks and public funds to nongovernmental institutions likely to be staffed by fellow practitioners of the New Politics--nonprofit social service agencies, legal services clinics, public interest law firms, and the like.' These are today's democracy-downsizing elites: 'Having established their political influence ... the liberal heirs of the New Politics were understandably reluctant to place it at risk by issuing appeals for mass activism. They were likely to flourish politically in a low-turnout environment.' Other parts of his research focus on the United States. The stuff on the effect of negative ads is great. The favorite plaint among politicians is that such ads depress turnout (the bromide serves them well because it focuses attention away from the cracks in the political system itself). Wattenberg proves that the very premise is drivel: The most-cited work on the subject is based on controlled experiments, not actual election data--which in fact shows that the more respondents remember ads, the higher their turnout is. Also impressive is his debunking of the argument, presented, among other places, in these pages by Ruy Teixeira, that greater turnout wouldn't help the Democrats and the left generally. The problem with studies propounding this conclusion, Wattenberg demonstrates, is that they overgeneralize from presidential election years, where a big electorate more closely matches the actual opinions of the general population. But it is the low-turnout ones in between where non-voting distorts ideology the most. In 1994, 30 percent of people without high school diplomas voted compared to 62 percent with college degrees; 'If turnout rates had been equal among all education categories,' Wattenberg concludes, 'the Republican share of the vote would have fallen from 52.0 percent to 49.2 percent'--for 'registered nonvoters in 1994 were consistently more pro-Democratic than were voters on a variety of measures of partisanship.' It's an argument with a bonus: armed with it, you get to credit not Dick Morris for Clinton's 1996 reelection but simply a routine increase in turnout from 1994.
Riassunto LE RIMESSE dei MIGRANTI IL LORO VALORE ECONOMICO-SOCIALE SIA PER IL PAESE OSPITANTE CHE PER IL PAESE DI ORIGINE. Per diversi anni gli studiosi hanno dibattuto sul ruolo delle rimesse dei migranti verso il loro paese di origine in un'ottica di co-sviluppo: dopo essere giunti alla conclusione condivisa che questi flussi di denaro svolgono un ruolo molto importante nell'economia del proprio paese, nonostante alcuni rischi legati all'aumento dei consumi e delle importazioni, l'attenzione si è concentrata su come le rimesse dei migranti possano essere al meglio valorizzate. Se le rimesse da flussi vengono convertite in risparmio, o comunque capitale vincolato, possono generare maggiori effetti positivi, ad esempio trasformandosi in fondi per l'erogazione di nuovi microcrediti o di servizi aggiuntivi per le istituzioni di microfinanza (IMF) diminuendo così la dipendenza dai sussidi e dalle donazioni. Esse giocano un ruolo fondamentale nelle economie dei paesi in via di sviluppo, esportatori di manodopera. Questo sia a livello micro, essendo le famiglie dei migranti le beneficiarie dirette le quali utilizzano le rimesse per consumi quotidiani, sia a livello macroeconomico, in quanto le rimesse costituiscono una delle principali voci della bilancia dei pagamenti di molti paesi d'origine. Questi flussi sono solo secondi agli investimenti diretti esteri e superano gli aiuti ufficiali allo sviluppo rivolti a questi paesi. L'immigrazione è uno degli argomenti di cui oggi in Italia si parla di più a livelli molto diversi. E' un tema centrale del dibattito politico, un argomento della conversazione quotidiana tra le persone, un tema presente negli approfondimenti dei mass media. Spesso questo interesse non è supportato da adeguati elementi conoscitivi o margini di approfondimento e si risolve in uno scontro di luoghi comuni e pregiudizi di volta in volta positivi o negativi. Tuttavia, anche quando risulta supportato da un'adeguata preparazione preliminare, il dibattito rischia di risolversi in una contrapposizione tra posizioni apparentemente inconciliabili. Da una parte la posizione che potremmo definire filo-migratoria e dall'altra parte quella anti-migratoria. Ogni posizione si consolida nelle proprie convinzioni con argomenti che paiono incontrovertibili ai sostenitori e tali da poter affermare con la massima convinzione che la propria opinione è l'unica sensata, convincente e soprattutto "realistica". Viceversa si accusa chi sostiene l'opinione contraria di essere vittima di pericolose e insensate "paure", o seguace di "utopie" altrettanto perniciose e prive di legami con la realtà. Anche un'analisi superficiale mostra che a quasi tutte queste posizioni può essere riconosciuto un certo contenuto di credibilità. Forse si può perfino ipotizzare che per ognuna di esse sussistano più o meno adeguati argomenti di difesa teorica. Tuttavia nessuna può essere ragionevolmente considerata l'unica incontrovertibile e dimostrabile verità rispetto all'argomento trattato. Certamente alla base di numerose affermazioni dei sostenitori di entrambe le posizioni pare sussistere una profonda e a volte inconscia convinzione nell'una o nell'altra delle due affermazioni: • Le migrazioni sono un bene • Le migrazioni sono un male. Basandosi su enunciati valutativi di valore soggettivo, le due posizioni sono destinate a scontrarsi in eterno, producendo vasti apparati giustificativi, proposte pratiche e modelli di intervento, che si contrappongono quasi specularmente. Piuttosto si è provato a limitare l'indagine ad un argomento intorno al quale si potessero esprimere posizioni teoriche, realizzare ricerche empiriche a supporto, e impostare un confronto su basi oggettive. La scelta di adottare questa impostazione di lavoro ha lo scopo di uscire dal dualismo che vede le migrazioni come un "male" o come un "bene", per inquadrare il problema dell'utilità dell'immigrazione in termini economici per i paesi di destinazione e in particolare per l'Italia. Per analizzare le determinanti dei flussi di rimesse è necessario tenere a mente che esse sono il frutto di un processo importante quale quello migratorio da parte di alcuni individui che decidono di lasciare il proprio ambiente, in questo caso, il proprio Paese alla ricerca di un lavoro. A differenza delle teorie sviluppate alcuni decenni fa, nelle quali l'emigrazione così come lo sviluppo non venivano posti in relazione tra di essi e in particolare con le rimesse, negli ultimi decenni gran parte degli sforzi dei ricercatori vanno proprio verso questa direzione. Inoltre, le nuove teorie intendono fare luce anche sulla capacità dell'emigrazione e quindi delle rimesse di agire sulla disuguaglianza, sul mercato del lavoro e sulla stessa stratificazione sociale dell'area di origine. Sul tema specifico, va ricordato che, dal 2004, grazie alle direttive della Banca Mondiale e del Fondo Monetario Internazionale, si è sviluppato un'attività di ricerca, di raccolta dati e di statistiche sullo specifico argomento delle Rimesse. Infatti si è capito quanta importanza hanno le rimesse degli emigranti sia dal punto di vista economico che sociale. Purtroppo anche il malaffare si è interessato a questi flussi, insinuandosi in questo ambito e sviluppando un sistema parallelo per finanziare: armi, droghe ed altro. Questo mio lavoro è suddiviso in cinque parti ed una conclusione: •la prima parte con l' "introduzione ed i cenni storici", introduce l'argomento sia delle rimesse che del loro valore; •la seconda parte analizza la funzione delle rimesse e cerca di dare una connotazione sulle tipologie delle stesse e spiegando ciò che al momento esiste sul mercato; •nella terza parte affronto le varie tipologie dei canali formali ed informali; •nella quarta parte prendo in considerazione tre tipologie di migranti e cioè le comunità più significative della provincia di Pisa (albanesi, senegalesi e ucraini), fornendo una scheda dei paesi di origine, loro economia e statistiche varie •nella quinta parte affronto i dati complessivi delle rimesse in Italia, la bancarizzazione degli stranieri residenti, i costi per il trasferimento delle rimesse. Inoltre presento sia le banche che offrono prodotti bancari agli stranieri e le tre società multinazionali di trasferimento del denaro. In questa parte dedico un capitolo al nuovo fenomeno dei BITCOIN nuovo strumento monetario e finanziario che rivoluzionerà il sistema e il futuro della "moneta". Affronto inoltre la tematica delle politiche di alcune nazioni per favorire le rimesse "formali", la formazione del risparmio e delle istituzioni bancarie locali che possono indirizzare "le rimesse" verso investimenti produttivi. •In ultimo le conclusioni. In questa ricerca ho trovato molta difficoltà nel reperire dati statistici omogenei e riferiti ad un determinato periodo temporale o anno. Pertanto ho presentato i vari capitoli ed argomenti con riferimento a dati statistici i più recenti possibili che vanno anche dal 2005 ai dati del 2016. Giugno 2017 Umberto Mugnaini
Ecological networks aim to integrate biodiversity conservation with sustainable spatial development. Their governance in Europe is shaped by the interplays between multiple actors from various levels along spatial and jurisdictional-institutional scales. Despite the calls for greater public and stakeholder involvement, the legitimacy or social robustness of spatial planning and biodiversity policies in Europe has continuously been questioned by various stakeholders. This thesis, drawing on a set of qualitative case studies, provides some reflections on the participatory development of certain ecological network initiatives foremost in Estonia (e.g. the Natura 2000 and the national Green Network), as well as in other EU countries. The following questions are addressed. (1) To what extent are participatory approaches able to effectively build stakeholder awareness? (2) What are instances of and factors contributing towards knowledge integration and social learning within participatory processes? (3) Which conditions affect the legitimacy of ecological network governance? Landowners are one key stakeholder group within the Natura 2000 designations and management. Yet, their awareness on important topics, like socio-economic implications of designations, or on formal rules of consultations in the Estonian cases was rather vague. The way information is exchanged, but its content also affects the success of communication: broad awareness-raising campaigns (e.g. information distributed via mass media) are not likely to satisfy stakeholders' specific information needs and build their trust towards environmental authorities. More personalised involvement tools are needed to raise landowners' awareness. In the Estonian Natura 2000 consultations, mostly scientific knowledge stood at the forefront, but the participatory delineations of the Green Network allowed the inclusion of knowledge from a broader set of stakeholders. Trust in each other's expertise, but also certain attributes of the decision-making context, and of participatory processes (e.g. goal definition, continuity of contacts) facilitated knowledge integration in the latter case. Conflictive situations can also catalyse learning among stakeholders, e.g. support them to become aware of and respectful towards each other's concerns. The cases have illustrated several challenges that the complex architectures of multi-level governance contexts pose on certain normative criteria for assessing legitimacy, e.g. for inclusion, accountability or transparency. Under different contexts, stakeholders tend to wear "multiple hats", e.g. represent different kinds of interests, or are carriers of various knowledge claims. Often the concrete situation determines which one of such "hats" will be the most important. Here, the legitimacy of decision-making foremost depends on what kinds of stakeholders' concerns are considered and/or included in the processes and their outcomes. Stakeholder analyses could help to identify the actors, analyse their roles, claims, and their relevance. The issue(s) at stake also affect stakeholders' expectations towards participatory decision-making. So, stakeholders' expectations towards participation, but the overall process boundaries should also be clarified from the outset, in order to avoid raising unjustified expectations. If conflicts within ecological network governance are caused by fundamental differences in frames, i.e. the various ways people make sense of problems, re-framing exercises could be one solution to reconcile such conflicts. Re-framing helps stakeholders to focus on common aspects in their views, which could facilitate mutual understanding and collaboration. Ultimately, participatory practices are influenced by the prevailing participatory culture, e.g. the ways different stakeholders, including public officials, have been used to conceptualise and exercise participation. ; Ökovõrgustike planeerimine ja rakendamine ühendab maastiku ökoloogilised funktsioonid mitmesuguste sotsiaal-majanduslike aspektidega ning hõlmab geograafilisi ja administratiivtasandeid kohalikest omavalitsustest Euroopa Liiduni (EL). Asjaliste (ingl stakeholders) kaasamist otsustusprotsessidesse peetakse mitmetel pragmaatilistel ning normatiivsetel kaalutlustel oluliseks ökovõrgustike valitsemise osaks. Väitekiri