Suchergebnisse

At DiGRA 2013 (Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA), the Indie Game Studies panel and dedicated issue of the journal Loading…, curated by Prof Bart Simon, brought the emerging forms of independent game development to the attention of game scholars (Parker 2014). Five years later, the indie scene has become richer and varied, and has been adapting to mutating contexts of production and distribution. Festivals, incubators for start-ups and small companies, workshops and mentoring schemes, have been proliferating in the USA, Canada, Australia, Northern Europe, and the United Kingdom. Numerous independent companies have been founded in the geographical areas where the video game industry was already solid, and a significant presence is establishing in parts of the world that have been traditionally distant from the main hubs of video game development. While the differences (economic, managerial, ideological) with the mainstream productions have always been contested, the recent proliferation of independent companies has further confused the boundaries that appeared to separate the independent territories from the 'official' video game industry. In 2013 the trade association TIGA estimated that in the United Kingdom '83% of all studios that started up in 2011 and 2012 were independent (as opposed to publisher owned)' (TIGA 2013). It has been estimated that, in 2014, 95% of video game companies in the United Kingdom were micro or small businesses, according to NESTA (2014) and the British government (GOV.uk 2014). In Australia, independent companies now form the 'backbone' of game development (Apperley and Golding 2015, 61; Banks and Cunningham 2016). In 2013, a survey involving 2,500 North American game developers revealed that 53% of them identified as 'indie' (GDC 2013), and a subsequent survey by IGDA revealed that 48% of US game developers self-identified as independent (IGDA 2014). Independence is no longer a marginal or alternative mode of production, if it ever was, but the most common type of organization within the video game industry. It appears that almost every game developer is now partially or temporarily 'indie' within their career, and the trend is expected to grow, consistently with the recent developments of the cinema, music, and fashion industries (Hesmondhalgh 2013, McRobbie 2016). The workshop will explore the current state, meanings, and values associated with independence in video game culture, through a series of contributions and findings that analyse the domain from different perspectives, disciplines and geographical specificities. What is at stake, in 2018, when making claims of autonomy, self-management, and creative control? Are indie games helping improve the diversity deficit in game makers and audiences? Is there still room for independence, in a production context where short-term contracts, individualism, and financial risks are considered necessary to be involved in game development? The workshop picks up where the 2013 DiGRA panel left off, bringing together the most current research and theorizing on the topic of "indie game studies." Speakers, including some of from the original panel in Atlanta, will present and compare research in a series of short (approx. 15 minutes) presentations. The presentation will culminate in a discussion, to which participants will be invited to contribute, identifying patterns, controversies and gaps, with a view toward continuing towards further collaboration, research, publication and dissemination. Speakers' contributions: Indie Game Studies – 5 years later Paolo Ruffino (Lecturer in Media Studies, University of Lincoln, UK) Ruffino will introduce the workshop. Drawing on Felan Parker's proposal of 'indie game studies', the workshop gathers some of the international scholars who are currently doing research on independent game development (Parker 2014). This presentation looks at the various approaches to the study of independence. It also questions the reasons for doing research on this topic in this particular historical moment, while developers are starting to organise in local/global unions and networks of mutual assistance. It also draws on regionally specific studies regarding the meaning and values of independence, with a view on mapping the contemporary topics and questions of academic research in the field. Game Production Studies: Theory, Method and Practice Casey O'Donnell (Associate Professor in the Department of Media and Information at Michigan State University, USA) Dr. O'Donnell's addition to this workshop is rooted in a deep interest and care for game production studies, beginning with his early dissertation work with AAA game developers and subsequently working in a variety of fields doing research on game production in the educational, crowdsourcing and "indie" communities. O'Donnell's focus will be on the theories, methods and practices of performing indie game production studies. Game Production Studies explore the wide array of processes, practices, texts, technologies and aspects that take place in and surrounding the game production process. This process is often referred to generally as "game development," which while rooted in the practice of making games actually constitutes a wide variety of tasks, disciplinary perspectives, processes, people and institutions. Indiepocalypse Nadav Lipkin (Assistant Professor of Media, Communication and Technology at La Roche College, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) In his 2013 article for Loading…, Lipkin went about defining independent games. A fear at the heart of that discussion was that larger corporations would co-opt the indie movement by producing games that look indie without being independent from dominant production practices. Since then, subsequent research suggests a different concern is perhaps more worthy of examination. For this workshop, Lipkin will discuss the Indiepocalypse and focus on how the biggest threat to independents is not the mainstream but each other. Overproduction, a glamorization of insecure and unpaid labor, and mainstream distribution partners (especially Steam) who have contradictory financial interests need to be better understood. By examining these conditions, Lipkin intends to connect the games industry more closely to examinations of other creative industries plagued by similarly poor labor and economic conditions. Some notes on the indiefication of game development Olli Sotamaa (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Game Lab, School of Information Sciences at University of Tampere, Finland) This presentation will draw on my study of the Finnish game development scene that has been going on for almost a decade now. While Finland arguably is a small node in the global circuits of game production, well known hit games like Rovio's Angry Birds and Supercell's Clash of Clans have attracted attention worldwide. Following Garda & Grabarczyk (2016), I consider it important to highlight how the notions of independent games are always connected to given time and place. Accordingly, I examine how independence and 'indie' get a particular meaning in a North-European game development scene defined by small domestic market and early focus on mobile games. Drawing from diverse examples ranging from Housemarque, an independent studio founded in 1995 and a nominee for the Best Indie Studio in Develop Awards 2018, to Arvi Teikari, the designer of IGF 2018 winner Baba is You, this presentation explores the different understandings of indie in an environment that has never hosted a strong AAA industry. As at least some of the game development practices look increasingly similar, it is clear that we need to take a closer look at the production networks (Tyni 2017) and cultural intermediaries (Parker, Whitson & Simon 2018) and explore how they differ between individual games and companies. The other side of the spectrum – how indies saved VR Paweł Grabarczyk (Post-Doc at ITU Copenhagen, Denmark) As has been pointed out (Juul 2015, Garda & Grabarczyk 2016) pixel art and low (or at least relatively humble) production values have become the de facto aesthetic standard for contemporary independent games. Indie games can typically be run on modest computers as they do not require expensive graphics cards or fast processors. The result of this common association is that independent games with relatively high production values are sometimes dubbed as "AAA indie" (Hellblade Senua's Sacrifice can be a good example of this). Contrary to this VR technologies are typically associated with expensive, high end machines because they require both: the purchase of a relatively powerful computer and the purchase of the headset itself. On the face of it, VR games and indie aesthetics could not be further apart. It is thus very surprising that this expensive technology attracted a substantial number of independent developers (for example, there are currently 1864 games tagged as "independent" "VR" games on the Steam platform). More importantly, many of the most successful VR games belong to the indie category (Job Simulator, SuperHot VR, Beat Saber). I believe that this phenomenon demands further study, because it escapes some of the existing classifications and conceptualizations of independent games market (the move from retro-aesthetics being the most obvious reason for this). I argue that there are three reasons why independent developers were attracted to VR platforms. The first reason is the move from pixel art to low poly art which has been visible in many recent games (and which made the transition from "flat" games to VR games possible). The second reason is the spirit of innovation which permeates both communities (indie developers and VR developers). The third, most intriguing factor is that VR games created an economic niche which resulted from the lack of so called "AAA" games being developed specifically for VR. Project:INDIE Dr Celia Pearce (Associate Professor of Game Design at Northeastern University, USA) Over the past decade, indie games have grown at such a rapid rate that by 2014 roughly half of game developers identified as indie. This explosion is the outcome of a bottom-up, complex, emergent process representing the convergence of a variety of visible and invisible factors, including: emerging technologies, new publication and funding models, game academia, festivals and exhibitions, accessible creation tools, peer-learning and creative communities (e.g. game jams, co-working spaces), as well changes in government and popular perception of games. Project:INDIE is an initiative and consortium formed to develop an overview of the indie ecosystem, mapping the complex interrelationships and influences between its constituent parts. We will do this by aggregating existing research on indie games, identifying gaps and setting research agendas, and conducting comparative analysis on datasets from key players to understand the synergies between various contributing factors to the growth and commercial success of indie and artgames. Independent game industry in Melbourne, Australia Dr Brendan Keogh (Digital Media Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology, Australia) Like other countries beyond North America and Japan, Australia has an emerging, grassroots videogame industry consisting primarily of small teams of independent studios creating original IP in precarious conditions. In Australia, this independent game industry has centred on Melbourne, Victoria, where state funding and the support of institutions such as the State Library of Victoria and the Australian Centre of the Moving Image have encouraged the growth of a robust and diverse ecology of videogame makers. Crucially, within this ecology are two interlocking but distinct independent scenes with different practices and approaches. This talk will present preliminary findings from interview research conducted with 40 videogame makers and cultural institutions in Melbourne to highlight the specific tensions, experiences, skills, and identities across these two Melbourne indie game scenes to draw attention to the need to account for a variety of scales of formal and informal creative labour practices within local videogame development fields. