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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DESIGNATED POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, OPINIONS ON TWENTY-ONE ISSUES, AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY AT LOCAL, STATE, AND NATIONAL LEVELS. THE SAMPLES EXAMINED INCLUDE DELEGATES TO THE 1984 PARTY CONVENTIONS IN ELEVEN STATES. GENERALLY, THE FINDINGS INDICATE THAT IDEOLOGY AND ISSUE POSITION ARE MOST STRONGLY ASSOCIATED WITH ACTIVITY IN NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS. AMONG DEMOCRATS LIBERALISM IS ASSOCIATED WITH NATIONAL ACTIVITY, WHEREAS AMONG REPUBLICANS THOSE WHO ARE CONSERVATIVE ARE MOST ACTIVE IN NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS. SOME IMPORTANT INTRAPARTY DIFFERENCES ARE FOUND BETWEEN LOCAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVISTS AND NATIONAL ACTIVISTS. FOR EXAMPLE, AMONG DEMOCRATS LOCAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVISTS ARE MUCH MORE CONSERVATIVE THAN NATIONAL ACTIVISTS ON SEVERAL ISSUES.

The Constitution of Nepal has adopted a three tier-system of federalism in which the functions and powers of the federal, provincial, and local levels are allocated in exclusive and concurrent lists in Annexes 5-9. These functions were further unbundled by the Government of Nepal (GoN) through an executive decision. The Allocation of Business Rules of the federal and provincial governments details ministry-wise functions at their respective levels. The functions and powers of local governments are enacted through the Local Government Operation Act, 2074 (LGOA, 2017). The arrangements for inter-governmental fiscal transfers are laid out in the Inter-Governmental Fiscal Arrangement Act, 2074 (2017) as well as the National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission Act, 2074 (2017). Federal legislations and amendments of various sectoral laws further specify the functions and responsibilities of the federal, provincial, and local governments in the changed constitutional context. Functions of several laws related to the implementation of fundamental rights specified in the Constitution have been allocated to the three levels of government. Despite efforts to implement these provisions, there are inconsistencies, overlaps, gaps, lacunae, and challenges in executing the functions and responsibilities entrusted to the different levels of government. This summary report attempts to identify these issues in the allocation of functions and expenditures across the three-levels of government,2 and focuses on key sectors including education, health, agriculture and livestock, and physical infrastructure development.

When comparing Argentina's population with the number of cellular telephony active lines, it can be assert that the active lines widely exceed the inhabitants. Because of this high concentration of cellular telephony, due to the lower cell phone's price against computer's price, it begins to be necessary for the government agencies to provide services that can be implemented in cellular phones. The government agencies, that opportunely, joined their efforts to provide on line services through the web, facilitating the procedures for the citizens and starting a field called eGovernment, must now consider the high insertion of the cellular phones within the population and, accordingly, facilitate the access to services from mobile devices (mServices). When mobile devices become the eGovernment communication channel, this new field of study is called mGovernment. The present paper presents the analysis of the obtained results after surveying mServices and the technology implemented by government agencies. ; VI Workshop Ingeniería de Software (WIS) ; Red de Universidades con Carreras en Informática (RedUNCI)

The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress

The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The present study was aimed to study the level of Social Maturity of Government and Private Secondary School Students. The study was conducted on a sample of 576 secondary school students studying in 9th class of Guntur district, Andhra Pradesh. For data collection the investigator has used Social Maturity scale constructed and standardized by Dr.Nalini Rao. The data collected was subjected to statistical analysis such as Mean, S.D. and "t" values. The results of the study showed that there is no significant difference in Social maturity of secondary school students in relation to their gender and type of management.

While governments increasingly turn to third-party providers to deliver public services and government responsibilities are increasingly shifted from the federal to the state and local levels, both contracting and the division of powers under federalism blur lines of accountability. Because recent experiments on blame shifting find mixed results and citizens have different expectations of federal, state, and local government, we ask the following: How does blame attribution in third-party governance compare across levels of government? To address this question, we employ a timely survey experiment to examine who is responsible for a prisoner's death in the case of interstate prisoner transport, which is one of the few services that is provided across all levels of government and by government contractors. The results show that contracting reduces the level of blame attributed to the government and that blame for contract failures varies by the level of government. Across levels of government, we find the local government sees the largest reduction in blame by contracting out. Findings have implications for accountability in contracting arrangements in public safety contexts.

Published interview of Brooks Hays in Nation's Cities (American Municipal Association)

Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that institutional distance increases perceived corruption. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relation is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. It is not reducible to geographical distance. We observe similar results in other countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published