Suchergebnisse

Recent studies suggest that a lack of judicial independence increases the risk of violent action, diminishing the incentives to solve disputes peacefully. However, violent action is not the only option when judiciaries are under the control of the executive. I argue that individuals become refugees in countries with non-independent judiciaries, losing their hope that violations of rules by the executive or privileged groups will be tried fairly. Using data from 181 countries over the 1976–2015 period, I find evidence that the lack of judicial independence leads countries to produce more refugees than others.

Recent studies suggest that a lack of judicial independence increases the risk of violent action, diminishing the incentives to solve disputes peacefully. However, violent action is not the only option when judiciaries are under the control of the executive. I argue that individuals become refugees in countries with non-independent judiciaries, losing their hope that violations of rules by the executive or privileged groups will be tried fairly. Using data from 181 countries over the 1976–2015 period, I find evidence that the lack of judicial independence leads countries to produce more refugees than others.

The expansion of judicial power in Italy has been supported by specific elements briefly outlined by the author. The Italian judiciary seems to be characterized by a basic contradiction: its institutional guarantees of independence are extremely effective, &, thanks to the inclusion of public prosecution, its decisions can significantly affect the political process while being inadequately protected from short-term political pressures. The only institutional channel of political influence in Italy is the Higher Council where increased tensions between the judiciary & the political system tend to be dealt with. Consequently, the political environment has compelling incentives to employ all available venues to influence such a powerful body. 16 References. E. Sanchez

Based on data from the EU Justice Scoreboard, we identify a puzzle: National levels of judicial independence (as perceived by the citizens of EU member states) are negatively associated with the presence of formal legislation usually considered as conducive to judicial independence. We try to resolve this puzzle based on political economy explanations and specificities of legal systems, but to no avail. We then ask whether cultural traits can help to put together the puzzle. And indeed, countries with high levels of generalized trust (and to a lesser extent individualistic countries) exhibit increased levels of de facto judicial independence and, at the same time, reduced levels of de jure judicial independence. The combination of these two effects can explain why judicial reforms that should be conducive to an independent judiciary may seem to have adverse consequences. We conclude that cultural traits are of fundamental importance for the quality of formal institutions, even in societies as highly developed as the EU member states.

There is a tendency among present and former law students to think that the development of the nature and extent of the authority of the federal judiciary, and of the Supreme Court of the United States in particular, may be found in the celebrated cases decided by that Court. To an extent this is undoubtedly true. However, at least two major political struggles in this nation have had as much to do with defining the nature of the judicial power in the federal system as anybut a handful of the major decisions of the Supreme Court. No reported judicial decision of these political struggles exists, because each was conducted in its entirety within or between the other branches of the federal government. Yet, both struggles are nonetheless precedents in the unwritten constitutional law dealing with Article III of the United States Constitution and the power of the federal courts. These events are first, the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase by the House of Representatives and his subsequent acquittal by the Senate in the first decade of the 19th century; and, second, the proposal by President Franklin Roosevelt referred to by its supporters as the "Court Reorganization Plan" and by its opponents as the "Court Packing Plan."