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION Paweł Grabarczyk is a post-doc researcher at IT University of Copenhagen and adjunct professor at University of Lodz. His research focuses mostly on the boundaries between philosophy and game studies: specifically philosophy of language (ontology of games and conceptual analysis) and philosophy of mind (forms of representation in games and virtual reality). He is also interested in the study of modern and historical trends in games (indie games, shareware games) and demoscene. He is the president of Centre for Philosophical Research and an editor-in-chief of Replay: The Polish Journal of Game Studies. Brendan Keogh is an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Research Fellow currently conducting research into Australian videogame makers and skills transfer. He is the author of A Play of Bodies: How We Perceive Videogames and Killing is Harmless: A Critical Reading of Spec Ops The Line. Nadav Lipkin is an Assistant Professor of Media, Communication and Technology at La Roche College in Pittsburgh. His dissertation, "Agents at work: Decision making capacity and creative labor in network society," explores agency for creative professionals through a cross-industry analysis and a case study of the independent game development community in New York City. His research focuses on independent media production both in and beyond the games industry. Currently, he is examining the responses of YouTube content producers to changes in the platform's content policies. Casey O'Donnell is an Associate Professor in the Department of Media and Information at Michigan State University. His research examines the creative collaborative work of videogame design and development. This research examines the cultural and collaborative dynamics that occur in both professional "AAA" organizations and formal and informal "independent" game development communities. His first book, "Developer's Dilemma" is published by MIT Press. Casey is an active game developer, releasing "Osy," in 2011, "Against the Gradient," in 2012, "GLITcH" in 2013 and "Kerem B'Yavneh," in 2016. His work has been funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institute of Health (NIH). Celia Pearce is an award-winning game designer, researcher, writer and curator. She currently holds a position as Associate Professor of Game Design at Northeastern University. She is the author or co-author of numerous of books and papers, including Communities of Play (MIT Press), Ethnography and Virtual Worlds (Princeton) and IndieCade@10: A Decade of Innovation (CMU ETC Press-In Progress), which chronicles the history of IndieCade, the festival she co-founded. Her recent game credits include Fracture, co-designed for the Blinks Platform, and eBee, which won the 2016 award for Innovation in Tabletop Game Design at Boston Festival of Indie Games. Paolo Ruffino is Lecturer in Media Studies at University of Lincoln, UK, and artist with the collective IOCOSE. Ruffino is the author of Future Gaming: Creative Interventions in Video Game Culture (Goldsmiths and MIT Press), and editor and co-author of numerous publications on games cultures, gamification, and game art. He has been researching in the areas of digital culture, media and cultural studies, media art, and semiotics. Ruffino is President of DiGRA Italia and board member of British DiGRA. Olli Sotamaa is an Associate Professor of game cultures studies at the University of Tampere. His publications cover co-production, user-generated content, game industry analysis & game studies methods. Sotamaa is the co-director of University of Tampere Game Research Lab and a team leader at the Centre of Excellence in Game Culture Studies (2018-2025). His current research interests include game production studies, creative labour and game policy. BIBLIOGRAPHY Apperley, T. and Golding, D. (2015) "Australia" in In Video Games Around the World (M.J.P. Wolf, dir.), Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, pp. 57–70. Arsenault, D., and Guay, L.-M. (2015). "Canada". In Video Games Around the World (M.J.P. Wolf, dir.), Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, p. 105-118. Garda, M.B. & Grabarczyk, P. (2016). Is Every Indie Game Independent? Towards the Concept of Independent Game. Game Studies, vol. 16, Issue 1. GDC (2013) "GDC State of the Industry research exposes major trends ahead of March show". GDConf.com. February 28. Available at http://www.gdconf.com /news/gdc_state_of_the_industry_rese/ GOV.uk (2014). "Video games tax relief passes final hurdle". GOV.uk, 27th March. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/video-games-tax-relief-passes-final-hurdle Gregg, M. (2011) Work's Intimacy. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press Hesmondhalgh, David. 2013. The Cultural Industries. 3rd Edition. London: Sage. Kultima, A; Alha, K. & Nummenmaa, T. (2016). Building Finnish Game Jam Community through Positive Social Facilitation. Proceedings of the 20th International Academic Mindtrek Conference, pp. 433-440. New York: ACM. Juul, J. (2014). "High-tech Low-tech Authenticity: The Creation of Independent Style at the Independent Games Festival". In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on the Foundations of Digital Games. Fort Lauderdale. Lessard, J. (2012). "Glutomax: Québecois Proto-Indie Game Development". Loading. Vol. 7, no 11, December 31st. Available at http://journals.sfu.ca/loading/index.php/loading/article/view/127. Lipkin, N. (2012). "Examining Indie's Independence: The Meaning of "Indie" Games, the Politics of Production, and Mainstream Cooptation". Loading. Vol. 7, no 11, December 31st. Available at http://journals.sfu.ca/loading/index.php/loading/article/view/122. NESTA (2014) "A Map of the UK Games Industry", Nesta.org, 25th September. Available at https://www.nesta.org.uk/publications/map-uk-games-industry McRobbie, A. 2016. Be Creative: Making a Living in the New Culture Industries. Cambridge: Polity Press. Parker, F. (2014) "Indie Game Studies Year Eleven". In Proceedings of DiGRA 2013: DeFragging Game Studies, Vol. 7, August 2014. Available at http://www.digra.org/digital-library/publications/indie-game-studies-year-eleven/ Parker, F; Whitson, J.R. & Simon, B. (2018). Megabooth: The cultural intermediation of indie games. New Media & Society, 20(5), 1953-1972. Ruffino, P. (2012). "Narratives of Independent Production in Video Game Culture". Loading. Vol. 7, no 11, December 31st. Available at http://journals.sfu.ca/loading/index.php/loading/article/view/120. Swalwell, M., and Davidson, M. (2015). "Game History and the Case of 'Malzak': Theorizing the Manufacture of 'local Product'in 1980s New Zealand". Locating Emerging Media (Ben Aslinger et Germaine R. Halegoua, dirs.), London: Routledge. Swalwell, M. (2012). "The Early Micro User: Games writing, hardware hacking, and the will to mod". In Proceedings of DiGRA Nordic 2012 Conference: Local and Global—Games in Culture and Society , June, Tampere Swalwell, M. (2008). "1980s Home coding: The art of amateur programming". Aotearoa Digital Arts New Media Reader (Stella Brennan and Su Ballard, dirs.), p. 192-201. Tyni, H. (2017). Double Duty: Crowdfunding and the Evolving Game Production Network. Games and Culture, Online First. UKIE (2017) "The UK Video Games Sector: a Blueprint for Growth". The UK Interactive Entertainment Association. Available at http://ukie.org.uk/blueprint

PREFACE PART ONE Introduction Chapter 1. INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT AND CULTURE 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Factors that influence decision making 1.3 Using culture 1.4 Cross-cultural and international management 1.5 Implications for the Manager 1.5 Summary 1.7 Exercise Case for PART ONE Chapter 1. Slicing the meat. PART TWO: CROSS-CULTURAL MANAGEMENT Chapter 2. ANALYSING CULTURES: MAKING COMPARISONS 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Comparative analysis 2.3 Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) 2.4 Hall (1976) 2.5 Hofstede's model 2.6 Applying Hofstede's model 2.7 Implications for the Manager 2.8 Summary 2.9 Exercise Chapter 3 ANALYSING CULTURES: AFTER HOFSTEDE 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Comparative analysis since Hofstede 3.3 Problems in using comparative analysis 3.4 New approaches 3.5 Implications for the Manager 3,6 Summary 3.7 Exercise Chapter 4 MOVEMENT IN THE CULTURE 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Recognizing significant movement in the culture 4.3 Economic change and cultural movement in Japan 4.4 Other factors causing movement 4.5 Implications for the Manager 4.6 Summary 4.7 Exercise Chapter 5. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Defining and analysing organizational cultures 5.3 Organizational culture and national culture 5.4 Mitigating the effects of the environment 5.5 Implications for the Manager 5.6 Summary 5.7 Exercise Chapter 6. CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Appropriate communication across cultures 6.3 One- and two-way communication styles 6.4 Non-verbal communication 6.5 Implications for the Manager 6.6 Summary 6.7 Exercise Chapter 7. MOTIVATION 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Needs 7.3 Intrinsic and extrinsic needs 7.4 How context influences needs 7.5 Designing incentives 7.6 Implications for the Manager 7.7 Summary 7.8 Exercise Chapter 8. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND NEGOTIATION 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Reasons for dispute 6.3 Culture and dispute 6.4 The manager resolves a dispute 6.5 Negotiation 6.6 Implications for the Manager 6.7 Summary 6.8 Exercise Chapter 9. FORMAL STRUCTURES 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Defining structure 9.3 Bureaucracy 9.4 Culture and bureaucracy 9.5 Implications for the Manager 9.6 Summary 9.7 Exercise Chapter 10. INFORMAL SYSTEMS 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Informal relationships 10.3 Modelling patronage 10.4 Patronage, culture and society 10.5 Some variants: Guanxi and Wasta 10.6 Managing informal systems 10.7 Implications for the Manager 10.8 Summary 10.9 Exercise Chapter 11 THE CULTURE AND POLITICS OF PLANNING CHANGE 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The meaning of planning 11.3 The classic planning model 11.4 How national culture influences planning 11.5 How organisational culture influences planning 11.6 The politics of planning 11.7 Implications for the Manager 11.8 Summary 11.9 Exercise Chapter 12 WHEN DOES CULTURE MATTER? THE CASE OF SMEs 12.1 Introduction 12.2 The start-up in the United Kingdom and United States 12.3 The start-up in Taiwan 12.4 The Anglo family company 12.5 The Chinese family company 12.6 The Middle eastern family company 12.7 Assessing the influence of national culture 12.8 Implications for the Manager 12.9 Summary 12.10 Exercise Cases for PART TWO Chapter 2 Relations between manager and employees Chapter 3 The Venezuelan manager Chapter 4 Youth and age, or youth and age? Chapter 5 The Vietnamese bank Chapter 6 Bad communication Chapter 7 Motivating who? Chapter 8 The Nigerian family firm Chapter 9 No job description Chapter 10 Patronage in Europe Chapter 11 Improving quality control Chapter 12 Explaining decisions made by small business owners PART THREE: INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT Chapter 13 GLOBALIZATION AND LOCALIZATION 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Defining globalisation 13.3 The social effects of globalisation 13.4 The roots of high globalisation 13.5 Implications for the Manager 13.6 Summary 13.7 Exercise Chapter 14 PLANNING STRATEGY 14.1 Introduction 14.2 Reasons for strategic planning 14.3 Stages in strategic planning 14.4 Strategic planning based on resources 14.5 Balancing resources and position 14.6 The influence of environmental factors 14.7 Growth strategies 14.8 Emergent strategy 14.9 Scenario planning 14.10 Implications for the Manager 14.11 Summary 14.12 Exercise Chapter 15 IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY AND APPLYING KNOWLEDGE 15.1 Introduction 15.2 Identifying and applying knowledge 15.3 Organizational capabilities and competitive advantage 15.4 Implementation and communication 15.5 Mergers and Acquisitions 15.6 Transferring the implementation system 15.7 Implications for the Manager 15.8 Summary 15.9 Exercise Chapter 16 E-COMMUNICATION 16.1 Introduction 16.2 Controlling by E-communication 16.3 Cross national implementation 16.4 Culture and E-communication 16.5 Implications for the Manager 16.6 Summary 16.7 Exercise Chapter 17 FORMING AN INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE 17.1 Introduction 17.2 Why invest in an IJV? 17.3 Preparing for success: the four compatibilities 17.4 Trust and mistrust 17.5 Sharing control 17.6 Implications for the Manager 17.7 Summary 17.8 Exercise Chapter 18 OPPORTUNITY AND RISK: HEADQUARTERS AND SUBSIDIARY 18.1 Introduction 18.2 Risk for the subsidiary 18.3 Control 18.5 Implications for the Manager 18.6 Summary 18.7 Exercise Chapter 19 MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES 19.1 Introduction 19.2 Applying concepts of HRM 19.3 The general functions of HRM 19.4 HRM activities in context 19.5 Recruitment 19.6 Performance appraisal 19.7 Training 19.8 Retention 19.9 Implications for the Manager 19.10 Summary 19.11 Exercise Chapter 20 CONTROLLING BY STAFFING 20.1 Introduction 20.2 Staffing to control the IJV 20.3 Bureaucratic or cultural control in the subsidiary? 20.4 Local or expatriate management? 20.5 Implications for the Manager 20.6 Summary 20.7 Exercise Chapter 21 MANAGING EXPATRIATE ASIGNMENTS 21.1 Introduction 21.2 What expatriates do 21.3 Expatriate success and failure 21.4 Expatriate selection 21.5 Expatriate training 21.6 Expatriate support 21.7 Implications for the Manager 21.8 Summary 21.9 Exercise Chapter 22 THE EXPATRIATE BRAND MANAGER 22.1 Introduction 22.2 The emergence of global brands 22.3 Role of the expatriate brand manager 22.4 Brand communication: managing the mix 22.5 Implications for the Manager 22.6 Summary 22.7 Exercise Cases for PART THREE Chapter 13 The call centre revolution Chapter 14 Baby food Chapter 15 New knowledge Chapter 16 Betafield Chapter 17 The Indian joint venrture Chapter 18 Global Paper (1) Chapter 19 The foreign employee Chapter 20 Global Paper (2) Chapter 21 Appointing a headquarters manager to the Swiss subsidiary Chapter 22 Teldaswift PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS Chapter 23 THE CULTURE OF THE SUBSIDIARY: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE 22.1 Introduction 23.2 Corporate cohesion and cultural shift 23.3 Convergence and divergence 23.4 The dual-pressure perspective 23.5 Cross-vergence 23.6 Implications for the Manager 23.7 Summary 23.8 Exercise Chapter 24. ETHICS AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 24.1 Introduction 24.2 Ethics 24.3 Ethics across culture and time 24.4 Ethics in branding 24.5 Corporate Social Responsibility 24.6 Implications for the Manager 24.7 Summary 24.8 Exercise Cases for PART FOUR Chapter 23 CAS Chapter 24 A Donation to the President's Campaign Fund Appendix Planning a Dissertation Bibliography BIBLIOGRAPHY

The global economy needs to completely transform itself over the next two decades. We need to comprehensively retrofit, remodel, and construct our economic system to achieve our net zero and sustainable development goals. It is a herculean task that will require unprecedented levels of compromise, cooperation and importantly, investment.Sustainable infrastructure is the backbone to this transformation. We'll need to retrofit our buildings to make them more energy efficient and resilient to increased weather events. We must remodel our systems of transportation so that we can move from A to B with zero emissions. We'll have to construct infrastructure that can protect our coastal communities from sea level rise while restoring nature to rebuild species fundamental for the planet's well-being, such as bees. If that seems like a big task, imagine undertaking it from an Emerging Market or Developing Country (EMDC). EMDC's have the additional challenge of trying to move many of their people out from poverty and build sustainable, inclusive, and resilient economic systems. In Africa, for example over 50% of the population still lives without access to electricity and there is limited domestic financial capacity to address it. Investment is key to unlocking the transformation we require. The need is enormous and growing. The gap between infrastructure investment and need is approximately US$ 3 trillion per annum, roughly equivalent to the entire economic output of the United Kingdom – the world's sixth largest economy. The good news is that the world has the capital to achieve this. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates that there is approximately US$430 trillion in global wealth. The challenge is getting the capital from where it is to where it's needed. With Government balance sheets at capacity, there are huge efforts underway to mobilize private capital to fill this gap. For these efforts to bear fruit, we must build an economic framework to enable this. The reason why we haven't been successful in mobilizing capital at the scale we require comes down to risk vs. reward. The perception from investors that the risk is too high for many of these investments and the rewards too low, particularly in EMDCs. In many cases, this is true. There are huge efforts underway to address this piecemeal, project by project, instrument by instrument, platform by platform but few which seek build a global framework to unlock capital at scale. One area that must be addressed to succeed at mobilizing private capital at scale is Basel III banking regulations.What is Basel III?"Basel III" refers to the reforms proposed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Basel III addresses shortcomings with the global financial system prior to the crisis to create a more resilient and stable banking system. These reforms are slowly being implemented by central banks across the globe, including in the US. The reforms require larger capital reserves (among additional requirements) for banks with US$100 billion more in assets. Increasing the stability and resilience of the global banking system is a noble and necessary goal, particularly given some of the cracks we've seen in recent years with the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, Credit Suisse and First Republic Bank.The Unintended Consequences of Basel IIIThe Basil II are strengthening bank balance sheets, however, these reforms are also making cross border lending by banks for EMDC infrastructure more risky and less rewarding with devastating consequences. Banks are the largest source of private sector investment in infrastructure and are less expensive than other forms of private capital. Since the Basel III reforms have begun implementation cross-border investment from global banks into EMDCs has decreased to levels not seen since the early 2000s. This is a huge problem because most private capital is housed in developed economies and must travel across borders to invest in EMDCs. The challenge is that Basel III wasn't designed with infrastructure investment in mind. As such, it fails to account for the lower risk and greater performance of infrastructure, as my former colleague, G20 Global Infrastructure Hub Senior Economist, Manpreet Juneja, outlines here. This results in higher capital charges which in turn has disincentivized banks from investing in infrastructure in EMDCs. The Global Infrastructure Hub estimates that if Basil III's stardards reflected infrastructure's historical credit performance, capital charges could be reduced by an 60% - 70% for banks.The Strategic Imperative for the US to Act This is a huge structural problem at a time when we are trying to mobilize record levels of private investment for our transformative net zero and sustainable development goals. The alarm bells should be ringing across the globe. But they aren't… The G20 is the only global body that can direct the Bank of International Settlements to act. Despite efforts to encourage G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) to move on this issue, it has yet to be meaningfully taken up. These reforms will take time to strike the right balance between financial stability and infrastructure investment. But as the impressive historical performance of infrastructure shows, this can be done. We must move carefully but quickly. The geopolitical stakes for the US are high. As the world's largest economy, home to the world's largest reserves of private capital, the US stands to benefit from private investment in infrastructure economically, politically and strategically. This is an opportunity for the US to catalyze its private capital mobilization and demonstrate to EMDCs that it can be partner of choice for infrastructure investment. It's a huge task and the stakes are high. As my colleague Sam Barr outlines, private capital mobilization isn't the only choice out there. China's Belt and Road Initiative has been rebooted and can offer investment quicker and with less strings than western investment. The future of investment flows, economic ties and the global economic architecture is at stake. The US Government, through the US Treasury, can push to make this an agenda item at the upcoming G20 FMCBG in Washington DC. The US will again host the G20 in 2026. The time between now and 2026 offers time for the BIS to announce the necessary changes to Basel III during the US G20 Presidency. It's an opportunity for a much-needed G20 good news story while on home soil. Most importantly, it's an opportunity to create an economic framework to catalyze private capital investment in infrastructure. That's good for the US, good for emerging markets and good for the planet. The time to act is now.