tugineb juhtumiuuringute analüüsil, käsitledes ökovõrgustikega seonduvate kaasamisprotsesside tõhusust ja tulemuslikkust Eestis ning mõnedes teistes EL riikides, ning juhindub järgmistest uurimisküsimustest. (1) Kuidas saab kaasamisega toetada tulemuslikku suhtlust eri osapoolte vahel (sh tõsta maaomanike teadlikkust) Natura 2000 alade määratlemise kontekstis? (2) Millistel juhtudel on / ei ole kaasamine toiminud õpi- ning erinevate asjaliste teadmisi koondava protsessina? Millised faktorid seda mõjutavad? (3) Millised asjaolud määravad otsustusprotsesside ja nende tulemite legitiimsuse (s.t vastuvõetavuse)? Maaomanikud on Natura 2000 võrgustiku moodustamisel üks olulisimaid asjalistegruppe. Analüüsitud juhtumid näitavad, et laialdased avalikustamiskampaaniad ei suuda rahuldada maaomanike spetsiifilist infovajadust, kuid vahetumad ja konkreetsemat sisulist infot pakkuvad suhtlusvormid (nt telefonivestlus looduskaitseametnikuga või osalemine asjaliste koosolekutel) tõstavad tõenäolisemalt maaomanike teadlikkust ning aitavad ennetada arusaamatusi maaomanike ja looduskaitse-ekspertide vahel. Eesti Natura 2000 alade määratlemine põhines eeskätt teaduslikel alustel, kuid maakondade rohevõrgustiku planeerimine võimaldas paljude erinevate teadmistega asjaliste kaasamist. Viimasel juhul olid määravad edutegurid otsustusprotsessi varases etapis loodud usalduslik kontakt ja osapoolte vahelise hea suhte järjepidevus. Kui varasemalt on leitud, et kaasamine on õpiprotsess eeskätt koostööliste suhete tingimustes, siis käesolev uurimus kinnitab, et ka konfliktiolukorrad võivad soodustada üksteise seisukohtade ja huvide teadvustamist ning nendega arvestamist. Valitsustasandite paljusus võib takistada tõhusat teabevahetust neil toimivate asjaliste vahel, samuti asjaliste võrdväärset kaasamist, vastutusvaldkondade selget piiritlemist ja otsustetegijate aruandekohustuse (accountability) täitmist mitme erineva valitsustasandi ees. Laiapõhjaline asjaliste kaasatus (inclusion) otsustusprotsessidesse ei pruugi alati tagada lõplike otsuste legitiimsust. Otsuste vastuvõetavust mõjutavad siinkohal eeskätt asjaliste hinnangud sellele, kuivõrd nende panusega on kaasamisel arvestatud. Asjalised võivad eri olukordades esindada väga mitmesuguseid rolle, millele vastavalt nad otsustesse panustavad, nt oma teadmiste või huvide kajastamisega. Asjalistel on tihti ka erinevad ootused kaasamisprotsesside ülesehituse ja tulemuste osas, seega tuleks ekslike ootuste vältimiseks kaasamise aluspõhimõtted ning täpsemad protsessireeglid varakult kõigi osapooltega läbi rääkida. Asjaliste analüüs (stakeholder analysis) võimaldab otsusetegijail asjalisi ja nende rolle kaardistada ning lõppkokkuvõttes hinnata, milliseid osapooli tuleks antud kontekstis esmajoones kaasata. Väitekirjas tuli esile legitiimsuseuuringutes seni vähest kajastamist leidnud aspekt, et otsuste illegitiimsus võib tuleneda ka asjaolust, et kaasamisel pole piisavalt arvestatud märkimisväärsete erinevustega asjaliste probleemikäsitlustes (frames). Seda tüüpi vastuolude lahendamisel võib abi olla probleemide ümbersõnastamisest (re-framing) nii, et keskendutakse seisukohtades peituvaile ühisjoontele, millele ehitada üles edasine arutelu ning võimalik koostöö. Selgus ka, et mõnesid Eesti keskkonnakorralduspraktikas laialdaselt kasutatavaid kaasamisvorme (nt avalikke koosolekuid) peavad asjalised ebapiisavateks võimalusteks otsuseid mõjutada. Võimalik, et koosolekuid jt sarnaseid kaasamisvorme aitaksid tõhustada nende parem organiseeritus, mida soodustaksid nt professionaalsed hõlbustajad (facilitators) või ametnike koosolekujuhtimisalaste oskuste arendamine. Kaasamise tõhusust ja tulemuslikkust mõjutab suuresti ka osalus- ja kaasamiskultuur: erinevate asjaliste, sh ametnike arusaamad kaasamisest-osalusest. ; Publication of this dissertation has been supported by the Estonian University of Life Sciences and by the Doctoral School of Earth Sciences and Ecology created under the auspices of European Social Fund.
Die Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Frage nach der Rolle des Bürgers im Prozess der Risikobewertung. In der sozialwissenschaftlichen Risikokommunikationsforschung wird diese Rolle unter dem Begriff der Risikomündigkeit diskutiert. Das Leitbild der Risikomündigkeit zielt auf ein reflektiertes Urteil unter Einbezug von Fakten, Unsicherheiten und Werten der Bürgerinnen und Bürger ab. Im Fokus steht die Frage, welche empirische Relevanz Risikomündigkeit (spezieller: kognitive Kompetenz als Vorbedingung von Risikomündigkeit, kurz: KKR) im Hinblick auf die Risikokommunikation zwischen den Gruppen von Laien und Experten bei unterschiedlichen, technischen Risiken (Atomkraft und Mobilfunk) hat: Wie weit trägt das Konzept der Risikomündigkeit bei verschiedenen Risiken? Diese Forschungsfrage wird sowohl mit quantitativen als auch mit qualitativen Methoden untersucht. Es werden folgende Hypothesen getestet. Die Kognitionshypothese besagt, dass mit steigendem Grad der kognitiven Faktoren der Risikobewertung als Vorbedingung von Risikomündigkeit bei Laien sich die Risikobewertungen von Laien und Experten tendenziell annähern. Aus der Kognitionshypothese lassen sich zwei weitere Hypothesen ableiten: Laien mit hoher kognitiver Kompetenz (hoher Wissensstand, großes Interesse am Thema etc.) kommen zu ähnlichen Risikobewertungen wie Experten (Konsenshypothese) bzw. Laien mit niedriger kognitiver Kompetenz (niedriger Wissensstand, geringes Interesse am Thema etc.) kommen zu unterschiedlichen Risikobewertungen wie Experten (Dissenshypothese). Dies impliziert wiederum eine weitere Hypothese: Laien mit hoher kognitiver Kompetenz kommen zu unterschiedlichen Risikobewertungen wie Laien mit niedriger kognitiver Kompetenz (Laienkompetenzhypothese). Die Hypothesen werden anhand eines repräsentativen Datensatzes getestet. Der Risikomündigkeitssurvey 2006 ist eine quantitative, deutschlandweite Repräsentativbefragung mit einer Fallzahl von n = 868 (gewichteter Datensatz). Die Befragten werden anhand ihrer Antworten zu mehreren Items auf einem Index der KKR verortet. Theoretische Grundlage für die Messung von KKR ist das Elaboration Likelihood Modell (ELM) von John Petty und Richard Cacioppo. Der Hypothesentest bestätigt für die Atomkraft die Kognitionshypothese, Konsenshypothese und Dissenshypothese. Im Falle des Mobilfunks (Sender und Handys) müssen die Hypothesen jedoch zurück gewiesen werden. Die Laienkompetenzhypothese kann für beide Technologien als bestätigt angesehen werden. Des Weiteren wurde die Güte der Operationalisierung der KKR anhand von knapp 60 qualitativen Leitfadeninterviews zu Mobilfunk und Atomkraft überprüft. Eine Einordnung der Befragten nach zentralen Kategorien des ELM müsste ungefähr dasselbe Muster produzieren wie es sich in der quantitativen Studie gezeigt hat. Das qualitativ gewonnene Muster gleicht in der Tat der quantitativen Verteilung im Risikomündigkeitssurvey 2006. Der KKR-Index scheint damit tauglich zu sein, um eine Teilkomponente der Risikomündigkeit zu erfassen. Wie sind diese Ergebnisse zu interpretieren? Zunächst einmal scheint KKR nur bei Atomkraft die vermutete Wirkung zu haben, da beim Mobilfunk die Kognitionshypothese, Konsenshypothese und Dissenshypothese nicht bestätigt werden konnten. Eine mögliche Erklärung hierfür könnte die Tatsache sein, dass im Fall der Kernenergie bedingt durch einen längeren Erfahrungszeitraum mehr belastbares Wissen vorhanden ist, welches Eingang in die Köpfte der Menschen finden konnte. Erst wenn sich der Grad an KKR beim Mobilfunk erhöht, können Wissen und Motivation ihre vermutete Wirkung (Konsens zwischen Experten und Laien oder zumindest Konsens über Dissens) entfalten. Jedoch besteht zur Absicherung dieser Interpretation noch weiterer Forschungsbedarf. Die geschilderten Ergebnisse haben eventuell weit reichende politische Implikationen: Wenn bei Atomkraft Risikomündigkeit "funktioniert", können Bürger in die Entscheidungsfindung mit einbezogen werden, ohne das es gleich zu Missverständnissen mit Akteuren aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft kommen muss. Konflikte auf Grund von Wertedifferenzen kann es natürlich nach wie vor geben. Laien und Experten aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft können entweder zu einem klaren Konsens oder zumindest einem rational begründeten Konsens über bestehende Differenzen (Konsens über Dissens) gelangen. Beim Mobilfunk ist dies (noch) nicht der Fall. Für die Risikowahrnehmungsforschung bedeutet die Risikomündigkeit eine Erweiterung der bekannten Perspektiven (Psychometrie, normative Kulturtheorie, Vertrauensforschung). In Bezug auf die Rolle der KKR für die Risikokommunikation hat sich gezeigt, dass eine Differenzierung nach Technologien auch eine entsprechende Differenzierung in den Kommunikationsstrategien sinnvoll erscheinen lässt. ; The dissertation focuses on the citizen's role in the risk evaluation process. This role is being discussed in the current social science risk research under the concept of "risk maturity". Risk maturity means that citizens evaluate risks under consideration of the facts, uncertainties and their own values. The main research question refers to the empirical relevance of risk maturity for risk communication between laypeople and experts in the case of two different, technological risks (nuclear energy, mobile telephony): What constitutes risk maturity, in particular its cognitive component (Cognitive Competence as a precondition for risk maturity, in short: CCR) in case of two different yet physically related risks? Quantitative as well as qualitative methods are used in the research design. Several empirical hypotheses were tested using quantitative methods. The cognition hypothesis states that risk evaluations of laypersons and experts will become more congruent with the increasing level of layperson's cognitive competence. Two other hypotheses can be derived from the first one: Laypersons with high cognitive competence (high knowledge level, great interest in the topic etc.) will arrive at similar risk evaluations to the expert judgments in this case (consensus hypothesis) and laypersons with low cognitive competence (low knowledge level, little interest in the topic etc.) will arrive at different risk evaluations compared with the expert judgments (dissent hypothesis), respectively. This in turn implies another hypothesis: Laypersons with high cognitive competence and laypersons with low cognitive competence will significantly differ in their risk evaluations (layperson competence hypothesis). The hypotheses were tested using a quantitative, empirical survey. The Risk Maturity Survey 2006 was conducted as a representative telephone survey in Germany (n = 868, weighted data). Respondents were classified by using an index for characterising different degrees of CCR. The theoretical basis for measuring CCR is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (in short: ELM) from John Petty and Richard Cacioppo. The test confirms the cognitive hypothesis, the consensus hypothesis and the dissent hypothesis for nuclear energy. However, all three hypotheses could not be confirmed for mobile telephony (both base stations and mobiles). The layperson competence hypothesis was confirmed for both technologies. Further more, the validity of the measurement of CCR was checked by 60 qualitative, open-ended interviews focussing on nuclear energy and mobile telephony. It was assumed that a classification of the respondents using the main categories of the ELM would produce a similar pattern of peripheral and central groups compared to the quantitative distribution in the survey. Indeed, the qualitative pattern is similar to the quantitative distribution found in the Risk Maturity Survey 2006. This can be interpreted as an indication that the operationalisation of the ELM is indeed valid. How can these findings be interpreted? CCR seems to work only for nuclear energy, not for mobile telephony. One aspect could be time. On the one hand, nuclear energy has been investigated and deployed for a very long time span, at least compared to mobile telephony. There has been more scientific evidence communicated via the mass media which may found its way into the memory of the public. Only with an increasing degree of CCR will knowledge and motivation produce the expected effect which is more consensus between experts and laypersons or at least consensus about dissent. This interpretation however needs more research to confirm it. The research findings may have some important political implications. Risk maturity seems to work for nuclear energy, so participation of laypersons in processes of risk management are less likely to experience conflicts that are based on misunderstanding rather than differences in values. Laypersons and experts from science, politics and industry can reach either a substantive consensus or a consensus on why they dissent on conclusions based on a rational discourse. However, this is (still) not the case for mobile telephony. Risk maturity expands the perspectives of risk perception research (psychometric approach, cultural theory of risk, organisational studies on confidence and trust in risk perception). The study about CCR also showed that the distinction between technologies is relevant for risk communication: Differentiation between technologies or risks may assist risk communicators to design the most appropriate risk communication strategies.
