Suchergebnisse

"Summary presentation to the Congress." ; "Military: Department of Defense." ; "Economic: Agency for International Development." ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Summary presentation to the Congress." ; "Military: Department of Defense." ; "Economic: Agency for International Development." ; Mode of access: Internet.

At head of title: Army, Navy, Air Force; Defense Supply Agency. ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

From the Dust Jacket: McNarmara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969, volume VI in the newly-named Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, covers the incumbency of Robert S. McNamara, as well as the brief, but significant, tenure of Clark M. Clifford. McNamara's key role in the ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 forms the centerpiece of the narrative. During these years, Vietnam touched every aspect of Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, determining budget priorities, provoking domestic unrest, souring relations with NATO, and complicating negotiations with the Soviet Union. McNamara's early miscalculations about Vietnam became the source of deep disappointments. Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, never good, frayed almost to the breaking point as McNamara repeatedly rejected military advice in favor of his civilian experts. McNamara's carefully crafted plans failed, his frustrations grew, and he became estranged from the President. His private attempts to check the war's momentum contradicted his public statements supporting the military effort and tarred McNamara as a hypocrite. McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, arrived with a reputation as a hawk, but focused most of his effort on extricating the United States from Vietnam. McNamara and Clifford presided over the Department of Defense during momentous and dangerous times. Vietnam was one of a series of wars, emergencies, and interventions involving U.S. interests. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, declining U.S. prestige and power in Europe and NATO, war in the Middle East, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, arms control talks with the Soviet Union, and violent protests at home competed for attention. Overseeing the Vietnam War and contending with these complex policy issues taxed even McNamara's enormous energy and brilliant intellect as he struggled to manage DoD programs. His long-cherished cost-cutting programs fell by the wayside; his favored weapons systems were swept aside; his committed efforts to limit strategic arms faltered; and his reputation was permanently tarnished. McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam highlights the interaction of McNamara and Clifford with the White House, Congress, the JCS, the Department of State, and other federal agencies involved in policy formulation. The two secretaries increasingly found that the cost of winning the war became a morally prohibitive as the price of losing. ; Volumes 1-5 have series title: History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 654-671) and index. ; Arms Control : An Elusive Goal. Multilateral force ; Test ban and nonproliferation ; Threshold test ban treaty debate ; Comprehensive test ban treaty ; Nuclear nonproliferation treaty ; Arms control-through 1967 ; Arms control 1968 -- ABM: Centerpiece Of Strategic Defense. Strategic forces, 1965 ; Civil defense ; Soviet buildup ; Old bombers, new bombers, advanced bombers ; ABM debate ; To Glassboro ; Announcing the deployment of the ABM ; Clifford's approach to strategic arms -- NATO Readjustment. France secedes ; Nuclear planning group ; Flexible response ; NATO and Vietnam -- NATO: Burden-Sharing And U.S. Troop Reduction. Framing the issue ; Force structures ; Reduction of U.S. forces in Europe ; Assessing Germany's share of the load ; OSD, the JCS, and troop reductions in Germany ; Tripartite talks ; Clark Clifford and NATO ; Aftermath of Czechoslovakia -- Crisis In The Middle East. Genesis of the crisis ; Onset of an emergency ; Personal diplomacy ; To the breaking point ; Six-day war ; Arab reaction ; Attack on the Liberty and the U S -Soviet crisis ; Aftermath ; Rearming Israel -- Battle Over Military Assistance. FY 1966 MAP request ; Vietnam assistance and FY 1966 MAP ; FY 1967 MAP ; More is needed ; Export-import bank credit controversy ; FY 1969 MAP ; Final MAP proposal -- Year Of Crises. Losing H-bombs ; Pueblo and the Blue House ; Prague spring: Moscow summer ; REDCOSTE and the Czech effect -- Strategy And Cost-Effectiveness. Cost-efficient war? ; Strategic forces ; Procurement contracting impact ; Cost reduction ; Global drawdown ; Conclusion. ; Movers and Shakers. DoD's senior leadership ; Civilian-military divide ; Commander in chief ; National security policymaking apparatus ; Mastering the Pentagon -- Vietnam : Escalation Without Mobilization. Pondering escalation ; Hidden escalation ; More troops, more money ; Enemy dictates the course of action ; McNamara's 180-degree turn ; Conflicting assessments ; President's decision -- Air War Against North Vietnam, 1965-1966. Targeting North Vietnam ; Rolling thunder ; Working toward an extended bombing pause ; Resuming rolling thunder ; POL debate ; Rolling thunder: indecision, discord, and escalation -- Paying For A War: Budgets, Supplements, And Estimates, 1965-1967. FY 1966 defense budget ; 1965 supplemental ; August supplemental amendment to the 1966 budget ; FY 1966 supplemental ; FY 1967 defense budget ; Vietnam spending and the economy -- Vietnam: Escalating A Ground War, July 1965-July 1967. Planning a ground war ; Hard choices ; Cost-effective deployments ; Barrier concept ; More troops, more questions ; Search for a winning formula -- More Than Expected: Supplementals And Budgets, 1966-1968. Enacting the FY 1966 supplemental ; FY 1967 defense budget ; Need for a FY 1967 supplemental budget ; Price of escalation ; Enacting the FY 1967 supplemental ; FY 1968 budget request ; Defending the FY 1968 budget -- Vietnam: An Endless War, 1967-1968. Accelerating troop deployments ; Shaping public opinion ; Manning the barrier ; Khe Sanh ; Tet offensive ; New secretary ; Ground war grinds on ; Settling in or getting out ; Fighting while negotiating -- Air War Against North Vietnam: Escalation To Cessation, 1967-1968. State of the air war at the outset of 1967 ; Targeting debate ; Rift widens ; Pennsylvania initiative ; After tet -- Bills Come Due: Budgets And Supplementals, 1968-1970. Final FY 1968 defense budget ; How big a tax increase? ; Proposed FY 1969 budget submission ; Juggling the numbers ; Passage of the FY 1968 SEA supplemental ; Enactment of the FY 1969 budget ; FY 1970 defense budget -- Home Front. Conscripts and volunteers: lower standards, greater inequality ; Project 100,000 ; Race and casualties ; Burning cities: rising protest ; March on the Pentagon ; 1968 riots -- Another Cuba?. Intervention in the Dominican Republic ; Justifying intervention ; Operational plans and planning operations ; Perils of peacekeeping ; Withdrawal ; From the Dust Jacket: McNarmara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969, volume VI in the newly-named Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, covers the incumbency of Robert S. McNamara, as well as the brief, but significant, tenure of Clark M. Clifford. McNamara's key role in the ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 forms the centerpiece of the narrative. During these years, Vietnam touched every aspect of Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, determining budget priorities, provoking domestic unrest, souring relations with NATO, and complicating negotiations with the Soviet Union. McNamara's early miscalculations about Vietnam became the source of deep disappointments. Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, never good, frayed almost to the breaking point as McNamara repeatedly rejected military advice in favor of his civilian experts. McNamara's carefully crafted plans failed, his frustrations grew, and he became estranged from the President. His private attempts to check the war's momentum contradicted his public statements supporting the military effort and tarred McNamara as a hypocrite. McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, arrived with a reputation as a hawk, but focused most of his effort on extricating the United States from Vietnam. McNamara and Clifford presided over the Department of Defense during momentous and dangerous times. Vietnam was one of a series of wars, emergencies, and interventions involving U.S. interests. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, declining U.S. prestige and power in Europe and NATO, war in the Middle East, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, arms control talks with the Soviet Union, and violent protests at home competed for attention. Overseeing the Vietnam War and contending with these complex policy issues taxed even McNamara's enormous energy and brilliant intellect as he struggled to manage DoD programs. His long-cherished cost-cutting programs fell by the wayside; his favored weapons systems were swept aside; his committed efforts to limit strategic arms faltered; and his reputation was permanently tarnished. McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam highlights the interaction of McNamara and Clifford with the White House, Congress, the JCS, the Department of State, and other federal agencies involved in policy formulation. The two secretaries increasingly found that the cost of winning the war became a morally prohibitive as the price of losing. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"March 1994." ; Shipping list no.: 94-0397-P. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-47). ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Reform and Experimentation after the Cold War, the 5th volume in the series History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense, focuses on the adoption in the 1990s of new concepts and methods for acquiring major weapon systems. The changes came from several quarters--the White House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and Congress--and in response to numerous pressures. The most important of these were the end of the Cold War and the resulting decline in defense spending; advances in weapons technology, especially information technology; and the widespread belief that the acquisition system was failing to deliver the weapon systems the nation needed, when it needed them, and at a cost it was willing to pay. Both President George H. W. Bush and President William J. "Bill" Clinton made correcting acquisition's perceived weaknesses a high priority. Reforms aimed at decreasing the time required to develop and field advanced weapon systems while reducing their cost, strengthening acquisition management and organizations, improving the quality and professionalism of the acquisition workforce, forging new relationships with the defense industry, and tapping the commercial economy for leading-edge technologies, innovative business practices, and finished products easily installed in or adapted to military systems. Despite the many changes of the 1990s, decades-long trends continued: reliance on technologically superior weapons to gain advantage over potential opponents, the centralization of acquisition management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and congressional push for greater oversight. In-depth case studies of major weapon system programs illustrate how acquisition functioned, particularly in adapting to reforms that sometimes succeeded, sometimes failed, and sometimes had no impact on program outcomes. Taken as a whole, however, the reforms made the acquisition community better able to adopt innovations and best practices from the private sector, more responsive to the users of systems, and more capable of designing policies, organizations, and procedures to address the security threats of the new century"--