The global economy needs to completely transform itself over the next two decades. We need to comprehensively retrofit, remodel, and construct our economic system to achieve our net zero and sustainable development goals. It is a herculean task that will require unprecedented levels of compromise, cooperation and importantly, investment.Sustainable infrastructure is the backbone to this transformation. We'll need to retrofit our buildings to make them more energy efficient and resilient to increased weather events. We must remodel our systems of transportation so that we can move from A to B with zero emissions. We'll have to construct infrastructure that can protect our coastal communities from sea level rise while restoring nature to rebuild species fundamental for the planet's well-being, such as bees. If that seems like a big task, imagine undertaking it from an Emerging Market or Developing Country (EMDC). EMDC's have the additional challenge of trying to move many of their people out from poverty and build sustainable, inclusive, and resilient economic systems. In Africa, for example over 50% of the population still lives without access to electricity and there is limited domestic financial capacity to address it. Investment is key to unlocking the transformation we require. The need is enormous and growing. The gap between infrastructure investment and need is approximately US$ 3 trillion per annum, roughly equivalent to the entire economic output of the United Kingdom – the world's sixth largest economy. The good news is that the world has the capital to achieve this. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates that there is approximately US$430 trillion in global wealth. The challenge is getting the capital from where it is to where it's needed. With Government balance sheets at capacity, there are huge efforts underway to mobilize private capital to fill this gap. For these efforts to bear fruit, we must build an economic framework to enable this. The reason why we haven't been successful in mobilizing capital at the scale we require comes down to risk vs. reward. The perception from investors that the risk is too high for many of these investments and the rewards too low, particularly in EMDCs. In many cases, this is true. There are huge efforts underway to address this piecemeal, project by project, instrument by instrument, platform by platform but few which seek build a global framework to unlock capital at scale. One area that must be addressed to succeed at mobilizing private capital at scale is Basel III banking regulations.What is Basel III?"Basel III" refers to the reforms proposed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Basel III addresses shortcomings with the global financial system prior to the crisis to create a more resilient and stable banking system. These reforms are slowly being implemented by central banks across the globe, including in the US. The reforms require larger capital reserves (among additional requirements) for banks with US$100 billion more in assets. Increasing the stability and resilience of the global banking system is a noble and necessary goal, particularly given some of the cracks we've seen in recent years with the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, Credit Suisse and First Republic Bank.The Unintended Consequences of Basel IIIThe Basil II are strengthening bank balance sheets, however, these reforms are also making cross border lending by banks for EMDC infrastructure more risky and less rewarding with devastating consequences. Banks are the largest source of private sector investment in infrastructure and are less expensive than other forms of private capital. Since the Basel III reforms have begun implementation cross-border investment from global banks into EMDCs has decreased to levels not seen since the early 2000s. This is a huge problem because most private capital is housed in developed economies and must travel across borders to invest in EMDCs. The challenge is that Basel III wasn't designed with infrastructure investment in mind. As such, it fails to account for the lower risk and greater performance of infrastructure, as my former colleague, G20 Global Infrastructure Hub Senior Economist, Manpreet Juneja, outlines here. This results in higher capital charges which in turn has disincentivized banks from investing in infrastructure in EMDCs. The Global Infrastructure Hub estimates that if Basil III's stardards reflected infrastructure's historical credit performance, capital charges could be reduced by an 60% - 70% for banks.The Strategic Imperative for the US to Act This is a huge structural problem at a time when we are trying to mobilize record levels of private investment for our transformative net zero and sustainable development goals. The alarm bells should be ringing across the globe. But they aren't… The G20 is the only global body that can direct the Bank of International Settlements to act. Despite efforts to encourage G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) to move on this issue, it has yet to be meaningfully taken up. These reforms will take time to strike the right balance between financial stability and infrastructure investment. But as the impressive historical performance of infrastructure shows, this can be done. We must move carefully but quickly. The geopolitical stakes for the US are high. As the world's largest economy, home to the world's largest reserves of private capital, the US stands to benefit from private investment in infrastructure economically, politically and strategically. This is an opportunity for the US to catalyze its private capital mobilization and demonstrate to EMDCs that it can be partner of choice for infrastructure investment. It's a huge task and the stakes are high. As my colleague Sam Barr outlines, private capital mobilization isn't the only choice out there. China's Belt and Road Initiative has been rebooted and can offer investment quicker and with less strings than western investment. The future of investment flows, economic ties and the global economic architecture is at stake. The US Government, through the US Treasury, can push to make this an agenda item at the upcoming G20 FMCBG in Washington DC. The US will again host the G20 in 2026. The time between now and 2026 offers time for the BIS to announce the necessary changes to Basel III during the US G20 Presidency. It's an opportunity for a much-needed G20 good news story while on home soil. Most importantly, it's an opportunity to create an economic framework to catalyze private capital investment in infrastructure. That's good for the US, good for emerging markets and good for the planet. The time to act is now.

The fear in Europe that the effects of the war in Gaza would engulf the entire Middle East came one step closer to reality this week with an Israeli air strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, that reportedly killed six Iranians, including a senior commander in the elite Al-Qods unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps Mohammad Reza Zahedi and his deputy. While Israel has regularly carried out air strikes against Iranian targets and assassinations of Iranian military personnel in Syria, an attack on a consulate, legally on Iranian soil, marks a significant escalation. Until now, Iran's leadership has been relatively restrained in its response to Israeli actions as it wished to avoid an all-out war. After the Damascus attack, however, Tehran is under increasing pressure from domestic constituencies and regional allies to push back forcefully lest it project an image of extreme weakness that invites further aggression.And so, Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi promised to take revenge on Israel. At Iran's request, the U.N. Security Council held an extraordinary meeting on April 2, where the Iranian representative sought the body's condemnation of the Israeli attack and vowed that Iran reserved the "inherent and legitimate right to give a decisive response, within the international law and the U.N. Charter."Hossein Shariat-Madari, the managing editor of the state-run hardline Kayhan newspaper, appointed to that position directly by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, argued that Iran had a legal right to retaliate by attacking Israel's embassies worldwide. A member of the parliament, Jamal Rashidi Kochi, went further and openly called for an attack on "Zionist diplomatic centers" in the region, singling out neighboring Azerbaijan, a close ally of Israel. Of note, responding to past alleged Israeli attacks, Iran struck targets in Iraqi Kurdistan, another regional entity with strong ties to Israel.The precise nature, scale, and timing of the Iranian response are yet to be determined. But the first signs are that, as expected, the attack in Damascus would elicit a more forceful reaction. Following the deliberations of the National Security Council, Ayatollah Khamenei delivered a harsh speech in which he promised a strong response by "our brave Iranians," which many analysts interpreted as a vow to respond directly, not through allies and proxies, Tehran's usual modus operandi. That, in turn, augurs heightened risks of a further escalation.That prospect leaves Europe in a precarious position. An all-out war would destabilize the region, provoke mass migration to Europe, possible attacks on European targets in the Middle East (such as the EU naval operation in the Red Sea to counter the Yemeni Houthi rebels, allied with Iran), and revive the fortunes of terrorist organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaida. After the ISIS attack in Moscow on March 22, intelligence services of France and other European countries have already warned of an increased terrorist threat in Europe.To mitigate those risks, the EU and Britain should use their diplomatic connections to all players in the region to prevent an expansion of the war. That includes Iran with which, unlike the U.S., the EU and its member states have direct relations.In fact, the EU high representative for foreign policy Josep Borrell uses his contacts with Iran's foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to press Iran to influence its regional allies, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq- and Syria-based Shiite militias, and Yemeni Houthis, to move towards de-escalation.The EU is right to assess that Iran's political, financial, and military support for these groups undermine regional security, but not even Tehran wields absolute control over them. However, these European efforts can bear fruit if they are part of a broader strategy to achieve a sustainable ceasefire in Gaza and re-activation of an inclusive political process leading to a viable Palestinian state co-existing in security with Israel. The EU cannot credibly push back against Tehran's support for its regional allies if it itself is seen as unable or unwilling to restrain Israel.Borrell condemned the attack on the Iranian consulate and stressed that the inviolability of diplomatic premises and personnel must always be respected. However, most EU member states failed to condemn the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus — unlike the regional nations of Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey, as well as China, Russia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, among others. Slovenia, a non-permanent Security Council member, did so at the April 2 U.N. Security Council meeting. France and United Kingdom (which, even though not a part of the EU, still wields considerable influence on the bloc's Iran policy) mostly blamed Iran for the regional destabilization.Given the abysmal state of EU-Iran relations, it would be politically unpalatable for the EU to act differently. But the EU has leverage to push Israel to transition to a political track in Gaza and warn it against regional escalation.So far it has been unable to deploy that leverage: The EU is Israel's biggest trade partner, accounting for 28.8% of Israel's trade in 2022. The joint initiative by Spain and Ireland to review a deal that facilitates this trade, with a possible partial suspension due to Israel's conduct of war in Gaza, has been met with a pushback by Israel's EU allies, such as Germany, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Austria.Critics of Israel were encouraged that the review is being conducted by the Borrell-led European External Action Service rather than the European Commission, whose president Ursula von der Leyen has taken strongly pro-Israeli stances. Even so, a suspension is not likely. And so far, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Netanyahu government in Israel is receptive to whatever less robust diplomatic urgings the EU might convey.The further escalation also risks pushing Iran closer toward obtaining a nuclear deterrent as an ultimate insurance policy, particularly if its current network of regional allies and forward defense posture keep facing decimation by the Israeli attacks. Such a shift is particularly plausible with a looming leadership transition — Ayatollah Khamenei, who issued a fatwa against building nuclear weapons, is 85. The next generation of the Islamic Republic's leaders may not have such qualms.Iran's nuclearization would only compound the destabilizing spillover from the Gaza war and render the decades-long European-led effort to control Iran's nuclear program ultimately futile. On the current trajectory, however, it doesn't seem likely that the EU will muster the political will and deploy its leverage to tackle the epicenter of the expanding war in the Middle East — the Gaza conflict.