In: Die Natur der Gesellschaft: Verhandlungen des 33. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Kassel 2006. Teilbd. 1 u. 2, S. 3310-3324
"Man sollte meinen, dass der Begriff 'Anpassung' in der historischen Forschung zur Frage der Diskontinuität und Kontinuität von Eliten in Deutschland nach 1945 eine zentrale Bedeutung besitzt. Meist wird er aber nur dort benutzt, wo es um das flüchtige Erklären und Verstehen-Wollen von Anpassungsakten einzelner (meist prominenter) Persönlichkeiten geht. An einer systematischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff, der letztlich ein wesentliches Movens für Elitenkontinuität(en) ist, fehlt es bislang. Genau dies ist in der Diskussion um ein allgemeines Erklärungsmodell der Diskontinuitäten und Kontinuitäten von Karrieren in unterschiedlichen politischen Systemen vonnöten. Insofern sollte seine heuristische Erklärungskraft auch für die fach- und wissenschaftshistorische Forschung geprüft werden. Der Vorschlag des Verfassers ist, mit 'Anpassung' erst einmal nicht einzelne Handlungsweisen zu fassen, sondern - mit Hilfe eines ideen- und institutionenhistorischen Zugangs - das Klima und den Kontext zu untersuchen, in denen 'Anpassung' gefördert oder gestört wird. Das ermöglicht dann im Vergleich mit der Entwicklung verschiedener Fächer, Muster diskursiver und institutioneller Strategien herauszustellen, die die Kontinuität von Wissenschaften nach 1945 getragen haben. Mittlerweile ist die disziplingeschichtliche Auseinandersetzung innerhalb der Kommunikationswissenschaft (biographisch und institutionengeschichtlich) soweit gediehen, dass ein systematischer Blick auf die Mechanismen und Prozesse, die es ihrer Vorläuferdisziplin Zeitungswissenschaft trotz ihrer 'Überanpassung' an den NS-Staat erlaubten, nach 1945 Kontinuität zu wahren, möglich wird. Ziel des Vortrags ist es, nach einer Systematisierung der institutionellen Mechanismen und Prozesse des 'Überlebens' der Zeitungswissenschaft nach 1945, der Frage nachzugehen, mit welchen Ideen das Fach sich seinen Bestand in der Nachkriegszeit zu sichern suchte. Dabei zeigt sich aus der Perspektive der longue durée die Auseinandersetzung um den Wandel des Fachs von einer Geistes- zu einer Sozialwissenschaft. Die von den arrivierten Eliten des Fachs nach 1945 immer noch transportierte 'konservative Dogmatik' (Stefanie Averbeck) wurde immer weniger der Erkenntnis von Medien und Öffentlichkeit in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft gerecht. Erst mit Neugründungen von Instituten in den 1960er Jahren sicherte sich das Fach mit einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Neuorientierung von Erkenntnisinstrumentarien und Erkenntnisperspektiven sein 'Überleben'." (Autorenreferat)
Summary. The aim of this work was to analyse the competences of future teachers of pedagogy in middle education in mathematics, by transforming the representations of a function. The information was collected in the second half of 2019 and processed using the technique of content analysis. It is a qualitative job, where it interacted with teachers in training, while solving problem situations involving roles and preparing a class, which they then simulated to their class group and teacher. The sample was made up of 36 subjects from teachers in mathematics from a Chilean university. The results show that they managed to produce multiple forms of representation of the functional relationships analysed, which made it easier to analyse and establish connections with elements of the socio-cultural context, but part of the group presented difficulties with perceptual fluidity, which prevented connections between them. They changed the partial meanings of the function, in an articulated manner, to one of them, from where they produced and articulated their multiple representations. We conclude on the need to implement intervention processes that will lead future teachers to perform more comprehensive job analyses, which will make it easier for them to make operational use of their knowledge, in order to minimise learning difficulties for their students. ; Resumen En este trabajo se tuvo como objetivo analizar las competencias de futuros profesores de pedagogía en enseñanza media en matemáticas, al hacer transformaciones de las representaciones de una función. La información se recogió en el segundo semestre de 2019 y se procesó utilizando la técnica análisis de contenido. Es un trabajo cualitativo, donde se interactuó con docentes en formación, mientras resolvían situaciones problema que involucraban funciones y preparaban una clase, que luego simulaban ante su grupo de clase y su docente. La muestra la constituyeron 36 sujetos estudiantes del profesorado en matemáticas de una universidad chilena. Los resultados ...
From the Mac Bride report to date, the dominance of information by multinational companies remains in place, it follows that the media do not serve a public service or contribute to the classification of information as a cultural and social fact, but rather as a market fact. On the other hand, governments and multinationals of information (those above) discuss the right to information, which is only access to it and not the participation or appropriation of content or communication processes by civil society organisations (below) who are guided by the latter parameters, are seeking the right to communication. Thus, those above draw up speeches and analyse ways of acting in the context of technological advances without risking power, while those at stake reflect and fight for the right to communication in connection with the development, formation and maintenance of identity and cultural plurality. ; Del informe Mac Bride a hoy, el dominio de la información por parte de las empresas multinacionales sigue vigente, de ello se desprende que los medios no responden a un servicio público ni aporten a la consideración de la información como un hecho cultural y social, sino, como un hecho de mercado. Por otro lado, gobiernos y multinacionales de la información (los de arriba) debaten el derecho a la información que no es sino el acceso a ella y no la participación ni apropiación de contenidos ni procesos comunicacionales por parte de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (los de abajo) quienes guiados por estos últimos parámetros, pretenden el derecho a la comunicación. Así, los de arriba elaboran discursos y analizan las formas de actuar en el marco de los avances tecnológicos sin que ello supongaponer en riesgoel poder, mientras los de abajoreflexionan y luchan por el derecho a la comunicación en vinculación al desarrollo, la formación y mantenimiento de la identidad y la pluralidad cultural.
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President Volodymyr Zelensky and the current Ukrainian parliament are approaching the hour when their formal legitimacy, their mandate, comes to an end. Under normal conditions, elections to the Verkhovna Rada would have been held last October, while candidates for the presidency would have started preparing for elections scheduled for the last Sunday in March of 2024. But the country is consumed by war, and elections are probably not an option. Or are they? President Zelensky is considering the answer to this question. [1]I should state at the outset that I find the idea of organizing elections, whether presidential only or both presidential and parliamentary, during wartime is a very bad idea. At the same time, I also disagree with those who think the matter of postponing elections can be settled purely by having recourse to existing laws.In this brief I show that the ruling group could, if it chose, adopt some legal maneuvering that would formally respect the constitution and the nation's laws (though violating their spirit), and that these maneuvers have been tested several times in Ukraine since 2014. But such formally legal if doubtfully legitimate elections could also pose unjustifiably high sociopolitical risks for a state at war, and this creates a dilemma for the nation.Defining the Wartime Electoral DilemmaCurrently, the Zelensky administration is under pressure to organize parliamentary and presidential elections soon. The first source of the pressure is the West.[2] Behind the scenes, Ukraine's allies are allegedly demanding that Kyiv renew its government's legitimacy, despite the ongoing war and the mass dislocation of citizens. Ukraine's allies know well the constitutional limitations on wartime elections in Ukraine. They also know that the current legal regime is "flexible" enough to find legal ways of organizing elections. After all, they point out, the war started in 2014, and thereafter two presidents and two parliaments were elected. Also, some opposition-minded groups in the United States and Europe are casting doubt on the democratic nature of Ukraine's government as a reason to reduce the military and financial support being provided to Ukraine.[2] Elections would help the Western pro-Ukrainian governments overcome these objections at home in the upcoming budgetary debates.A second source of pressure to hold elections is the domestic political situation. After a very uneven, challenging, and tragic five-year governing effort that had to deal with the "Green Wave" of radical reforms, the COVID-19 pandemic, growing clashes with opposition groups, and Russia's full-fledged invasion, President Zelensky and his party need to renew their mandate. For the sake of political stability they must demonstrate their democratic legitimacy to the nation, the opposition, and, especially, the army. Whatever future awaits Ukraine, whether protracted war or peace negotiations, the government must be regarded as fully legitimate and must be trusted by its constituencies and the military to cope with upcoming challenges.Under such circumstances, Volodymyr Zelensky and his closest associates must resolve the dilemma: to hold elections or not to hold elections. Each choice has pros and cons.Reasons to defer elections. Russia's war of attrition goes on and demands all the government's attention and all the nation's resources. There are also many constitutional, legal, and political reasons for not holding elections.[4] To organize meaningful, free, and fair elections, Kyiv would need to lift the many political restrictions that were put in place to create national solidary and a singular national focus on achieving victory. This means that the government would need to revise electoral legislation, create new tools to enable the vast number of displaced citizens to vote, allow a more capacious writ and greater ideological diversity of the media, and restart political competition. Reasons not to defer elections. On the other hand, without the essential democratic legitimacy conferred by free and fair elections, it may soon be impossible to govern a nation embroiled in a war for freedom. Even more, if elections were organized, they would need to be conducted in a way that citizens—whether serving at the front or working in the rear or living in the occupied territories—fully recognized that the campaign and ballot count were honest. Ukrainians have a record of revolts provoked by a suspicious electoral process and results.[5] The wartime legal, administrative, socioeconomic, and demographic problems could influence any elections in a big way and so rattle the political order and divert the government's attention from the needs of the front. Legal-Political Flexibility as Ukraine's Answer to a Long WarDespite pressures for—and expert voices against—holding the elections in wartime, Zelensky's team is taking into account Ukraine's recent experience in living under conditions of war. The war in Ukraine started de facto with Russia's first acts of aggression, in 2014, and has now spread throughout the country with Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. However, de jure, the war between Russia and Ukraine has seen three different legal regimes during the past nine years. First, between April 15, 2014, and April 30, 2018, Ukraine existed in the regime of the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), which was a set of military and legal measures adopted by Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and aimed at countering Russian and pro-Russian armed groups in the war in eastern Ukraine. This regime limited some civil rights in some territories, but it was not martial law.[6] So both presidential and parliamentary elections could be conducted in 2014 in all regions not directly affected by war. Both presidential and parliamentary elections were internationally recognized as free and fair, despite military actions in some oblasts and the inability of voters to participate in elections in Crimea and some districts of the Donbas.[7] The legal regime flexibly mixed elements of martial law and peacetime politics.Second, between April 30, 2018, and February 24, 2022, the regime of the Joint Forces Operation was in effect which continued the logic of the ATO in slightly different military and administrative terms. Again, this flexible legal-political regime allowed free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in 2019, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas and the annexed Crimea.[8] Even though President Petro Poroshenko attempted to impose martial law and postpone the elections of 2019, the Verkhovna Rada resisted his efforts and saved the elections in a form characteristic of peacetime.[9]The same legal flexibility allowed Zelensky to use military elements of the legal regime and to start using the Security Council as a core instrument in his fight with the oligarchs in 2020–2021.[10]The third legal regime started with Russia's full-fledged invasion on February 24, 2022. It was thought that this time, Ukraine's legal-political flexibility would not be up to the task. But again, some legal-political flexibility remained: martial law (voiennyi stan) was imposed without declaration of a state of war (stan viiny) and war on Russia. Indeed, de jure, martial law was initiated by Volodymyr Zelensky and approved by the Rada on February 24, 2022.[11] Since then the process has been repeated regularly, with martial law being continued for several months ahead at each approval.[12] This time, the legal order of war was additionally defined by the Law on the Use of the Armed Forces and other military formations to defend the country.[13] Military-civil administrations started governing all regions of Ukraine, and civilian associations, mass media outlets, and political parties began functioning under wartime restrictions.[14]According to the laws on the legal regime of martial law and on defense, martial law was introduced to avert the threat to the nation and to repel armed aggression in all regions of Ukraine.[15] The laws on martial law and on defense provide state authorities, the military command, military administrations, and local self-government bodies with special powers necessary to fight the enemy. Also, as allowed by the constitution's Article 64, certain temporary restrictions on many civil rights and freedoms were imposed. Altogether, the various ramifications of the legal regime of martial law have directly affected domestic political processes.At the same time, the Ukrainian government did not announce a state of war and did not declare war on Russia. Volodymyr Zelensky submitted to parliament a draft law on the declaration of a state of war, but it was never considered by parliament (and only the web archive has actually preserved some traces of this step).[16] Even though a state of war regime is mentioned in the Ukrainian constitution, it has never been defined. Where does the concept of a "state of war" come from, particularly with reference to Ukraine and its political-legal flexibility? In a nutshell, the concept stems from international agreements such as the Third Hague Convention on the Opening of Hostilities (1907) or the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974), both of which introduce the concepts of war and aggression (Ukraine is a signatory to both). They define the norm according to which one state may not initiate military action against another state absent a declaration of war or an ultimatum. They also stipulate that the use of armed force by one state is sufficient evidence of an act of aggression against another state. By not announcing war on Russia and not introducing a state of war, the Ukrainian government has some flexibility, for example, in continuing to transit Russian gas to the EU.