Suchergebnisse

In this article, I argue that apparently common values, such as 'judicial independence' have significantly different meanings in different judicial cultures. As an illustration, I take Sweden and Spain, countries with very different histories and institutional arrangements. It is my contention that basic values are understood and implemented in the light of historical and institutional settings. These have given rise to issues which a nation's judiciary feel it has to address and set the context in which the contemporary judiciary has to operate. The purpose is to examine how far national histories and traditions colour the understanding of common values, such as judicial independence and democracy in the judicial process.

It is of course by no means certain that the Treaty of Nice will be ratified and that we will face the most radical revision to the EC Treaty provisions on the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) since its inception in 1957. Unlike most other proposed changes, however, this revision was foreshadowed in substance if not in detail by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which by adding a new paragraph 5 to the existing Article 133, allowed for the possibility of the extension of the CCP by Council decision. This aspect of the Treaty of Nice is particularly worth discussing, even in the absence of certainty as to its coming into force, both because some alterations to the CCP would be possible even under the existing regime, and because the issues raised by the Nice amendment are extremely pertinent to any such development. Discussion of the implications of the choices made at Nice are instructive when considering not only the post-Nice CCP but alternative options in the event of other Treaty amendments. The complexity of the Nice amendment is a reminder of just how difficult it is to achieve consensus in this area, and also of how important in practice that consensus is.

On 1 March 2002, the Competition Commission Appeal Tribunals ('the Appeal Tribunals') celebrate the second year of their existence, this being also the second anniversary of the coming into force of the Competition Act 1998 ('the Act') which founds their jurisdiction. In fact the Act had existed in dormant form for some time before this date (it was enacted on 9 November 1998), giving competition practitioners and officials alike ample warning of the main provisions of the new regime. However, as the Appeal Tribunals are an appellate body, their opportunity to play their part in the brave new world of competition law had to await the actions of the administrative bodies, and hence the Appeal Tribunals were not called upon to act until fifteen months into their tenure. Nevertheless, once appraised of appeals they have proceeded to produce a number of final and interlocutory judgments which have established the framework and ground rules for an effective judicial forum.

This article maps out the channels at the disposal of private parties for challenging the legality of EC measures, and attempts some predictions of the future shape and content of this plank of the EU's judicial architecture. This area of the law is in a state of flux, particularly in the light of rulings such asUEAPMEv.Council, Masterfoods Limitedv.HB Ice Cream, Fresh Marine Company ASv.Commission, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA, in liquidation, andJean-Jacques Goupilv.Commission, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbHv.Commission, and most recently, and significantly,Jégo Quéré and Cie SAv.Commission. In this latter ruling the Court of First Instance prescribed a major change to the rules onlocus standiunder Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty, a hitherto much maligned aspect of the case law, by relaxing the requirement of 'individual concern' laid down in that article.

From the point of view of an individual, rights conferred by a legal system are only effective and substantive if there are effective remedies available if those rights are infringed. In some instances, those remedies may be pre-emptive; but in most instances, they seek to deal with infringements of rights, or damage to interests, which have taken place.

A lot of attention has been devoted in the past few years to attempts made by intellectual property owners to oppose parallel imports. This refers in particular to imports without their consent of goods placed by themselves, or with their consent, on the export market. The question is crucial as it is inherently linked to the quest for the key to control international trade flows and to restrict intra-brand competition in the country of importation.