Problem setting. The system of state management of regulatory and legal regulation of social and economic relations in construction adopted by the countries of the European Union can today be considered as an effective model for international cooperation, since its creation envisaged the formation of a single economic space. North America, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and, likewise, most of the economically advanced states in the region have a state policy of denationalizing the system of managing socio-economic relations in construction. They lose the monopoly of managing this system by passing state regulatory functions to the private sector. These actions are usually driven by a number of objective reasons, they can be both political and economic, and may be social. Therefore, in the world, the refusal of the monopoly on regulation of socio-economic relations in construction, which was formed historically and the transition to self-regulatory systems, is gradually increasing. In Ukraine, today, there is a shortage of skilled personnel, financial, material and human potential in the public sector, which prompts the transfer of the regulatory functions of the state to the private sector, which, as historically, is a state prerogative. Moreover, the situation is close to a deadlock, because simply increasing financial support and expanding the staff of skilled personnel, the problems of handling huge engineering data arrays that are accompanied by a stream of innovations will not find a solution. That is why international practice of solving such problems is so important in order to be able to identify all possible risks in a timely manner and possibly take additional measures to reduce them.Recent research and publications analysis. Theoretical and methodological analysis of public administration by the regulation of social and economic relations in construction has devoted its scientific works to such domestic scientists as: V. Averyanov, Y. Brusentsov, A. Vorobyov, D. Isaenko, A. Korotich, V. Logvinenko, O. Nepomnyashchy, N. Nyzhnik, V. Romosko and many other scholars.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Many scientific foreign and domestic studies are devoted to the analysis and evaluation of mechanisms of self-regulation in the field of socio-economic relations in construction. However, today, the situation in our country affects the development of the construction industry, which is why the issue of the dissatisfied demand of the population for services on the construction of social housing is very acute. Proceeding from the above it can be argued that the chosen topic of the article is relevant and timely.Paper main body. The purpose of the paper is to determine the essence of international approaches to the formation and implementation of mechanisms for self-regulation of socio-economic relations in construction.Emphasized on the relevance of the formation of an effective mechanism of self-regulation of socio-economic relations in construction, which requires the analysis of scientific research and will allow the formation of alternative solutions, taking into account international experience. Studies are based on the use of information resources, generalization of scientific developments of domestic and foreign scientists, personal observations. The purpose of the article is to determine the essence of international approaches to the formation and implementation of mechanisms for self-regulation of socio-economic relations in construction. Indicates the need for a conscious transfer of state functions in the regulatory and legal regulation of socio-economic relations in the construction of the non-state sector. In Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, it is these organizations that have the functions of licensing business activities, which is associated with the construction of buildings, professional certification. Such procedure is carried out by architects, design engineers, technicians and experts who regulate admission to the market of these categories of persons, etc. Thus, these organizations (the so-called chambers) have certain powers of authority, which, as a rule, are monopolistic powers of the state.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. The conducted researches have shown that the change of the structure of the modern system of legal regulation of socio-economic relations in construction is determined by many factors. The most influential ones are globalization of the world economy; close economic integration; the fact that the national trade and economic frontiers collapse; a technical revolution that is increasingly affecting the construction industry and caused by the growth of various technical regulation objects. On the latter, we can say, as the biggest economic reason for the denationalization of such systems, since it is likely that, in many cases, the public sector does not have adequate resources to track new technologies, materials, products, methods and processes, and especially, for a qualified assessment their safety and suitability for practical use.In the long run, the importance of studying the state policy on strengthening the institutional capacity of self-regulatory organizations to regulate socio-economic relations in construction and formulating a legislative framework in order to be able to implement a European model of the organizational structure of the technical support system of the industry is not diminished. ; Акцентовано увагу на актуальності питання формування ефективного механізму саморегулювання в сфері соціально-економічних відносин у будівництві, що потребує здійснення аналізу наукових досліджень та дасть змогу формувати альтернативні рішення, беручи до уваги міжнародний досвід. Узагальнено інформаційні ресурси, що представляють наукові розробки вітчизняних і закордонних вчених. Визначено сутність міжнародних підходів до формування і реалізації механізмів саморегулювання в сфері соціально-економічних відносин у будівництві. Вказано на необхідність свідомої передачі державою частини функцій із нормативно-правового регулювання соціально-економічних відносин у будівництві недержавному сектору. Зазначено, що у Німеччині, Великобританії, США саме саморегулюючим організаціям належать функції з ліцензійного забезпечення господарської діяльності, яка пов'язана зі створенням будівель та споруд, проведенням професійної атестації. Зауважено, що таку процедуру професійної атестації проходять архітектори, інженери-проектувальники, інженери технічного нагляду та експерти, що дає змогу врегулювати допуск на ринок цих категорій осіб тощо. Доведено, що зазначені організації (т. зв. палати) володіють певними владними повноваженнями, що, як правило, є монопольними повноваженнями держави. Обґрунтовано, що для впровадження світових тенденцій та підтримки напряму подальшого роздержавлення національної системи нормативно-правового регулювання соціально-економічних відносин у галузі будівництва необхідно посилити інституційну спроможність організацій саморегулювання та удосконалити законодавче підґрунтя, щоб мати можливість впровадити європейські та кращі світові моделі його організаційної структури.

Problem setting. The system of state management of regulatory and legal regulation of social and economic relations in construction adopted by the countries of the European Union can today be considered as an effective model for international cooperation, since its creation envisaged the formation of a single economic space. North America, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and, likewise, most of the economically advanced states in the region have a state policy of denationalizing the system of managing socio-economic relations in construction. They lose the monopoly of managing this system by passing state regulatory functions to the private sector. These actions are usually driven by a number of objective reasons, they can be both political and economic, and may be social. Therefore, in the world, the refusal of the monopoly on regulation of socio-economic relations in construction, which was formed historically and the transition to self-regulatory systems, is gradually increasing. In Ukraine, today, there is a shortage of skilled personnel, financial, material and human potential in the public sector, which prompts the transfer of the regulatory functions of the state to the private sector, which, as historically, is a state prerogative. Moreover, the situation is close to a deadlock, because simply increasing financial support and expanding the staff of skilled personnel, the problems of handling huge engineering data arrays that are accompanied by a stream of innovations will not find a solution. That is why international practice of solving such problems is so important in order to be able to identify all possible risks in a timely manner and possibly take additional measures to reduce them.Recent research and publications analysis. Theoretical and methodological analysis of public administration by the regulation of social and economic relations in construction has devoted its scientific works to such domestic scientists as: V. Averyanov, Y. Brusentsov, A. Vorobyov, D. Isaenko, A. Korotich, V. Logvinenko, O. Nepomnyashchy, N. Nyzhnik, V. Romosko and many other scholars.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Many scientific foreign and domestic studies are devoted to the analysis and evaluation of mechanisms of self-regulation in the field of socio-economic relations in construction. However, today, the situation in our country affects the development of the construction industry, which is why the issue of the dissatisfied demand of the population for services on the construction of social housing is very acute. Proceeding from the above it can be argued that the chosen topic of the article is relevant and timely.Paper main body. The purpose of the paper is to determine the essence of international approaches to the formation and implementation of mechanisms for self-regulation of socio-economic relations in construction.Emphasized on the relevance of the formation of an effective mechanism of self-regulation of socio-economic relations in construction, which requires the analysis of scientific research and will allow the formation of alternative solutions, taking into account international experience. Studies are based on the use of information resources, generalization of scientific developments of domestic and foreign scientists, personal observations. The purpose of the article is to determine the essence of international approaches to the formation and implementation of mechanisms for self-regulation of socio-economic relations in construction. Indicates the need for a conscious transfer of state functions in the regulatory and legal regulation of socio-economic relations in the construction of the non-state sector. In Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, it is these organizations that have the functions of licensing business activities, which is associated with the construction of buildings, professional certification. Such procedure is carried out by architects, design engineers, technicians and experts who regulate admission to the market of these categories of persons, etc. Thus, these organizations (the so-called chambers) have certain powers of authority, which, as a rule, are monopolistic powers of the state.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. The conducted researches have shown that the change of the structure of the modern system of legal regulation of socio-economic relations in construction is determined by many factors. The most influential ones are globalization of the world economy; close economic integration; the fact that the national trade and economic frontiers collapse; a technical revolution that is increasingly affecting the construction industry and caused by the growth of various technical regulation objects. On the latter, we can say, as the biggest economic reason for the denationalization of such systems, since it is likely that, in many cases, the public sector does not have adequate resources to track new technologies, materials, products, methods and processes, and especially, for a qualified assessment their safety and suitability for practical use.In the long run, the importance of studying the state policy on strengthening the institutional capacity of self-regulatory organizations to regulate socio-economic relations in construction and formulating a legislative framework in order to be able to implement a European model of the organizational structure of the technical support system of the industry is not diminished. ; Акцентовано увагу на актуальності питання формування ефективного механізму саморегулювання в сфері соціально-економічних відносин у будівництві, що потребує здійснення аналізу наукових досліджень та дасть змогу формувати альтернативні рішення, беручи до уваги міжнародний досвід. Узагальнено інформаційні ресурси, що представляють наукові розробки вітчизняних і закордонних вчених. Визначено сутність міжнародних підходів до формування і реалізації механізмів саморегулювання в сфері соціально-економічних відносин у будівництві. Вказано на необхідність свідомої передачі державою частини функцій із нормативно-правового регулювання соціально-економічних відносин у будівництві недержавному сектору. Зазначено, що у Німеччині, Великобританії, США саме саморегулюючим організаціям належать функції з ліцензійного забезпечення господарської діяльності, яка пов'язана зі створенням будівель та споруд, проведенням професійної атестації. Зауважено, що таку процедуру професійної атестації проходять архітектори, інженери-проектувальники, інженери технічного нагляду та експерти, що дає змогу врегулювати допуск на ринок цих категорій осіб тощо. Доведено, що зазначені організації (т. зв. палати) володіють певними владними повноваженнями, що, як правило, є монопольними повноваженнями держави. Обґрунтовано, що для впровадження світових тенденцій та підтримки напряму подальшого роздержавлення національної системи нормативно-правового регулювання соціально-економічних відносин у галузі будівництва необхідно посилити інституційну спроможність організацій саморегулювання та удосконалити законодавче підґрунтя, щоб мати можливість впровадити європейські та кращі світові моделі його організаційної структури.

