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Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.

Das Hauptziel der meisten Zentralbanken der Welt und auch der Europäischen Zentralbank ist die Sicherung eines stabilen Preisniveaus. Gemessen an der Entwicklung der Güter- und Dienstleistungspreise waren die Zentralbanken in den meisten Industrieländern in den letzten Jahren diesbezüglich recht erfolgreich. Die starken Preisschwankungen bei Vermögenswerten zeigen ein anderes Bild: Die Aktienkurse sind seit der ersten Jahreshälfte 2002 klar rückläufig, die Immobilienpreise dagegen haben sich in mehreren Ländern deutlich erhöht. Einige Ökonomen plädieren deshalb für eine erweiterte Definition des Inflationsziels, in dem auch Vermögenspreise enthalten sind. Ein makroökonometrisches Mehrländermodell zeigt, dass die Geldpolitik in diesem Fall im Zeitraum 1994 bis 2001 in Europa wahrscheinlich ein etwas restriktiveren Kurs gefahren hätte. Im Großen und Ganzen aber sind die Effekte einer breiteren Definition des Inflationsziels sehr gering.

In recent years central bankers have placed new emphasis on communication with financial markets and the general public. They have done this not only through the traditional channel of monetary policy pronouncements but also by increasing the quantity of information they make public. Yet as central banks strive to provide more and clearer information about the outlook for the economy, they must balance their capacity to steer economic expectations with their natural caution about committing to future monetary policy paths. This volume offers a variety of perspectives on the economic implications of increased central bank communication. - Contributors offer theoretical analyses of the effect of central bank communication on the general macroeconomic environment; consider a variety of novel empirical approaches to the issue; and analyze communication, decision making, and governance practices of the Greenspan-era U.S. Federal Reserve, the fledgling European Central Bank, and a variety of smaller central banks, including those of the Czech Republic, Sweden, England, and New Zealand.

Using a panel fixed effects model for a large sample of countries, we examine how financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises are related to income inequality. Our results suggest that all finance variables increase income inequality. In addition, the impact of financial liberalization on inequality seems to be conditioned by the level of financial development. There is evidence that the quality of political institutions conditions the impact of finance on income inequality, in contrast to the quality of economic institutions. Our main finding is robust for using random effects, cross-country regressions and legal origin as instrument for financial development.

Using a panel fixed effects model for a sample of 121 countries covering 1975 ]2005, we examine how financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises are related to income inequality. In contrast with most previous work, our results suggest that all finance variables increase income inequality. The level of financial development conditions the impact of financial liberalization on inequality. Also the quality of political institutions conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality, in contrast to the quality of economic institutions. Our main findings are robust for using random effects, cross ]country regressions and legal origin as instrument for financial development.

Using a panel fixed effects model for a sample of 121 countries covering 1975‐2005, we examine how financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises are related to income inequality. In contrast with most previous work, our results suggest that all finance variables increase income inequality. The level of financial development conditions the impact of financial liberalization on inequality. Also the quality of political institutions conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality, in contrast to the quality of economic institutions. Our main findings are robust for using random effects, cross‐country regressions and legal origin as instrument for financial development.

Using a panel fixed effects model for a sample of 121 countries covering 1975-2005, we examine how financial development, financial liberalization and banking crises are related to income inequality. In contrast with most previous work, our results suggest that all finance variables increase income inequality. The level of financial development conditions the impact of financial liberalization on inequality. Also the quality of political institutions conditions the impact of financial liberalization on income inequality, in contrast to the quality of economic institutions. Our main findings are robust for using random effects, cross]country regressions and legal origin as instrument for financial development.