[17] So, even after announcing martial law, the government of Ukraine has preserved some element of legal-political flexibility by not declaring war on Russia.All three legal-political regimes have allowed and prepared Ukrainians to adapt their political and legal systems, as well as their communal life and economy, to the conditions of a temporally protracted and spatially enlarging war. This adaptability has immersed Ukrainian institutions in a state of legal, political, security, and even military affairs that has proved rather flexible in merging de jure and de facto situations. For example, it has allowed the nation to survive when some of its territory was occupied by Russia or Russia-backed separatists—yet there are front-line areas with vast Ukrainian military operations. There are also the rear regions where, prior to the current state of conflict, Ukrainians continued to live and work. And before 2022, but during wartime, they enjoyed competitive elections, the division of power, functional courts, and active participation in international relations. This flexibility, whose roots survived even after 2022, may be used by the ruling group to organize yet another wartime election. And Western allies know it well. Does the Current Legal Regime Allow Elections in Ukraine? Usually, elections are not conducted in countries at war. However, if the war is protracted, elections might be needed to reestablish the domestic and international legitimacy of the government. The Ukrainian constitution and its laws do not provide a clear answer to this question, and this ambiguity is one of the sources of wartime Ukraine's legal-political flexibility.Indeed, the constitution's Article 83 states that if the term of service of the Verkhovna Rada expires when the country is under martial law, its authority is extended until a new parliament is elected. This and other constitutional provisions cannot be changed while martial law is in effect (Article 157). However, the constitution does not prohibit either presidential or local elections from being held. The restrictions on presidential and local elections are provided for in the Law on Martial Law and the Electoral Code's Articles 20 and 280.[18] These stipulations, however, can be changed by parliament and approved by the president, if there is political will to do so. Thus, if the Ukrainian political class agrees, presidential elections can be conducted under martial law next year. Even more, if the president and the Rada agree, they could stop continuing the regime of martial law, despite ongoing military actions on the soil of Ukraine. That way even parliamentary elections could be legally held. However, in such a case the legality and the legitimacy of the decisions would openly contradict each other.In sum, the existing legal-political flexibility indeed provides an opportunity for elections. But it neither resolves the question of the essential democratic legitimacy of elections held during a de facto war nor decreases the risk of desolidarization of society during competitive elections. Security Risks around Wartime Elections Despite all the legal workarounds and some benefits that flexibility can bring, elections pose an existential risk for a nation at war. Ukraine has nonetheless held elections in the face of this risk after 2014, but with the current war of vastly greater scale than earlier stages of the conflict and having an incalculably greater influence on Ukrainian society, economy, and political institutions, the former success may not be repeatable. If elections are attempted in 2024, they may lead to disaster for Ukraine.Ukrainian experts who publicly oppose the decision to hold elections in 2024 typically adduce two arguments. The first is that the constitution and laws prohibit elections when the country is under martial law. This argument has its weak side: there are ways to get around such prohibitions, as discussed above. The second argument is stronger: the sociopolitical order will face overwhelming challenges to its stability if elections are conducted during wartime. The reasoning here usually refers to the unjustifiably high costs of elections and the fact that they would undermine national unity during war. Wartime elections would indeed drag a hugely sensitized society into debates that might still be constrained by the needs of war and into voting that might not be well attended by so many displaced citizens, reducing representation. Here is the major contradiction that makes wartime elections so potentially destructive. If the aim is to uphold and reinforce by democratic means the legitimacy of the government, elections must be free, honest, based on open debate and competition, and accessible to all voters. If some element on this list is missing, the aim of elections will not be achieved. Also, if some element on this list is missing, the sensitized Ukrainian society, which already trusts military institutions more than it trusts civilian, democratic ones, might protest en masse. The picture is even more contradictory: if resources are so scarce as to hamper the country's defense efforts, and if international support is slowing, then diverting resources away from defense and toward some other purpose is counterproductive. Indeed, allocating human, administrative, and financial resources to elections during a war of attrition is an unjustifiable luxury. Over 47 percent of the Ukrainian budget for 2024 is planned to come from external sources.[19] And these sources, as the current debates in the U.S. Congress demonstrate, may not be as generous as in 2022–2023. Every public and economic sector in Ukraine reports a growing deficit in human resources.[20] Well over six million Ukrainians have left the country, and many of them—over a million, at a minimum—live on the territory of the aggressor state.[21] Over three million Ukrainians are fighting to survive in internal displacement. Another four million Ukrainians live in Russia-occupied Ukrainian territory.[22] Under such conditions, it would be close to impossible to organize an inclusive and accessible voting apparatus. And that would put in doubt the legitimacy of any government elected under such conditions.The question of legitimacy gains another wrinkle when citizens' fading trust in the government and democratic institutions is considered. After almost two years of life under martial law, Ukrainian society shows signs of stable trust in security institutions and declining trust in public organizations. Even though polls conducted under conditions of war have, as expected, a large margin of error, the results still deserve attention for the social dynamics and the relative ratios they reveal. For example, according to a recent poll by the Razumkov Center, a nongovernmental think tank, the most trusted state bodies include military or war-related institutions and organizations: the armed forces (93 percent of respondents trust them), volunteer organizations (that support the army, 84 percent), the National Guard (81 percent), the State Border Service (76.5 percent), the president (who is commander in chief, 72 percent), the Ministry of Defense (71 percent), and the Security Service (66 percent).[23] But trust in democracy-related institutions is falling. The majority of respondents expressed distrust in political parties (74 percent), public officials (72 percent), the courts (70 percent), parliament (64 percent), the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (53 percent), and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (52 percent). Despite being dissatisfied with the civil part of government, the population remaining within Ukraine's borders is opposed to the prospect of elections in 2024. According to the same Razumkov Center poll, only 15 percent of respondents support holding national elections before the end of the war, with almost two-thirds (64 percent) rejecting such a proposal and 21 percent of respondents undecided. Election supporters argue that elections are necessary to support democracy in the country (6 percent) and to show the world that Ukraine is a democratic state (5 percent); another 5 percent see the need to change the government or at least to renew President Zelensky's mandate (5 percent). Election opponents argue that elections are too expensive for the current state budget (36 percent), that the legislation does not allow them (32 percent), that voting would be insecure (31 percent), and that, under martial law, it is impossible to observe democratic standards (29 percent).These data are supported by many other polls (such as ones conducted by KIIS and the IRI/Rating Group).[24] Altogether they show that Ukraine's wartime society has greater trust in the army than in civil authorities and values elections only if they are conducted as a genuine democratic process. More generally, even if a political system were to develop some adaptive legal-political flexibility, war is not conducive to democracy-reinforcing elections.Let's Wait on Elections and Focus on Core IssuesI want to stress that the vox populi as represented, with all caveats, in the above polls and in experts' analysis is aligned, for one good reason: Under current military conditions in Ukraine, it would be hugely risky to conduct elections. All available resources must be poured into defense and achieving victory.Elections would most likely not respond to the legitimate expectations of citizens and would not comply with OSCE standards. Even if the wartime restrictions on the political rights and freedoms of citizens and on the operations of the mass media were canceled, it would arguably take another year to return to the pre-2022 mode of operations. Public debate has long been absent, and Ukrainian society is fragmented, with new cleavages. It will take time for political parties to address both issues and restart meaningful competition for the voters' sympathies in Ukraine. Without such careful preparation of society, elections would be a senseless formality that would only intensify the population's dissatisfaction with the government and negative reactions to those Western nations pushing for elections to be held. Even if some European politicians might not insist on the proper democratic quality to any election, the Ukrainian citizenry would be quite unlikely to tolerate electoral incongruencies.[25] And Zelensky needs real, essential democratic legitimacy in 2024. I believe that the Zelensky administration should resist all pressures and postpone elections. Instead, it should address legitimate dissatisfaction with the public administration and the lack of access to trusted mass media, and focus on the major security needs of Ukraine.[1] Sky News: "President Zelenskyy weighing up spring presidential elections," Sky News, November 3, 2023, https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-russian-man-arrested-for-passing-secrets-to-ukraine-moscow-ready-for-talks-on-post-conflict-settlement-12541713?postid=6708241#liveblog-body. [2] David L. Stern, Catherine Belton, John Hudson, "Western Officials Press Ukraine to Hold Elections," Washington Post, September 24, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/24/ukraine-elections-war-russia-west/.[3] "Zelensky showing 'authoritarian traits', says Swiss intelligence report," Swissinfo, July 9, 2023, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/zelensky-showing--authoritarian-traits---says-swiss-intelligence-report/48652496. ; Harry Enten, "How Republicans Have Grown More Skeptical of Zelensky and Ukraine," CNN, September 21, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/21/politics/republicans-zelensky-ukraine-polls-skeptical/index.html[4] Olga Aivazovska, "Opinion: Elections and War Are Incompatible," The Kyiv Independent, November 1, 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/opinion-elections-and-war-are-incompatible/. [5] "Orange Revolution," Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed November 15, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Orange-Revolution. [6] "Про Тимчасові Заходи На Період Проведення Антитерористичної Операції," Офіційний вебпортал парламенту України, June 2, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1669-18#Text. [7] "Despite Violence and Threats in East, Ukraine Election Characterized by High Turnout and Resolve to Guarantee Fundamental Freedoms, International Observers Say," OSCE, May 26, 2014, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/119081. ; "Ukraine, Early Parliamentary Elections, 26 October 2014: Final Report," OSCE, December 19, 2014, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/132556.[8] "Presidential Election, 31 March and 21 April 2019." OSCE. Accessed November 15, 2023. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/407660. ; "Early Parliamentary Elections, 21 July 2019," OSCE, accessed November 15, 2023, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/422585. [9] Andrian Prokip, "Ukraine's State of Martial Law: A Surprise, with Political Undertones," web log, Focus Ukraine (blog) (Wilson Center, November 29, 2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-state-martial-law-surprise-political-undertones. [10] Mykhailo Minakov, "The Three Ages of Zelensky's Presidency," web log, Focus Ukraine (blog) (Wilson Center, June 9, 2022), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-ages-zelenskys-presidency. ; Minakov, Mikhail. "War, De-Oligarchization, and the Possibility of Anti-Patronal Transformation in Ukraine." In Ukraine's Patronal Democracy and the Russian Invasion: The Russia-Ukraine War, Volume One, edited by Bálint Madlovics and Bálint Magyar, 141–66. Central European University Press, 2023. https://doi.org/10.7829/jj.3985461.9. [11] "Проект Закону про затвердження Указу Президента України "Про введення воєнного стану в Україні"", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, March 24, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39147.[12] "Про продовження строку дії воєнного стану в Україні", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, August 17, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/451/2023#Text.[13] "Проект Закону про схвалення Указу Президента України "Про використання Збройних Сил України та інших військових формувань"", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, March 3, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39151.[14] Serhii Tarasov, "The Role of Civil-Military Cooperation in the Protection of Civilians: The Ukraine Experience", Center for Civilians in Conflict, October 2023, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-Role-of-Civil-Military-Cooperation-in-Protection-of-Civilians-The-Ukraine-Experience.pdf.[15] "Про оборону України," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, April 15, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-12#n138. ; "Про правовий режим воєнного стану," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 19, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#n5. [16] "Проект Закону про оголошення стану війни," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, February 24, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220413044605/http:/w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=73873.[17] "Russian Gas Transit through Ukraine," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 3, 2023, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/qa-russian-gas-transit-through-ukraine/.[18] "Про правовий режим воєнного стану," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 19, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#Text. ; "Election Code of Ukraine," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, July 16, 2020, https://cvk.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Election-Code-of-Ukraine.pdf. [19] "Ukraine Releases 2024 Budget Plan, More Spending on Military, but Raising Enough Funding Will Be Tough", Intellinews, September 28, 2023, https://www.intellinews.com/ukraine-releases-2024-budget-plan-more-spending-on-military-but-raising-enough-funding-will-be-tough-294429/.[20] Andriy Karakuts, Yuriy Schedrin, and Oleksandra Davymuka, rep., "Future of Ukraine Workforce" Center for Applied Research, May 2023, https://cpd.com.ua/future-of-ukraine-workforce.pdf. [21] Andriy Karakuts, Yuriy Schedrin, Oleksandra Davymuka, "Future of Ukraine Workforce," Center for Applied Research, https://cpd.com.ua/future-of-ukraine-workforce.pdf. ; "Report on Ukraine Refugees," UN, Accessed November 15, 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.[22] Ella Libanova, "Ukraine's Demography in the Second Year of the Full-Fledged War," Focus Ukraine, June 27, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-demography-second-year-full-fledged-war.[23] "Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country," Razumkov Center, October 15, 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/en/component/k2/citizens-assessment-of-the-situation-in-the-country-trust-in-social-institutions-politicians-officials-and-public-figures-attitude-to-holding-national-elections-in-ukraine-before-the-end-of-the-war-september-2023.[24] "National Survey of Ukraine: October 2023," IRI/Rating Group, October 27, 2023, https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/vseukra_nske_opituvannya_m_zhnarodnogo_respubl_kanskogo_nstitutu_iri_zhovten2023.html. ; "When Elections Should Be Held, Attitudes Towards Online Voting and Possible Restrictions on Citiyens Rights," Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, October 30, 2023, https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1309&page=1.[25] Sergiy Sdorenko and Tiny Kox, "Nobody Will Blame Ukraine If Post-War Elections Are Not Perfect." Interview with PACE President," Ukrainiska Pravda, May 16, 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/interview/2023/05/16/7161793/.