La tesi di laurea si propone di esplorare il ruolo che le corti supreme o costituzionali possono svolgere nella risoluzione delle controversie secessioniste che si verificano in Stati federali e/o regionali le cui costituzioni non disciplinano espressamente l'argomento della secessione, attraverso l'analisi di cinque casi di studio concreti riguardanti altrettanti Paesi e le rispettive corti. Nella prima parte si esamina l'importanza assunta dai fenomeni secessionisti in tempi recenti, si introducono i concetti fondamentali per l'analisi e si espone la struttura generale dell'elaborato. Nella seconda parte si cerca di stabilire se una parte del territorio di uno Stato possa ricavare un diritto alla secessione dall'architettura costituzionale dello Stato federale o dal diritto internazionale pubblico, con riferimento alle divergenti posizioni della dottrina e ai possibili legami con il diritto di resistenza; infine si accenna all'argomento delle clausole costituzionali di secessione e di quali siano le ragioni che militano a favore o contro la loro previsione. Nella terza parte si introduce lo studio dei vari casi concreti partendo da quello degli Stati Uniti, per illustrarne l'evoluzione costituzionale ed il mutamento di atteggiamento del mondo politico e giuridico verso la secessione, dapprima comunemente ritenuta lecita e, poi, dopo la Guerra civile, riconosciuta contraria alla Costituzione dalla sentenza Texas v White della Corte Suprema. Nella quarta parte ci si concentra sul Canada, ripercorrendo le vicende della sua origine federale e dei due referendum sull'indipendenza del Québec, per approdare poi all'esame della reference della Corte Suprema del 1998, che ha ritenuto possibile a certe condizioni la secessione ed ha avuto una forte influenza politica e scientifica anche all'estero. Nella quinta parte viene preso in esame il caso di maggiore attualità, quello della Spagna, e del ruolo che il Tribunal Constitucional ha avuto nel gestire la crisi catalana. Si sottolinea a tale proposito come il giudice costituzionale, nonostante alcuni tentativi di mediazione fra le parti, abbia finito, a causa dei contenuti di certe sue sentenze, soprattutto quella del 2010 sul nuovo Statuto catalano, per essere percepito dalla Catalogna come un attore non neutrale e schierato sulle posizioni del Governo spagnolo, con grave danno per la sua legittimazione. La sesta parte tratta del Regno Unito, analizzando in dettaglio gli sviluppi della devolution e la vicenda del referendum sull'indipendenza della Scozia del 2014, che è stato possibile grazie ad un accordo consensuale fra i due governi. Si parla inoltre della sentenza Miller del 2017 della Corte Suprema, che ha affrontato anche la questione del possibile ruolo svolto dalle devolved jurisdictions nel meccanismo innescato dalla c.d. Brexit, e di come questa sentenza sia stata accolta da Scozia e Irlanda del Nord, rafforzando i sentimenti favorevoli alla secessione. Nella settima parte si esamina il caso dell'Italia, dapprima con riferimento alle varie sentenze della Corte Costituzionale che hanno respinto le pretese di esercizio di poteri sovrani di alcune Regioni, in seguito con focus sulla sentenza 118/2015 che ha stabilito l'incostituzionalità della legge che prevedeva un referendum consultivo sull'indipendenza della Regione Veneto. Nell'ottava parte, infine, vengono tratte le conclusioni dell'intero lavoro, evidenziando come le cinque corti prese in esame si siano mostrate in linea di principio più o meno aperte a mettere in discussione il principio dell'unità nazionale e ad ammettere la possibilità di una secessione a seconda che abbiano natura di federalismi "puri" o semplici Stati regionali decentrati. This paper is aimed at exploring the possible role of supreme and constitutional courts in handling secessionist disputes taking place in federal or regional States whose constitutions do not explicitly take secession into account. We will do that by analising five actual cases involving five countries and their courts. In the first part we will examine the importance of secessionism in recent times, we will introduce the fundamental concepts for our analysis and we will outline the general plan of the paper. In the second part we will try to clear whether a portion of a State's territory can derive a right to secession from federal States' constitutional structure or internationl public law. We will refer to the different authors' conflicting viewpoints and to the possible links with the concept of "right to revolution". Finally we will briefly discuss the subject of constitutional secession clauses and their pros and cons. In the third part we will introduce the case study by analysing the United States. We will explain their constitutional evolution and the change of political and jurisprudencial attitudes towards the subjects of secession, which was at first thought to be legal. After the Civil War, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled it as unconstitutional in Texas v White (1869). In the fourth part we will focus on Canada and we will discuss its federal origin and the two Quebec independence referenda . We will then examine the Supreme Court's Quebec Secession Reference of 1998, which ruled the secession as constitutional, provided some conditions are met, and which had a strong political and jurisprudencial influence in Canada as well as abroad. In the fifth part we will examine the most important recent case, that is Spain, and we will discuss the role the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional had in handling the Catalan crisis. We will show that, despite some attempts to mediate, the Court came to be perceived by Catalonia as a partial actor, aligned with the Spanish Government. This happened because of the contents of some of the Court's decisions, such as the one in 2010 on the Catalan Statute, and it severely damaged its legitimacy. The sixth part discusses the United Kingdom, and it analyses the devolution system's developments and the Scottish independence referendum in 2014, which was made possibile by the two governements' agreement. We will also discuss the UK Supreme Court Miller judgement in 2017, which dealt with the devolved jurisdictions' possible role in the Brexit mechanism, and Scotland's and Northern Ireland's reactions to it, as it strenghtened secessionism. In the seventh part we will discuss the Italian case; first we will refer to the the several judgments by Italy's Corte Costituzionale which rejected some Regions'claims to sovereign powers. We will then focus on Judgement 118/2015, which ruled as unconstitutional the law providing for an advisory referendum on the independence of the Veneto Region. In the eighth part we will draw some conclusions, highliting the five court's different attitudes towards the principle of national unity and secession and their relationship with the States' nature as "true" federalisms or mere devolved regional States.