Title from cover. ; Vols. for called Mode of access: Internet. ; Vols. for 1984-19 issued by: the Secretary of Defense; by: Joint Service Committee on Military Justice.

The law as of 1 February 1963. ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Exploratory Interviews -- Chapter Three: Challenge Nominations -- Chapter Four: Challenge Evaluation -- Chapter Five: Discussion -- Appendix A: Exploratory Interview Materials -- Appendix B: Challenge Nomination and Evaluation Materials -- Appendix C: Selected Nominated Challenges -- Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics of Challenge Evaluation Results.

The more accurately a cost index captures a shipbuilder's risk, the less the Navy should have to pay its shipbuilders. The Navy uses such indexes to correct for significant cost risks outside its shipbuilders' control. A longtime material-cost index in Navy shipbuilding is the steel-vessel index, but it is outdated and volatile. The authors urge the Navy to develop a modern-vessel index that more appropriately represents the materials used today

A universally accepted definition of what a sense of community is remains elusive, but policymakers agree that increasing that sense has tangible benefits for the U.S. military in improvements to commitment, performance, retention, and readiness. This report examines the role of the Defense Department's personnel support programs and focuses on nine tools for increasing sense of community: group symbols, rewards and honors, common external threat, making military membership attractive, group size and individuality, personal influence, personal investment, contact and proximity, and group activities. The report also analyzes which groups would most benefit from programs to increase a sense of community and how to avoid pitfalls when attempting to increase that sense

Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: The New Black Sea Military Balance -- Chapter Three: Diverse Perspectives and Avenues for Russian Influence -- Chapter Four: Tailored Russian Tactics, Constrained Regional Responses -- Chapter Five: Conclusions.