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President Volodymyr Zelensky and the current Ukrainian parliament are approaching the hour when their formal legitimacy, their mandate, comes to an end. Under normal conditions, elections to the Verkhovna Rada would have been held last October, while candidates for the presidency would have started preparing for elections scheduled for the last Sunday in March of 2024. But the country is consumed by war, and elections are probably not an option. Or are they? President Zelensky is considering the answer to this question. [1]I should state at the outset that I find the idea of organizing elections, whether presidential only or both presidential and parliamentary, during wartime is a very bad idea. At the same time, I also disagree with those who think the matter of postponing elections can be settled purely by having recourse to existing laws.In this brief I show that the ruling group could, if it chose, adopt some legal maneuvering that would formally respect the constitution and the nation's laws (though violating their spirit), and that these maneuvers have been tested several times in Ukraine since 2014. But such formally legal if doubtfully legitimate elections could also pose unjustifiably high sociopolitical risks for a state at war, and this creates a dilemma for the nation.Defining the Wartime Electoral DilemmaCurrently, the Zelensky administration is under pressure to organize parliamentary and presidential elections soon. The first source of the pressure is the West.[2] Behind the scenes, Ukraine's allies are allegedly demanding that Kyiv renew its government's legitimacy, despite the ongoing war and the mass dislocation of citizens. Ukraine's allies know well the constitutional limitations on wartime elections in Ukraine. They also know that the current legal regime is "flexible" enough to find legal ways of organizing elections. After all, they point out, the war started in 2014, and thereafter two presidents and two parliaments were elected. Also, some opposition-minded groups in the United States and Europe are casting doubt on the democratic nature of Ukraine's government as a reason to reduce the military and financial support being provided to Ukraine.[2] Elections would help the Western pro-Ukrainian governments overcome these objections at home in the upcoming budgetary debates.A second source of pressure to hold elections is the domestic political situation. After a very uneven, challenging, and tragic five-year governing effort that had to deal with the "Green Wave" of radical reforms, the COVID-19 pandemic, growing clashes with opposition groups, and Russia's full-fledged invasion, President Zelensky and his party need to renew their mandate. For the sake of political stability they must demonstrate their democratic legitimacy to the nation, the opposition, and, especially, the army. Whatever future awaits Ukraine, whether protracted war or peace negotiations, the government must be regarded as fully legitimate and must be trusted by its constituencies and the military to cope with upcoming challenges.Under such circumstances, Volodymyr Zelensky and his closest associates must resolve the dilemma: to hold elections or not to hold elections. Each choice has pros and cons.Reasons to defer elections. Russia's war of attrition goes on and demands all the government's attention and all the nation's resources. There are also many constitutional, legal, and political reasons for not holding elections.[4] To organize meaningful, free, and fair elections, Kyiv would need to lift the many political restrictions that were put in place to create national solidary and a singular national focus on achieving victory. This means that the government would need to revise electoral legislation, create new tools to enable the vast number of displaced citizens to vote, allow a more capacious writ and greater ideological diversity of the media, and restart political competition. Reasons not to defer elections. On the other hand, without the essential democratic legitimacy conferred by free and fair elections, it may soon be impossible to govern a nation embroiled in a war for freedom. Even more, if elections were organized, they would need to be conducted in a way that citizens—whether serving at the front or working in the rear or living in the occupied territories—fully recognized that the campaign and ballot count were honest. Ukrainians have a record of revolts provoked by a suspicious electoral process and results.[5] The wartime legal, administrative, socioeconomic, and demographic problems could influence any elections in a big way and so rattle the political order and divert the government's attention from the needs of the front. Legal-Political Flexibility as Ukraine's Answer to a Long WarDespite pressures for—and expert voices against—holding the elections in wartime, Zelensky's team is taking into account Ukraine's recent experience in living under conditions of war. The war in Ukraine started de facto with Russia's first acts of aggression, in 2014, and has now spread throughout the country with Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. However, de jure, the war between Russia and Ukraine has seen three different legal regimes during the past nine years. First, between April 15, 2014, and April 30, 2018, Ukraine existed in the regime of the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), which was a set of military and legal measures adopted by Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and aimed at countering Russian and pro-Russian armed groups in the war in eastern Ukraine. This regime limited some civil rights in some territories, but it was not martial law.[6] So both presidential and parliamentary elections could be conducted in 2014 in all regions not directly affected by war. Both presidential and parliamentary elections were internationally recognized as free and fair, despite military actions in some oblasts and the inability of voters to participate in elections in Crimea and some districts of the Donbas.[7] The legal regime flexibly mixed elements of martial law and peacetime politics.Second, between April 30, 2018, and February 24, 2022, the regime of the Joint Forces Operation was in effect which continued the logic of the ATO in slightly different military and administrative terms. Again, this flexible legal-political regime allowed free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in 2019, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas and the annexed Crimea.[8] Even though President Petro Poroshenko attempted to impose martial law and postpone the elections of 2019, the Verkhovna Rada resisted his efforts and saved the elections in a form characteristic of peacetime.[9]The same legal flexibility allowed Zelensky to use military elements of the legal regime and to start using the Security Council as a core instrument in his fight with the oligarchs in 2020–2021.[10]The third legal regime started with Russia's full-fledged invasion on February 24, 2022. It was thought that this time, Ukraine's legal-political flexibility would not be up to the task. But again, some legal-political flexibility remained: martial law (voiennyi stan) was imposed without declaration of a state of war (stan viiny) and war on Russia. Indeed, de jure, martial law was initiated by Volodymyr Zelensky and approved by the Rada on February 24, 2022.[11] Since then the process has been repeated regularly, with martial law being continued for several months ahead at each approval.[12] This time, the legal order of war was additionally defined by the Law on the Use of the Armed Forces and other military formations to defend the country.[13] Military-civil administrations started governing all regions of Ukraine, and civilian associations, mass media outlets, and political parties began functioning under wartime restrictions.[14]According to the laws on the legal regime of martial law and on defense, martial law was introduced to avert the threat to the nation and to repel armed aggression in all regions of Ukraine.[15] The laws on martial law and on defense provide state authorities, the military command, military administrations, and local self-government bodies with special powers necessary to fight the enemy. Also, as allowed by the constitution's Article 64, certain temporary restrictions on many civil rights and freedoms were imposed. Altogether, the various ramifications of the legal regime of martial law have directly affected domestic political processes.At the same time, the Ukrainian government did not announce a state of war and did not declare war on Russia. Volodymyr Zelensky submitted to parliament a draft law on the declaration of a state of war, but it was never considered by parliament (and only the web archive has actually preserved some traces of this step).[16] Even though a state of war regime is mentioned in the Ukrainian constitution, it has never been defined. Where does the concept of a "state of war" come from, particularly with reference to Ukraine and its political-legal flexibility? In a nutshell, the concept stems from international agreements such as the Third Hague Convention on the Opening of Hostilities (1907) or the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974), both of which introduce the concepts of war and aggression (Ukraine is a signatory to both). They define the norm according to which one state may not initiate military action against another state absent a declaration of war or an ultimatum. They also stipulate that the use of armed force by one state is sufficient evidence of an act of aggression against another state. By not announcing war on Russia and not introducing a state of war, the Ukrainian government has some flexibility, for example, in continuing to transit Russian gas to the EU.[17] So, even after announcing martial law, the government of Ukraine has preserved some element of legal-political flexibility by not declaring war on Russia.All three legal-political regimes have allowed and prepared Ukrainians to adapt their political and legal systems, as well as their communal life and economy, to the conditions of a temporally protracted and spatially enlarging war. This adaptability has immersed Ukrainian institutions in a state of legal, political, security, and even military affairs that has proved rather flexible in merging de jure and de facto situations. For example, it has allowed the nation to survive when some of its territory was occupied by Russia or Russia-backed separatists—yet there are front-line areas with vast Ukrainian military operations. There are also the rear regions where, prior to the current state of conflict, Ukrainians continued to live and work. And before 2022, but during wartime, they enjoyed competitive elections, the division of power, functional courts, and active participation in international relations. This flexibility, whose roots survived even after 2022, may be used by the ruling group to organize yet another wartime election. And Western allies know it well. Does the Current Legal Regime Allow Elections in Ukraine? Usually, elections are not conducted in countries at war. However, if the war is protracted, elections might be needed to reestablish the domestic and international legitimacy of the government. The Ukrainian constitution and its laws do not provide a clear answer to this question, and this ambiguity is one of the sources of wartime Ukraine's legal-political flexibility.Indeed, the constitution's Article 83 states that if the term of service of the Verkhovna Rada expires when the country is under martial law, its authority is extended until a new parliament is elected. This and other constitutional provisions cannot be changed while martial law is in effect (Article 157). However, the constitution does not prohibit either presidential or local elections from being held. The restrictions on presidential and local elections are provided for in the Law on Martial Law and the Electoral Code's Articles 20 and 280.[18] These stipulations, however, can be changed by parliament and approved by the president, if there is political will to do so. Thus, if the Ukrainian political class agrees, presidential elections can be conducted under martial law next year. Even more, if the president and the Rada agree, they could stop continuing the regime of martial law, despite ongoing military actions on the soil of Ukraine. That way even parliamentary elections could be legally held. However, in such a case the legality and the legitimacy of the decisions would openly contradict each other.In sum, the existing legal-political flexibility indeed provides an opportunity for elections. But it neither resolves the question of the essential democratic legitimacy of elections held during a de facto war nor decreases the risk of desolidarization of society during competitive elections. Security Risks around Wartime Elections Despite all the legal workarounds and some benefits that flexibility can bring, elections pose an existential risk for a nation at war. Ukraine has nonetheless held elections in the face of this risk after 2014, but with the current war of vastly greater scale than earlier stages of the conflict and having an incalculably greater influence on Ukrainian society, economy, and political institutions, the former success may not be repeatable. If elections are attempted in 2024, they may lead to disaster for Ukraine.Ukrainian experts who publicly oppose the decision to hold elections in 2024 typically adduce two arguments. The first is that the constitution and laws prohibit elections when the country is under martial law. This argument has its weak side: there are ways to get around such prohibitions, as discussed above. The second argument is stronger: the sociopolitical order will face overwhelming challenges to its stability if elections are conducted during wartime. The reasoning here usually refers to the unjustifiably high costs of elections and the fact that they would undermine national unity during war. Wartime elections would indeed drag a hugely sensitized society into debates that might still be constrained by the needs of war and into voting that might not be well attended by so many displaced citizens, reducing representation. Here is the major contradiction that makes wartime elections so potentially destructive. If the aim is to uphold and reinforce by democratic means the legitimacy of the government, elections must be free, honest, based on open debate and competition, and accessible to all voters. If some element on this list is missing, the aim of elections will not be achieved. Also, if some element on this list is missing, the sensitized Ukrainian society, which already trusts military institutions more than it trusts civilian, democratic ones, might protest en masse. The picture is even more contradictory: if resources are so scarce as to hamper the country's defense efforts, and if international support is slowing, then diverting resources away from defense and toward some other purpose is counterproductive. Indeed, allocating human, administrative, and financial resources to elections during a war of attrition is an unjustifiable luxury. Over 47 percent of the Ukrainian budget for 2024 is planned to come from external sources.