The successful installation, commissioning, and operation of the Pierre Auger Observatory would not have been possible without the strong commitment and effort from the technical and administrative staff in Malargüe. We are very grateful to the following agencies and organizations for financial support: Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, Fundación Antorchas, Gobierno De La Provincia de Mendoza, Municipalidad de Malargüe, NDM Holdings and Valle Las Leñas, in gratitude for their continuing cooperation over land access, Argentina; the Australian Research Council; Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq), Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP), Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ), São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) Grants # 2010/07359-6 and # 1999/05404-3, Ministério de Ciência e Tecnologia (MCT), Brazil; MSMT-CR LG13007, 7AMB14AR005, CZ.1.05/2.1.00/03.0058 and the Czech Science Foundation Grant 14-17501S, Czech Republic; Centre de Calcul IN2P3/CNRS, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Conseil Régional Ile-de-France, Département Physique Nucléaire et Corpusculaire (PNC-IN2P3/CNRS), Département Sciences de l'Univers (SDU-INSU/CNRS), Institut Lagrange de Paris, ILP LABEX ANR-10-LABX-63, within the Investissements d'Avenir ProgrammeANR-11-IDEX-0004-02, France; Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF), Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Finanzministerium Baden-Württemberg, Helmholtz Alliance for Astroparticle Physics (HAP), Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren (HGF), Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Forschung, Nordrhein Westfalen, Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst, Baden-Württemberg, Germany; Istituto Nazionale di Astrofisica (INAF), Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca (MIUR), Gran Sasso Center for Astroparticle Physics (CFA), CETEMPS Center of Excellence, Italy; Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT), Mexico; Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO), Stichting voor Fundamenteel Onderzoek der Materie (FOM), Netherlands; National Centre for Research and Development, Grant nos. ERA-NETASPERA/01/11 and ERA-NET-ASPERA/02/11, National Science Centre, Grant nos. 2013/08/M/ST9/00322, and 2013/08/M/ST9/00728 and HARMONIA 5 – 2013/10/M/ST9/00062, Poland; Portuguese national funds and FEDER funds within COMPETE – Programa Operacional Factores de Competitividade through Fundação para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia, Portugal; Romanian Authority for Scientific Research ANCS, CNDI-UEFISCDI partnership projects nos. 20/2012 and nr.194/2012, project nos. 1/ASPERA2/2012 ERA-NET, PN-II-RU-PD-2011-3-0145-17, and PN-II-RU-PD-2011- 3-0062, the Minister of National Education, Programme for research – Space Technology and Advanced Research – STAR, project number 83/2013, Romania; Slovenian Research Agency, Slovenia; Comunidad de Madrid, FEDER funds, Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, Xunta de Galicia, European Community 7th Framework Program, Grant no. FP7-PEOPLE-2012-IEF-328826, Spain; Science and Technology Facilities Council, United Kingdom; Department of Energy, Contract no. DE-AC02-07CH11359, DE-FR02-04ER41300, DE-FG02-99ER41107 and DE-SC0011689, National Science Foundation, Grant no. 0450696, The Grainger Foundation, USA; NAFOSTED, Vietnam; Marie Curie-IRSES/EPLANET, European Particle Physics Latin American Network, European Union 7th Framework Program, Grant no. PIRSES-2009- GA-246806; and UNESCO. ; The Pierre Auger Observatory, located on a vast, high plain in western Argentina, is the world׳s largest cosmic ray observatory. The objectives of the Observatory are to probe the origin and characteristics of cosmic rays above 1017 eV and to study the interactions of these, the most energetic particles observed in nature. The Auger design features an array of 1660 water Cherenkov particle detector stations spread over 3000 km2 overlooked by 24 air fluorescence telescopes. In addition, three high elevation fluorescence telescopes overlook a 23.5 km2, 61-detector infilled array with 750 m spacing. The Observatory has been in successful operation since completion in 2008 and has recorded data from an exposure exceeding 40,000 km2 sr yr. This paper describes the design and performance of the detectors, related subsystems and infrastructure that make up the Observatory. ; Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica ; Fundacion Antorchas ; Gobierno De La Provincia de Mendoza ; Municipalidad de Malargue ; NDM Holdings and Valle Las Lenas ; Australian Research Council ; National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) ; Ciencia Tecnologia e Inovacao (FINEP) ; Carlos Chagas Filho Foundation for Research Support of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) ; Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Sao Paulo (FAPESP) 2010/07359-6 1999/05404-3 ; Ministerio de Ciencia e Tecnologia (MCT), Brazil ; Ministry of Education, Youth & Sports - Czech Republic LG13007 7AMB14AR005 CZ.1.05/2.1.00/03.0058 ; Grant Agency of the Czech Republic Czech Republic Government 14-17501S ; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) ; Region Ile-de-France ; Departement Physique Nucleaire et Corpusculaire PNC-IN2P3/CNRS ; Departement Sciences de l'Univers (SDU-INSU/CNRS) ; Institut Lagrange de Paris ; French National Research Agency (ANR) ANR-11-IDEX-0004-02 ANR-10-LABX-63 ; Federal Ministry of Education & Research (BMBF) ; German Research Foundation (DFG) ; Finanzministerium Baden-Wurttemberg ; Helmholtz Alliance for Astroparticle Physics (HAP) ; Helmholtz Association ; Ministerium fur Wissenschaft und Forschung ; Nordrhein Westfalen ; Ministerium fur Wissenschaft ; Forschung und Kunst ; Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany ; Istituto Nazionale Astrofisica (INAF) ; Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN) ; Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR) ; Gran Sasso Center for Astroparticle Physics (CFA) ; CETEMPS Center of Excellence, Italy ; Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACyT) ; Ministerie van Onderwijs ; Cultuur en Wetenschap ; Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) ; FOM (The Netherlands) Netherlands Government ; National Centre for Research and Development ERA-NET-ASPERA/01/11 ERA-NET-ASPERA/02/11 ; National Science Centre, Poland 2013/08/M/ST9/00322 2013/08/M/ST9/00728 HARMONIA 5 - 2013/10/M/ST9/00062 ; Portuguese national funds ; FEDER funds within COMPETE - Programa Operacional Factores de Competitividade through Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia, Portugal ; Romanian Authority for Scientific Research ANCS ; CNDI-UEFISCDI 20/2012 194/2012 1/ASPERA2/2012 ERA-NET PN-II-RU-PD-2011-3-0145-17 PN-II-RU-PD-2011-3-0062 ; Programme for research - Space Technology and Advanced Research - STAR, Romania 83/2013 ; Slovenian Research Agency - Slovenia ; Comunidad de Madrid Instituto de Salud Carlos III ; European Union (EU) ; Spanish Government ; Xunta de Galicia ; European Community, Spain FP7-PEOPLE-2012-IEF-328826 ; Science & Technology Facilities Council (STFC) ; United States Department of Energy (DOE) DE-AC02-07CH11359 DE-FR02-04ER41300 DE-FG02-99ER41107 DE-SC0011689 ; National Science Foundation (NSF) 0450696 ; Grainger Foundation, USA ; National Foundation for Science & Technology Development (NAFOSTED) ; Marie Curie-IRSES/EPLANET ; European Particle Physics Latin American Network ; European Union (EU) PIRSES-2009-GA-246806 ; UNESCO

Представляем Вашему вниманию перевод доклада «Исполнение рекомендаций Руководящих принципов обеспечения качества в сфере трансграничного высшего образования»: где мы отстаем?», подготовленный Директоратом по образованию ОЭСР. «Руководящие принципы обеспечения качества трансграничного высшего образования» были разработаны для стимулирования международного сотрудничества по обеспечению качества высшего трансграничного образования. Целью «руководящих принципов» является защита студентов и других стейкхолдеров от недобросовестных поставщиков образовательных услуг низкого качества и развитие качественного трансграничного высшего образования, отвечающего гуманитарным, социальным, экономическим и культурным потребностям общества. Руководящие принципы не связывают страны юридическими обязательствами. Предполагается, что страны реализуют принципы в соответствии с национальным контекстом. Основываясь на результатах исследования, этот доклад анализирует степень исполнения рекомендаций странами ОЭСР и несколькими странами, не входящими в состав ОЭСР. В июне 2010 года опросник был разослан во все страны ОЭСР. Департамент по образованию ОЭСР также взаимодействовал с секретариатом ЮНЕСКО для проведения исследования в странах, не входящих в ОЭСР. Было получено 23 ответа от 22 стран (Австралия, Австрия, Бельгия (фламандские и французские сообщества), Чешская Республика, Дания, Финляндия, Германия, Венгрия, Израиль, Италия, Япония, Корея, Новая Зеландия, Норвегия, Польша, Словения, Испания, Швейцария, Нидерланды, Турция, Великобритания, США и 9 стран, не входящих в состав ОЭСР, Болгария, Колумбия, Фиджи, Индонезия, Иордания, Кыргызстан, Литва, Оман и Руанда). Представители правительств стран координировали заполнение опросника стейкхолдерами. Основной вывод исследования заключается в том, что все страны, участвующие в опросе, продемонстрировали высокую степень исполнения рекомендаций. В среднем, степень исполнения рекомендаций правительствами, вузами, аккредитационными агентствами стран, входящих в ОЭСР, составляет 72%. При включении студенческих организаций степень исполнения рекомендаций снижается до 67%, но возрастает количество пропущенных данных, и, следовательно, неопределенность результатов исследования. Степень исполнения рекомендаций вузами наиболее высока и составляет 80% (0,8). Степень исполнения рекомендаций правительствами и аккредитационными агентствами в среднем составляет 76% и 61% соответственно. Степень исполнения рекомендаций студенческими организациями равна 51% с учетом того, что опросник лишь отчасти затрагивает деятельность данной группы стейкхолдеров. К ключевым целям, отмеченным в руководстве, отностятся: 1) включение трансграничного образования в нормативно-правовую базу страны; 2) комплексный охват всех форм трансграничного образования; 3) защита студентов и потребителей услуг трансграничного высшего образования; 4) прозрачность процедур аккредитации для поставщиков услуг высшего образования; 5) доступность и распространение информации (для потенциальных студентов); 6) развитие сотрудничества между стейкхолдерами. По данным исследования, в среднем страны исполняют четыре из шести целей: отмечается наличие нормативно-правовых баз, обеспечение комплексного охвата всех форм трансграничного образования и прозрачности процедур аккредитации. Также отмечено сотрудничество стейкхолдеров на национальном и международном уровне. В настоящий момент слабыми сторонами исполнения рекомендаций остаются обеспечение легкодоступной информации и защита студентов и потребителей услуг трансграничного образования. В данный момент нет необходимости в доработке рекомендаций, и страны должны продолжать распространять лучшие практики и исполнять рекомендации. Необходимо укрепить меры по защите студентов и потребителей услуг трансграничного образования и повышению прозрачности процедур регистрации и лицензирования для поставщиков услуг трансграничного высшего образования. Также необходима дальнейшая работа по обеспечению легкого доступа к информации для студентов. Парадоксально, но степень исполнения рекомендации «Руководящих принципов» аккредитационных агентств ниже, чем у правительств и вузов стран, принявших участие в исследовании. ; The Guidelines for Quality Provision in Cross-Border Higher Education were developed and adopted to support and encourage international cooperation and enhance the understanding of the importance of quality provision in cross-border higher education. The purposes of the Guidelines are to protect students and other stakeholders from low-quality provision and disreputable providers (that is, degree and accreditation mills) as well as to encourage the development of quality cross-border higher education that meets human, social, economic and cultural needs. The Guidelines are not legally binding and member countries are expected to implement them as appropriate in their national context. Based on a survey of the main recommendations of the Guidelines, this report monitors the extent to which OECD countries and a few non-member countries comply with its recommendations. The Survey was sent out in June 2010 to all OECD countries. The Secretariat has also collaborated with the UNESCO Secretariat to have the questionnaire sent to all UNESCO non-OECD country delegations. Twenty-three responses were obtained from 22 Members: Australia, Austria, Belgium (Flemish and French communities), Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States; and 9 non-Members: Bulgaria, Colombia, Fiji, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Oman, Rwanda. Government representatives were asked to co-ordinate with the other stakeholders covered to answer the survey. The main conclusion of the survey is that (responding) countries report a high level of compliance with the Guidelines recommendations. On average, responding OECD countries conform to 72% of the main recommendations made to governments, tertiary education institutions, and quality assurance and accreditation agencies. The level of compliance decreases to 67% when recommendations to student bodies are included, but the level of missing information, and thus uncertainty about actual compliance, increases significantly. Tertiary education institutions are the group of stakeholders that follow the most the recommendations of the Guidelines, with an average compliance index of 0.80 (80%). Governments and quality assurance and accreditation bodies comply on average with 76% and 61% of the guidelines, respectively. Student bodies only conform to 51% of the recommendations – with the caveat that information about their activities was generally scant in the survey answers. The objectives or desirable practices emphasised by the Guidelines are: 1) the inclusion of crossborder higher education in countries' regulatory framework, 2) the comprehensive coverage of all forms of cross-border higher education, 3) student and customer protection, 4) transparency in procedures (for providers), 5) information access and dissemination (for potential international students), 6) collaboration. Four of these objectives are largely met on average: countries have regulatory frameworks or arrangements in place, cover different forms of cross-border higher education comprehensively, are transparent in their procedures, and are engaged in national and international collaboration. The current main weaknesses in compliance lie in easy access to information and the level of student and customer protection. While there is probably no need for a revision of the Guidelines, countries should continue to disseminate and implement the recommendations. The main areas of improvement lie in measures to improve student and customer protection as well as the transparency in procedures of assessment, registration, and licensing for providers. Further progress in the ease of access of information for students would also be welcome. Paradoxically, quality assurance and accreditation bodies comply less with the Guidelines than governments and tertiary education institutions.

