The weighted voting rule in the EU's Council of Ministers, 1958–1995: Intentions and outcomes
In: Electoral Studies, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 33-47
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In: Electoral Studies, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 33-47
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 33-48
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Public choice, Band 87, Heft 3-4, S. 315-318
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 87, Heft 3-4, S. 315-318
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Electoral Studies, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 143-169
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 143-170
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Behavioral science, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 250-274
In: Behavioral science, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 109-127
In: Public choice, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 57-71
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 57
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Behavioral science, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 116-130
In: International Studies Quarterly, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 177
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 177-200
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: Political behavior, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 311-324
ISSN: 1573-6687
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 26, Heft 4, S. 664-691
ISSN: 1552-8766
On the basis of the results obtained by different experiments testing two-person bargaining situations, it is reasonable to assume that under certain circumstances bargainers are more likely to refer to a "minimum utility point" in forming their strategies, and hence reach different agreements than as hitherto suggested in the literature, e.g., the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. The employment of such a minimum utility point is not merely descriptive, but normative, and should be viewed as a modification of the Pareto-optimum axiom, as well as other axioms, applicable in certain bargaining situations. It is also argued that such a modification is more reasonable than Kalai and Smorodinsky's axiom of monotonicity, which they suggested should replace Nash's axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is suggested that many real-life, as well as laboratory, two-person bargaining situations differ from the two-person bargaining problem characterized by Nash, and hence the employment of a probabilistic model is advocated in order to predict the bargainers' expected utility.