[19] And these sources, as the current debates in the U.S. Congress demonstrate, may not be as generous as in 2022–2023. Every public and economic sector in Ukraine reports a growing deficit in human resources.[20] Well over six million Ukrainians have left the country, and many of them—over a million, at a minimum—live on the territory of the aggressor state.[21] Over three million Ukrainians are fighting to survive in internal displacement. Another four million Ukrainians live in Russia-occupied Ukrainian territory.[22] Under such conditions, it would be close to impossible to organize an inclusive and accessible voting apparatus. And that would put in doubt the legitimacy of any government elected under such conditions.The question of legitimacy gains another wrinkle when citizens' fading trust in the government and democratic institutions is considered. After almost two years of life under martial law, Ukrainian society shows signs of stable trust in security institutions and declining trust in public organizations. Even though polls conducted under conditions of war have, as expected, a large margin of error, the results still deserve attention for the social dynamics and the relative ratios they reveal. For example, according to a recent poll by the Razumkov Center, a nongovernmental think tank, the most trusted state bodies include military or war-related institutions and organizations: the armed forces (93 percent of respondents trust them), volunteer organizations (that support the army, 84 percent), the National Guard (81 percent), the State Border Service (76.5 percent), the president (who is commander in chief, 72 percent), the Ministry of Defense (71 percent), and the Security Service (66 percent).[23] But trust in democracy-related institutions is falling. The majority of respondents expressed distrust in political parties (74 percent), public officials (72 percent), the courts (70 percent), parliament (64 percent), the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (53 percent), and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (52 percent). Despite being dissatisfied with the civil part of government, the population remaining within Ukraine's borders is opposed to the prospect of elections in 2024. According to the same Razumkov Center poll, only 15 percent of respondents support holding national elections before the end of the war, with almost two-thirds (64 percent) rejecting such a proposal and 21 percent of respondents undecided. Election supporters argue that elections are necessary to support democracy in the country (6 percent) and to show the world that Ukraine is a democratic state (5 percent); another 5 percent see the need to change the government or at least to renew President Zelensky's mandate (5 percent). Election opponents argue that elections are too expensive for the current state budget (36 percent), that the legislation does not allow them (32 percent), that voting would be insecure (31 percent), and that, under martial law, it is impossible to observe democratic standards (29 percent).These data are supported by many other polls (such as ones conducted by KIIS and the IRI/Rating Group).[24] Altogether they show that Ukraine's wartime society has greater trust in the army than in civil authorities and values elections only if they are conducted as a genuine democratic process. More generally, even if a political system were to develop some adaptive legal-political flexibility, war is not conducive to democracy-reinforcing elections.Let's Wait on Elections and Focus on Core IssuesI want to stress that the vox populi as represented, with all caveats, in the above polls and in experts' analysis is aligned, for one good reason: Under current military conditions in Ukraine, it would be hugely risky to conduct elections. All available resources must be poured into defense and achieving victory.Elections would most likely not respond to the legitimate expectations of citizens and would not comply with OSCE standards. Even if the wartime restrictions on the political rights and freedoms of citizens and on the operations of the mass media were canceled, it would arguably take another year to return to the pre-2022 mode of operations. Public debate has long been absent, and Ukrainian society is fragmented, with new cleavages. It will take time for political parties to address both issues and restart meaningful competition for the voters' sympathies in Ukraine. Without such careful preparation of society, elections would be a senseless formality that would only intensify the population's dissatisfaction with the government and negative reactions to those Western nations pushing for elections to be held. Even if some European politicians might not insist on the proper democratic quality to any election, the Ukrainian citizenry would be quite unlikely to tolerate electoral incongruencies.[25] And Zelensky needs real, essential democratic legitimacy in 2024. I believe that the Zelensky administration should resist all pressures and postpone elections. Instead, it should address legitimate dissatisfaction with the public administration and the lack of access to trusted mass media, and focus on the major security needs of Ukraine.[1] Sky News: "President Zelenskyy weighing up spring presidential elections," Sky News, November 3, 2023, https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-russian-man-arrested-for-passing-secrets-to-ukraine-moscow-ready-for-talks-on-post-conflict-settlement-12541713?postid=6708241#liveblog-body. [2] David L. Stern, Catherine Belton, John Hudson, "Western Officials Press Ukraine to Hold Elections," Washington Post, September 24, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/24/ukraine-elections-war-russia-west/.[3] "Zelensky showing 'authoritarian traits', says Swiss intelligence report," Swissinfo, July 9, 2023, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/zelensky-showing--authoritarian-traits---says-swiss-intelligence-report/48652496. ; Harry Enten, "How Republicans Have Grown More Skeptical of Zelensky and Ukraine," CNN, September 21, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/21/politics/republicans-zelensky-ukraine-polls-skeptical/index.html[4] Olga Aivazovska, "Opinion: Elections and War Are Incompatible," The Kyiv Independent, November 1, 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/opinion-elections-and-war-are-incompatible/. [5] "Orange Revolution," Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed November 15, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Orange-Revolution. [6] "Про Тимчасові Заходи На Період Проведення Антитерористичної Операції," Офіційний вебпортал парламенту України, June 2, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1669-18#Text. [7] "Despite Violence and Threats in East, Ukraine Election Characterized by High Turnout and Resolve to Guarantee Fundamental Freedoms, International Observers Say," OSCE, May 26, 2014, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/119081. ; "Ukraine, Early Parliamentary Elections, 26 October 2014: Final Report," OSCE, December 19, 2014, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/132556.[8] "Presidential Election, 31 March and 21 April 2019." OSCE. Accessed November 15, 2023. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/407660. ; "Early Parliamentary Elections, 21 July 2019," OSCE, accessed November 15, 2023, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/422585. [9] Andrian Prokip, "Ukraine's State of Martial Law: A Surprise, with Political Undertones," web log, Focus Ukraine (blog) (Wilson Center, November 29, 2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-state-martial-law-surprise-political-undertones. [10] Mykhailo Minakov, "The Three Ages of Zelensky's Presidency," web log, Focus Ukraine (blog) (Wilson Center, June 9, 2022), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-ages-zelenskys-presidency. ; Minakov, Mikhail. "War, De-Oligarchization, and the Possibility of Anti-Patronal Transformation in Ukraine." In Ukraine's Patronal Democracy and the Russian Invasion: The Russia-Ukraine War, Volume One, edited by Bálint Madlovics and Bálint Magyar, 141–66. Central European University Press, 2023. https://doi.org/10.7829/jj.3985461.9. [11] "Проект Закону про затвердження Указу Президента України "Про введення воєнного стану в Україні"", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, March 24, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39147.[12] "Про продовження строку дії воєнного стану в Україні", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, August 17, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/451/2023#Text.[13] "Проект Закону про схвалення Указу Президента України "Про використання Збройних Сил України та інших військових формувань"", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, March 3, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39151.[14] Serhii Tarasov, "The Role of Civil-Military Cooperation in the Protection of Civilians: The Ukraine Experience", Center for Civilians in Conflict, October 2023, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-Role-of-Civil-Military-Cooperation-in-Protection-of-Civilians-The-Ukraine-Experience.pdf.[15] "Про оборону України," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, April 15, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-12#n138. ; "Про правовий режим воєнного стану," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 19, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#n5. [16] "Проект Закону про оголошення стану війни," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, February 24, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220413044605/http:/w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=73873.[17] "Russian Gas Transit through Ukraine," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 3, 2023, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/qa-russian-gas-transit-through-ukraine/.[18] "Про правовий режим воєнного стану," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 19, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#Text. ; "Election Code of Ukraine," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, July 16, 2020, https://cvk.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Election-Code-of-Ukraine.pdf. [19] "Ukraine Releases 2024 Budget Plan, More Spending on Military, but Raising Enough Funding Will Be Tough", Intellinews, September 28, 2023, https://www.intellinews.com/ukraine-releases-2024-budget-plan-more-spending-on-military-but-raising-enough-funding-will-be-tough-294429/.[20] Andriy Karakuts, Yuriy Schedrin, and Oleksandra Davymuka, rep., "Future of Ukraine Workforce" Center for Applied Research, May 2023, https://cpd.com.ua/future-of-ukraine-workforce.pdf. [21] Andriy Karakuts, Yuriy Schedrin, Oleksandra Davymuka, "Future of Ukraine Workforce," Center for Applied Research, https://cpd.com.ua/future-of-ukraine-workforce.pdf. ; "Report on Ukraine Refugees," UN, Accessed November 15, 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.[22] Ella Libanova, "Ukraine's Demography in the Second Year of the Full-Fledged War," Focus Ukraine, June 27, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-demography-second-year-full-fledged-war.[23] "Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country," Razumkov Center, October 15, 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/en/component/k2/citizens-assessment-of-the-situation-in-the-country-trust-in-social-institutions-politicians-officials-and-public-figures-attitude-to-holding-national-elections-in-ukraine-before-the-end-of-the-war-september-2023.[24] "National Survey of Ukraine: October 2023," IRI/Rating Group, October 27, 2023, https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/vseukra_nske_opituvannya_m_zhnarodnogo_respubl_kanskogo_nstitutu_iri_zhovten2023.html. ; "When Elections Should Be Held, Attitudes Towards Online Voting and Possible Restrictions on Citiyens Rights," Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, October 30, 2023, https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1309&page=1.[25] Sergiy Sdorenko and Tiny Kox, "Nobody Will Blame Ukraine If Post-War Elections Are Not Perfect." Interview with PACE President," Ukrainiska Pravda, May 16, 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/interview/2023/05/16/7161793/.
An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers We study electoral campaigns over the long run, through the lens of their spending. In particular, we ask whether changing media technologies and electoral environments impacted patterns of spending and their correlation with electoral results. To do so, we build a novel exhaustive dataset on general elections in the United Kingdom from 1857 to 2017, which includes information on campaign spending (itemized by expense categories), electoral outcomes and socio-demographic characteristics for 69, 042 election-constituency candidates. We start by providing new insights on the history of British political campaigns, in particular the growing importance of advertising material, including via digital means, to the detriment of paid staff and electoral meetings. We then show that there is a strong positive correlation between expenditures and votes, and that overall the magnitude of this relationship has strongly increased since the 1880s, with a peak in the last quarter of the 20th century. We link these transformations to changes in the conduct of campaigns, and to the introduction of new information technologies. We show in particular that the expansion of local radio and broadband Internet increased the sensitivity of the electoral results to differences in campaign spending. These results encourage greater contextualization in the drafting of campaign finance regulations.