Leveraging Sovereignty: Kauikeaouli's Global Strategy for the Hawaiian Nation, 1825-1854 examines the leadership of Hawai'i's longest reigning monarch, King Kamehameha III. It highlights the early 1840s, when Kauikeaouli secured recognition from the United States, Britain, and France that he ruled over an independent and sovereign Hawaiian state. Britain and France, however, sought to limit his powers through forced extraterritorial treaties, and the king struggled to regain ruling control over key governance functions. At the same time, foreign merchants and traders increasingly dominated Hawai'i's economic activity, demanded institutional and social changes, and threatened to overwhelm the Hawaiian population already decimated by disease and out-migration. Kauikeaouli quickly responded to threats to the monarchy's power with a comprehensive strategy to regain and maintain full functional control. In Leveraging Sovereignty, J. Susan Corley upends the popular narrative begun in Kauikeaouli's own lifetime that his white ministers ruled in his stead. Adding a new layer of understanding, Corley's meticulous research reveals insights into historical events and Kauikeaouli's reign. She supports her findings of the king's policies and tactical negotiations with an extensive use of Kamehameha III's own commands as recorded in kingdom archives, letters and documents from government records, and contemporary Hawaiian- and English-language newspaper accounts. While this book includes an overview of the kingdom's administrative structure in the 1840s, its analysis focuses on the origination, implementation, and effectiveness of key statecraft tactics. The king's carefully planned strategy relied on the acquisition of western ministerial skills and of an English-language newspaper (the Polynesian) to publicly defend his sovereign rights and privileges at home and abroad. He ensured the enactment of legislation to defeat foreigners' challenges by strengthening juridical processes and safeguarding land-title rights for Hawaiians, and he deftly managed the multistage renegotiation of unequal international treaties. By the end of his reign in 1854, Kamehameha III's strategy had succeeded: The king had reclaimed unrestricted power and authority over all governance areas of the independent, sovereign Hawaiian state. He delivered to his successor Kamehameha IV a restructured, constitutional state whose sovereign status was protected by the three maritime powers of that time.

Many people consider Canada, particularly in comparison to its southern cousin, as a "peaceable kingdom." However, as the historical record demonstrates, Canadians have never been a thoroughly non-violent people. Violence in Canada highlights from an interdisciplinary perspective the major areas and contexts where violence takes place. Consisting of thirteen contributions, the book forms an indispensable guide to the subject. All of the authors are experts in their field, many with international reputations, and are drawn from the fields of sociology, political science, history, and criminology. The foreword by Ted Robert Gurr, author of Violence in America, is followed by an historical analysis of violence on the Canadian western frontier. Other scholars describe contemporary violence: by and against indigenous peoples, women, children, and the elderly; in labor-related disputes; homicide; police and prison violence; terrorism; and discuss government responses and policy implications. Each chapter specifically addresses the sociological and political dimensions of violence. The authors make ample use of statistics and empirical research. Jeffrey Ian Ross's introduction outlines the sociopolitical dynamics of violence, and his summary chapter offers directions for future research. When the book was first published in 1995 it was widely praised by scholarly journals and has since become a standard text in the study of violence and modern Canadian cultural studies. The book is all the more valuable as its new introduction places its findings in the context of research that has been produced since the original publication. Violence in Canada will be of interest to sociologists, criminologists, and political scientists. Jeffrey Ian Ross is an associate professor in the Division of Criminology, Criminal Justice and Social Policy and fellow with the Center for Comparative and International Law, University of Baltimore. His work has appeared in many academic journals and chapters in academic texts, as well as articles in popular magazines in Canada and the United States. He is the author, co-author, editor, or co-editor of eight books. Ted Robert Gurr is Distinguished University Professor at the University of Maryland. Among his books are Why Men Rebel and Violence in America

The geopolitical consequences of the War of the Spanish Succession drove away from the New World the Habsburg Emperor Charles VI. After unsuccessful attempts to mobilise political networks in the Kingdoms of the Indies, the Habsburg projected its power to the overseas, not through direct armed intervention, but through the articulation of the Company of Ostend and the Imperial Privileged Oriental Company, settled in Vienna and Trieste. Because of the emulation of Great Britain, the United Provinces and the two Bourbon Crowns of France and Spain, the Emperor sent an extraordinary envoy to Lisbon in 1723 to achieve the cover of John V of Portugal for these companies: Juan Jacinto Vázquez de Vargas, Count of Pinos Puente. Through his mission – whether unsuccessful or pyrrhic – it is possible to learn about the means of negotiating with the court the Bragança sovereign, the re-articulation of the Imperial commercial networks that are part of the logic of Portuguese overseas trade, and the impact of informal diplomatic practices of the ministers of Charles VI. ; Las consecuencias de la guerra de Sucesión española alejaron del Nuevo Mundo al emperador Carlos VI de Habsburgo. Tras los intentos infructuosos para movilizar redes políticas en los reinos de Indias, el Austria proyectó su poder al mundo ultramarino, no con una intervención armada directa, sino con la articulación de la Compañía de Ostende y la Privilegiada Compañía Oriental Imperial, con sedes en Viena y Trieste. A causa de la emulación de Gran Bretaña, las Provincias Unidas y las Dos Coronas borbónicas, el emperador remitió en 1723 un enviado extraordinario a Lisboa para lograr la cobertura de Juan V de Portugal a dichas empresas: Juan Jacinto Vázquez de Vargas, conde de Pinos Puente. A través de su misión –fracasada o pírrica– se conocerán los medios de negociación con las autoridades lusas, la rearticulación de redes comerciales regio-cesáreas imbricadas en las lógicas del comercio ultramarino luso y el impacto de las prácticas informales de la diplomacia a la hora de captar voluntades para los intereses de Carlos VI.

After a short introduction on the centuries-old relationships between Spain and Italy, this essay offers a brief analysis of the 'Cadiz Constitution', completed with some remarks about Italy at the beginning of the Restoration period, offering a detailed, in-depth study of the kingdoms of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies. A revision of the political and social situation in both states, opens the way to an explanation of how the 'Cadiz Constitution' became the watchword of the Italian patriotic movement. The study shows how the 1820 Spanish constitutional insurrection triggered the Naples revolution that same year. It goes on delving on how the Neapolitan society reacted to the new political regime, emphasizing the cultural and political debate covered by the press. As for the Turin revolution, evidence is offered of how the patriotic faction reached the decision of adopting the 'Cadiz Constitution' only after heated dispute, and also of how the revolution eventually failed. This was due to the coward conduct of the Prince Regent, Carlo Alberto, and the substantial indifference of the low classes, who identified no immediate material advantage in a new political system. Drawing mainly on primary sources as well as on information provided by contemporary eyewitnesses, a parallel is drawn between Spanish and Italian patriots, united in the common destiny of fighting for freedom and independence. ; Tras una breve introducción sobre las seculares relaciones entre España e Italia, el presente ensayo ofrece un somero recorrido de la Constitución de Cádiz y se detiene en la situación italiana a comienzos de la Restauración, examinando detenida y profundamente los casos del Reino de las Dos Sicilias y del Reino de Cerdeña desde el punto de vista político y social. Se explica cómo la Constitución de Cádiz se convirtió en la consigna del movimiento patriótico italiano. Se plantea cómo la insurrección constitucional española de 1820 constituyó el detonador de la revolución de Nápoles ese mismo año. Las reacciones de la ...