Se il lavoro dello storico è capire il passato come è stato compreso dalla gente che lo ha vissuto, allora forse non è azzardato pensare che sia anche necessario comunicare i risultati delle ricerche con strumenti propri che appartengono a un'epoca e che influenzano la mentalità di chi in quell'epoca vive. Emergenti tecnologie, specialmente nell'area della multimedialità come la realtà virtuale, permettono agli storici di comunicare l'esperienza del passato in più sensi. In che modo la storia collabora con le tecnologie informatiche soffermandosi sulla possibilità di fare ricostruzioni storiche virtuali, con relativi esempi e recensioni? Quello che maggiormente preoccupa gli storici è se una ricostruzione di un fatto passato vissuto attraverso la sua ricreazione in pixels sia un metodo di conoscenza della storia che possa essere considerato valido. Ovvero l'emozione che la navigazione in una realtà 3D può suscitare, è un mezzo in grado di trasmettere conoscenza? O forse l'idea che abbiamo del passato e del suo studio viene sottilmente cambiato nel momento in cui lo si divulga attraverso la grafica 3D? Da tempo però la disciplina ha cominciato a fare i conti con questa situazione, costretta soprattutto dall'invasività di questo tipo di media, dalla spettacolarizzazione del passato e da una divulgazione del passato parziale e antiscientifica. In un mondo post letterario bisogna cominciare a pensare che la cultura visuale nella quale siamo immersi sta cambiando il nostro rapporto con il passato: non per questo le conoscenze maturate fino ad oggi sono false, ma è necessario riconoscere che esiste più di una verità storica, a volte scritta a volte visuale. Il computer è diventato una piattaforma onnipresente per la rappresentazione e diffusione dell'informazione. I metodi di interazione e rappresentazione stanno evolvendo di continuo. Ed è su questi due binari che è si muove l'offerta delle tecnologie informatiche al servizio della storia. Lo scopo di questa tesi è proprio quello di esplorare, attraverso l'utilizzo e la sperimentazione di diversi strumenti e tecnologie informatiche, come si può raccontare efficacemente il passato attraverso oggetti tridimensionali e gli ambienti virtuali, e come, nel loro essere elementi caratterizzanti di comunicazione, in che modo possono collaborare, in questo caso particolare, con la disciplina storica. La presente ricerca ricostruisce alcune linee di storia delle principali fabbriche attive a Torino durante la seconda guerra mondiale, ricordando stretta relazione che esiste tra strutture ed individui e in questa città in particolare tra fabbrica e movimento operaio, è inevitabile addentrarsi nelle vicende del movimento operaio torinese che nel periodo della lotta di Liberazione in città fu un soggetto politico e sociale di primo rilievo. Nella città, intesa come entità biologica coinvolta nella guerra, la fabbrica (o le fabbriche) diventa il nucleo concettuale attraverso il quale leggere la città: sono le fabbriche gli obiettivi principali dei bombardamenti ed è nelle fabbriche che si combatte una guerra di liberazione tra classe operaia e autorità, di fabbrica e cittadine. La fabbrica diventa il luogo di "usurpazione del potere" di cui parla Weber, il palcoscenico in cui si tengono i diversi episodi della guerra: scioperi, deportazioni, occupazioni . Il modello della città qui rappresentata non è una semplice visualizzazione ma un sistema informativo dove la realtà modellata è rappresentata da oggetti, che fanno da teatro allo svolgimento di avvenimenti con una precisa collocazione cronologica, al cui interno è possibile effettuare operazioni di selezione di render statici (immagini), di filmati precalcolati (animazioni) e di scenari navigabili interattivamente oltre ad attività di ricerca di fonti bibliografiche e commenti di studiosi segnatamente legati all'evento in oggetto. Obiettivo di questo lavoro è far interagire, attraverso diversi progetti, le discipline storiche e l'informatica, nelle diverse opportunità tecnologiche che questa presenta. Le possibilità di ricostruzione offerte dal 3D vengono così messe a servizio della ricerca, offrendo una visione integrale in grado di avvicinarci alla realtà dell'epoca presa in considerazione e convogliando in un'unica piattaforma espositiva tutti i risultati. Divulgazione Progetto Mappa Informativa Multimediale Torino 1945 Sul piano pratico il progetto prevede una interfaccia navigabile (tecnologia Flash) che rappresenti la pianta della città dell'epoca, attraverso la quale sia possibile avere una visione dei luoghi e dei tempi in cui la Liberazione prese forma, sia a livello concettuale, sia a livello pratico. Questo intreccio di coordinate nello spazio e nel tempo non solo migliora la comprensione dei fenomeni, ma crea un maggiore interesse sull'argomento attraverso l'utilizzo di strumenti divulgativi di grande efficacia (e appeal) senza perdere di vista la necessità di valicare le tesi storiche proponendosi come piattaforma didattica. Un tale contesto richiede uno studio approfondito degli eventi storici al fine di ricostruire con chiarezza una mappa della città che sia precisa sia topograficamente sia a livello di navigazione multimediale. La preparazione della cartina deve seguire gli standard del momento, perciò le soluzioni informatiche utilizzate sono quelle fornite da Adobe Illustrator per la realizzazione della topografia, e da Macromedia Flash per la creazione di un'interfaccia di navigazione. La base dei dati descrittivi è ovviamente consultabile essendo contenuta nel supporto media e totalmente annotata nella bibliografia. È il continuo evolvere delle tecnologie d'informazione e la massiccia diffusione dell'uso dei computer che ci porta a un cambiamento sostanziale nello studio e nell'apprendimento storico; le strutture accademiche e gli operatori economici hanno fatto propria la richiesta che giunge dall'utenza (insegnanti, studenti, operatori dei Beni Culturali) di una maggiore diffusione della conoscenza storica attraverso la sua rappresentazione informatizzata. Sul fronte didattico la ricostruzione di una realtà storica attraverso strumenti informatici consente anche ai non-storici di toccare con mano quelle che sono le problematiche della ricerca quali fonti mancanti, buchi della cronologia e valutazione della veridicità dei fatti attraverso prove. Le tecnologie informatiche permettono una visione completa, unitaria ed esauriente del passato, convogliando tutte le informazioni su un'unica piattaforma, permettendo anche a chi non è specializzato di comprendere immediatamente di cosa si parla. Il miglior libro di storia, per sua natura, non può farlo in quanto divide e organizza le notizie in modo diverso. In questo modo agli studenti viene data l'opportunità di apprendere tramite una rappresentazione diversa rispetto a quelle a cui sono abituati. La premessa centrale del progetto è che i risultati nell'apprendimento degli studenti possono essere migliorati se un concetto o un contenuto viene comunicato attraverso più canali di espressione, nel nostro caso attraverso un testo, immagini e un oggetto multimediale. Didattica La Conceria Fiorio è uno dei luoghi-simbolo della Resistenza torinese. Il progetto è una ricostruzione in realtà virtuale della Conceria Fiorio di Torino. La ricostruzione serve a arricchire la cultura storica sia a chi la produce, attraverso una ricerca accurata delle fonti, sia a chi può poi usufruirne, soprattutto i giovani, che, attratti dall'aspetto ludico della ricostruzione, apprendono con più facilità. La costruzione di un manufatto in 3D fornisce agli studenti le basi per riconoscere ed esprimere la giusta relazione fra il modello e l'oggetto storico. Le fasi di lavoro attraverso cui si è giunti alla ricostruzione in 3D della Conceria: . una ricerca storica approfondita, basata sulle fonti, che possono essere documenti degli archivi o scavi archeologici, fonti iconografiche, cartografiche, ecc.; . La modellazione degli edifici sulla base delle ricerche storiche, per fornire la struttura geometrica poligonale che permetta la navigazione tridimensionale; . La realizzazione, attraverso gli strumenti della computer graphic della navigazione in 3D. Unreal Technology è il nome dato al motore grafico utilizzato in numerosi videogiochi commerciali. Una delle caratteristiche fondamentali di tale prodotto è quella di avere uno strumento chiamato Unreal editor con cui è possibile costruire mondi virtuali, e che è quello utilizzato per questo progetto. UnrealEd (Ued) è il software per creare livelli per Unreal e i giochi basati sul motore di Unreal. E' stata utilizzata la versione gratuita dell'editor. Il risultato finale del progetto è un ambiente virtuale navigabile raffigurante una ricostruzione accurata della Conceria Fiorio ai tempi della Resistenza. L'utente può visitare l'edificio e visualizzare informazioni specifiche su alcuni punti di interesse. La navigazione viene effettuata in prima persona, un processo di "spettacolarizzazione" degli ambienti visitati attraverso un arredamento consono permette all'utente una maggiore immersività rendendo l'ambiente più credibile e immediatamente codificabile. L'architettura Unreal Technology ha permesso di ottenere un buon risultato in un tempo brevissimo, senza che fossero necessari interventi di programmazione. Questo motore è, quindi, particolarmente adatto alla realizzazione rapida di prototipi di una discreta qualità, La presenza di un certo numero di bug lo rende, però, in parte inaffidabile. Utilizzare un editor da videogame per questa ricostruzione auspica la possibilità di un suo impiego nella didattica, quello che le simulazioni in 3D permettono nel caso specifico è di permettere agli studenti di sperimentare il lavoro della ricostruzione storica, con tutti i problemi che lo storico deve affrontare nel ricreare il passato. Questo lavoro vuole essere per gli storici una esperienza nella direzione della creazione di un repertorio espressivo più ampio, che includa gli ambienti tridimensionali. Il rischio di impiegare del tempo per imparare come funziona questa tecnologia per generare spazi virtuali rende scettici quanti si impegnano nell'insegnamento, ma le esperienze di progetti sviluppati, soprattutto all'estero, servono a capire che sono un buon investimento. Il fatto che una software house, che crea un videogame di grande successo di pubblico, includa nel suo prodotto, una serie di strumenti che consentano all'utente la creazione di mondi propri in cui giocare, è sintomatico che l'alfabetizzazione informatica degli utenti medi sta crescendo sempre più rapidamente e che l'utilizzo di un editor come Unreal Engine sarà in futuro una attività alla portata di un pubblico sempre più vasto. Questo ci mette nelle condizioni di progettare moduli di insegnamento più immersivi, in cui l'esperienza della ricerca e della ricostruzione del passato si intreccino con lo studio più tradizionale degli avvenimenti di una certa epoca. I mondi virtuali interattivi vengono spesso definiti come la forma culturale chiave del XXI secolo, come il cinema lo è stato per il XX. Lo scopo di questo lavoro è stato quello di suggerire che vi sono grosse opportunità per gli storici impiegando gli oggetti e le ambientazioni in 3D, e che essi devono coglierle. Si consideri il fatto che l'estetica abbia un effetto sull'epistemologia. O almeno sulla forma che i risultati delle ricerche storiche assumono nel momento in cui devono essere diffuse. Un'analisi storica fatta in maniera superficiale o con presupposti errati può comunque essere diffusa e avere credito in numerosi ambienti se diffusa con mezzi accattivanti e moderni. Ecco perchè non conviene seppellire un buon lavoro in qualche biblioteca, in attesa che qualcuno lo scopra. Ecco perchè gli storici non devono ignorare il 3D. La nostra capacità, come studiosi e studenti, di percepire idee ed orientamenti importanti dipende spesso dai metodi che impieghiamo per rappresentare i dati e l'evidenza. Perché gli storici possano ottenere il beneficio che il 3D porta con sè, tuttavia, devono sviluppare un'agenda di ricerca volta ad accertarsi che il 3D sostenga i loro obiettivi di ricercatori e insegnanti. Una ricostruzione storica può essere molto utile dal punto di vista educativo non sono da chi la visita ma, anche da chi la realizza. La fase di ricerca necessaria per la ricostruzione non può fare altro che aumentare il background culturale dello sviluppatore. Conclusioni La cosa più importante è stata la possibilità di fare esperienze nell'uso di mezzi di comunicazione di questo genere per raccontare e far conoscere il passato. Rovesciando il paradigma conoscitivo che avevo appreso negli studi umanistici, ho cercato di desumere quelle che potremo chiamare "leggi universali" dai dati oggettivi emersi da questi esperimenti. Da punto di vista epistemologico l'informatica, con la sua capacità di gestire masse impressionanti di dati, dà agli studiosi la possibilità di formulare delle ipotesi e poi accertarle o smentirle tramite ricostruzioni e simulazioni. Il mio lavoro è andato in questa direzione, cercando conoscere e usare strumenti attuali che nel futuro avranno sempre maggiore presenza nella comunicazione (anche scientifica) e che sono i mezzi di comunicazione d'eccellenza per determinate fasce d'età (adolescenti). Volendo spingere all'estremo i termini possiamo dire che la sfida che oggi la cultura visuale pone ai metodi tradizionali del fare storia è la stessa che Erodoto e Tucidide contrapposero ai narratori di miti e leggende. Prima di Erodoto esisteva il mito, che era un mezzo perfettamente adeguato per raccontare e dare significato al passato di una tribù o di una città. In un mondo post letterario la nostra conoscenza del passato sta sottilmente mutando nel momento in cui lo vediamo rappresentato da pixel o quando le informazioni scaturiscono non da sole, ma grazie all'interattività con il mezzo. La nostra capacità come studiosi e studenti di percepire idee ed orientamenti importanti dipende spesso dai metodi che impieghiamo per rappresentare i dati e l'evidenza. Perché gli storici possano ottenere il beneficio sottinteso al 3D, tuttavia, devono sviluppare un'agenda di ricerca volta ad accertarsi che il 3D sostenga i loro obiettivi di ricercatori e insegnanti. Le esperienze raccolte nelle pagine precedenti ci portano a pensare che in un futuro non troppo lontano uno strumento come il computer sarà l'unico mezzo attraverso cui trasmettere conoscenze, e dal punto di vista didattico la sua interattività consente coinvolgimento negli studenti come nessun altro mezzo di comunicazione moderno. ; If the job of the historian is to understand the past like it has been comprised from the people who have lived it, then is perhaps not risked to think that it is also necessary to communicate turns out you of the searches with own instruments that belong to an age and that they influence the mentality of who in that age alive. Emergent technologies, especially in the area of the multimedialità like the virtual truth, allow the historians to communicate the experience of the past in more senses. In that way the history collaborates with the computer science technologies stopping itself on the possibility to make historical reconstructions virtual, with relati examples and book reviews to you? What mainly it takes care the historians is if a reconstruction of a lived last fact through its recreation in pixels is a method of acquaintance of the history that can be considered valid. That is the emotion that navigation in a truth 3D can provoke, is means in a position to transmitting acquaintance? Or perhaps the idea that we have of the past and its study comes thin changed in the moment in which it is disclosed through the diagram 3D? For a long time but the discipline has begun to above all make the accounts with this situation, forced from the invasività of this type of average, from the show making of the past and one spreading of the partial and antiscientific past. In a literary world post it must begin to think that the visual culture in which we are dipped is changing our relationship with the past: for this the acquaintances matured until today are not false, but it is necessary to recognize that historical truth exists more than one, to times written to times visual. The computer has become one omnipresent platform for the rappresentazione and information dissimation. The methods of interaction and representation are evolving continually. And it is on these two railroads that are move the offer of the computer science technologies to the service of the history. The scope of this thesis is just that one to explore, through it uses and the computer science experimentation of various instruments and technologies, as it can effectively be told the virtual past through three-dimensional objects and atmospheres, and like, in their being characterizing elements of communication, in that way they can collaborate, in this particular case, with the historical discipline. The present search reconstructs some history lines of the main active factories to Turin during the second world war, remembering tightened relation that exists between structures and individuals and in this city in particular between factory and movement laborer, is unavoidable to penetrate in the vicissitudes of the movement Turinese laborer who in the period of the fight of Liberation in city was a political and social subject of first relief. In the city, understanding like been involved biological entity in the war, the factory (or the factories) becomes the conceptual nucleus through which to read the city: they are the factories it objects to it to you main of the strafings and is in the factories that fight one war of liberation between class laborer and authority, of factory and citizens. The factory becomes the place of "usurpation of the power" of which Weber speaks, the stage in which the various episodes of the war are kept: strikes, deportations, occupations. The model of the city represented here is not a simple visualization but an informative system where the modeled truth is represented from objects, that they make from theatre to the development of events with a precise chronological positioning, to whose inside is possible to carry out operations of selection to render (images static), of filmati estimated (animations) and navigable scenes interactively beyond to activity of search of bibliographical sources and comments of students mainly legacies to the event in object. Objective of this job is to make to interact, through various plans, the historical disciplines and computer science, in the various technological opportunities that this introduces. The offered possibilities of reconstruction from the 3D come therefore put to service of the search, offering an integral vision in a position to approaching us the truth of the age taken in consideration and convogliando in an only espositiva platform all it turns out to you. Spreading Plan Informative Map Multimedia Turin 1945 On the practical plan the plan previews a navigable interface (Flash technology) that it represents the plant of the city of the age, through which it is possible to have a vision of the places and of the times in which the Liberation taken shape, it is to conceptual level, it is to practical level. This I interlace of coordinated in the space and in the time it not only improves the understanding of the phenomena, but it creates a greater interest on the argument through I use it of instruments disclosed you of great effectiveness (and appeal) without to lose sight the necessity of valicare the historical theses proposing itself like didactic platform. A such context demands a study deepened of the historical events to the aim to reconstruct with clarity a map of the city that is precise is topographicalally is to level of multimediale navigation. The preparation of the map must follow the standards of the moment, therefore the used computer science solutions are those supplied from Adobe Illustrator for the realization of the topography, and from Macromedia Flash for the creation of a navigation interface. The base of the data described is obviously consultabile being contained in the medium support and totally annotated in the bibliography. It is the continuous one to evolvere of the information technologies and it massiccia spread of the use of the computers that us door to a substantial change in the study and the historical learning; the academic structures and the operating economic have made the demand own that it reaches from the user (teaching, students, operating of the Cultural Assets) of one greater spread of the historical acquaintance through its computerized representation. On the didactic forehead the reconstruction of an historical truth through instruments informed to us concurs also with the not-historical to touch with hand those that are problematic of the search the which sources lacking, holes of the chronology and appraisal of the authenticity of the facts through tests. The computer science technologies allow a complete, unitary vision and exhausting of the past, convogliando all the information on an only platform, allowing also to who are not specialized to comprise immediately of what are spoken. The better book than history, for its nature, cannot make it in how much divides and organizes the news in various way. In this way to the students it comes given the opportunity to learn through a various rappresentazione regarding those to which they are accustoms to you. The premise centers them of the plan is that it turns out to you in the learning of the students can be improves to you if a concept or a content comes communicated through more channels than expression, in our case through a text, images and a multimediale object. Didactics The Fiorio Tannery is one of the place-symbol of the Turinese Resistance. The plan is one reconstruction in virtual truth of the Fiorio Tannery of Turin. The reconstruction serves to enrich the historical culture is to who produces it, through an accurate search of the sources, is to who can then have use of of, above all the young people, than, attracted from the ludic aspect of the reconstruction, they learn with more facility. The construction of manufatto in 3D supplies to the students the bases in order to recognize and to express the just relation between the model and the historical object. It is made of job through which it is joints to the reconstruction in 3D of the Tannery: a deepened historical search, based on the iconografiche, cartographic sources, that they can be documents of arches or archaeological diggings to you, sources, etc. The modellazione of the buildings on the historical basis for research work, in order to supply the poligonale geometric structure that allows three-dimensional navigation. The realization, through the instruments of the computer graphic of navigation in 3D. Unreal Technology is the name given to the used graphic motor in numerous videogames trades them. One of the fundamental characteristics of such product is that one of having a called instrument Unreal editor with which it is possible to construct virtual worlds, and that it is that one used for this plan. UnrealEd (Ued) is the software in order to create levels for Unreal and the games base to you on the motor of Unreal. E' be used the free version of the editor. The final result of the plan is a navigable virtual atmosphere representing one accurate reconstruction of the Fiorio Tannery to the times of the Resistance. The customer can visit the building and visualize specific information on some points of interest. Navigation comes carried out in first person, a process of "show" of atmospheres visits you through a furnishing consono allows to the customer one greater immersività rendering the more credible and immediately codificabile atmosphere. The Unreal architecture technology has allowed to obtain a good result in the short time, without that they were necessary participations of programming. This motor is, therefore, particularly adapted to the fast realization of prototypes of a discreet quality, the presence of a sure number of bug renders it, but, in inaffidabile part. To use a editor from videogame for this foretell reconstruction the possibility of a its employment in the didactic field, what the simulations in 3D allow in the specific case are to allow the students to experience the job of the historical reconstruction, with all the problems that the historian must face in recreating the past. This job wants to be for the historians a experience in the direction of the creation of a expressive repertorio more wide one, that it includes three-dimensional atmospheres. The risk to employ of the time in order to learn as this technology works in order to generate virtual spaces renders skeptics how many is engaged in the instruction, but the experiences of plans develop to you, above all to the foreign country, serve to understand that they are a good investment. The fact that a software house, that happening of public creates a videogame of large, includes in its product, a series of instruments that concur with the customer the creation of own worlds in which playing, it is sintomatico that the computer science schooling of the medium customers is growing more and more quickly and that I use it of a editor as Unreal Engine will be in future one activity to the capacity of a more and more immense public. This puts to us in the conditions for planning modules of instruction more immersed to you, in which the experience of the search and the reconstruction of the past they interlace with the more traditional study of the events of one sure age. The virtual worlds interatti to you often come defined like the cultural shape key of XXI the century, as the cinema it has been for the XX. The scope of this job has been that one to suggest that the objects and the acclimatizations in 3D are large opportunities for the historians employing, and that they must pick them. The fact is considered that the aesthetic one has an effect on the epistemologiy. Or at least on the shape that turns out you of the historical searches they assume in the moment in which they must be diffuse. A made historical analysis in superficial way or with presupposed wrong can however be diffuse and to have credit in numerous atmospheres if diffused with winning and modern means. Here why it does not convene to bury a good job in some library, in attended that someone discovers it. Here why the historians do not have to ignore the 3D. Our ability, like students and students, to perceive important ideas and guidelines often depends on the methods that we employ in order to represent the data and the evidence. Because the historians can obtain the benefit that 3D the door with himself, however, they must develop a search agenda turns to assess that the 3D he supports theirs objects you of teaching investigators and. An historical reconstruction can be much profit from the educational point of view is not from who the visit but, also from who it realizes it. The phase of necessary search for the reconstruction cannot make other that to increase the background cultural of the developer. Conclusions The thing more important has been the possibility to make experiences in the use of mass media of this kind in order to tell and to introduce the past. Turning upside down the cognitive paradigm that I had learned in the humanistic studies, I have tried to desumere those that we will be able to call "universal laws" from the objective data emerged from these experiments. From epistemologico point of view computer science, with its ability to manage impressive masses of data, gives to the students the possibility to formulate of the hypotheses and then to assess them or to refute them through reconstructions and simulations. My job has gone in this direction, trying to know and to use instruments it puts into effect them that in the future they will have always greater presence in the communication (also scientific) and that they are the mass media of excellence for determined bands of ages (adolescent). Wanting to push to the end the terms we can say that the challenge that today the visual culture places to the traditional methods of making history is the same one that Erodoto and contrapposero Tucidide to the narrators of myths and legends. Before Erodoto the myth existed, that it was means perfectly adapted in order to tell and to give meant to the past of one tribe or one city. In a literary world post our acquaintance of the past is thin changing in the moment in which we see it represented from pixel or when the information gush not alone, but thanks to the interattività with means. Our ability as studious and students to perceive important ideas and guidelines often depend on the methods that we employ in order to represent the data and the evidence. Because the historians can obtain the benefit sottinteso to the 3D, however, they must develop a search agenda turns to assess that the 3D he supports theirs objects you of teaching investigators and. The experiences collections in the previous pages carry to not too much think that in a future far away an instrument to us as the computer will be the only means through which transmitting acquaintances, and from the didactic point of view its interattività concurs involvement in the students like no other modern mass media.
