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There is a standard academic consensus that semi-presidentialism is perilous for new democracies. In particular, this is because semi-presidential countries run the risk of experiencing difficult periods of 'cohabitation' between a president and a prime minister who are opposed to each other, and because they may also experience periods of divided minority government that encourage the president to rule by decree and subvert the rule of law. This article examines the evidence to support these two arguments. We find very few cases of cohabitation in young democracies and only one case where cohabitation has directly led to democratic collapse. By contrast, we find more cases of divided minority government and more cases where it has been associated with democratic failure. However, we also find that young democracies have survived divided minority government. We conclude that, to date, there is insufficient evidence to support the long-standing and highly intuitive argument that cohabitation is dangerous for new democracies. There is more evidence to support the much newer argument about the dangers of divided minority government. Even so, more work is needed in this area before we can conclude that semi-presidentialism is inherently perilous.

Semi-presidentialism is the situation where the constitution identifies both a directly elected president and a prime minister responsible to the legislature. There are now some 58 countries in the world with a semi-presidential constitution. However, the academic wisdom is resolutely opposed to the adoption of semi-presidentialism and nascent democracies are advised to avoid this form of government. This paper examines the performance of semi-presidentialism. Particular attention is paid to the effect of various forms of semi-presidentialism. Different forms of semi-presidentialism are expected to have different effects. To this end, all the countries with a semi-presidential constitution that have embarked on the process of democratic transition are identified. To what extent was semi-presidentialism a factor in the cases when the transition process was successful? When the transition process failed, to what extent was semi-presidentialism responsible for this failure? What was the effect of different forms of semi-presidentialism on the process of democratisation? The findings suggest that there is inconclusive evidence to support some of the major problems commonly associated with semi-presidentialism. The performance of semi-presidentialism seems strongly influenced by non-institutional factors. However, there is a difference between the performance of the two main types of semi-presidentialism that are identified. Overall, the findings do not provide grounds to recommend for or against the adoption of semi-presidentialism as opposed to parliamentarism or presidentialism, but if constitution-makers decide to adopt a semi-presidential constitution, then the findings suggest that they should adopt a premier-presidential form of semi-presidentialism.

In recent years, there has been a considerable degree of delegation from governments to quasi-autonomous agencies. Various reasons have been put forward to explain why governments decide to delegate authority in this way (Thatcher 2002, 129-139). Some reasons are based on a transactions cost approach, such as credible commitments. Other reasons are more contextual. For instance, governments may be responding to a process of cross-national policy transfer. In the literature on delegation some hypotheses have already been tested. Specifically, Gilardi (2002) has found evidence to suggest that governments create agencies to credibly commit to particular policy choices. However, other hypotheses, particularly ones based on contextual explanations, have proved much more difficult to operationalise. This article aims to help fill this gap. It does so by focusing on the creation of Independent Administrative Authorities (Autorités administratives indépendantes - AAIs) in France. We examine the reasons for their creation. Why have successive governments created so many AAIs in the last couple of decades? Does the qualitative evidence in this particular case corroborate the quantitative studies that have been undertaken elsewhere? What does the French example tell us about the more general literature on delegation?

In recent years, there has been a considerable degree of delegation from governments to quasi-autonomous agencies. Various reasons have been put forward to explain why governments decide to delegate authority in this way. Some reasons are based on a transaction-cost approach, such as credible commitments. Other reasons are more contextual. For instance, governments may be responding to a process of cross-national policy transfer. In the literature on delegation some hypotheses have already been tested. Specifically, evidence has been found suggesting that governments create agencies to commit credibly to particular policy choices. However, other hypotheses, particularly ones based on contextual explanations, have proved much more difficult to operationalize. This article aims to help fill this gap. It does so by focusing on the creation of Independent Administrative Authorities in France. Does the qualitative evidence in this particular case corroborate the quantitative studies that have been undertaken elsewhere?

Abstract: This paper provides a definition of semipresidentialism and identifies the set of semipresidential countries in the world. It aims to isolate the independent impact of semipresidentialism on democratic performance. The conclusion is that countries should avoid highly presidentialised semipresidential systems, whereas semipresidential systems with ceremonial presidents and strong prime ministers have performed well. In semipresidential systems where both the president and the prime minister have significant powers, the situation is more complex. Many such countries have democratized successfully, but only despite the institutional crises caused by this particular form of semipresidentialism. So, a balanced form of semipresidentialism is a risky choice for newly-democratizing regimes.

The debate about the relative merits of presidentialism and parliamentarism has a long history, but it was revived in 1990 with Juan Linz's articles about the supposed perils of presidentialism and the virtues of parliamentarism. The argument presented in this review is that we are now witnessing a 'third wave' of presidential/parliamentary studies since 1990. The 'first wave' began with Linz's articles. It was characterized by a debate in which there was one explanatory variable (the regime type) and one dependent variable (the success of democratic consolidation). The 'second wave' of presidential/parliamentary studies began around 1992-93. In the 'second wave' there is more than one explanatory variable (the regime type, usually, plus the party system and/or leadership powers) and often a different dependent variable ('good governance' as opposed to democratic consolidation). The 'third wave' is quite different. This work is informed by more general theories of political science. Here, the respective merits of presidential and parliamentary regimes are not necessarily the sole focus of the work. However, its overarching approach informs the debate in this area in a more or less direct manner. The argument in this review article is that the 'third wave' of studies has much to offer the ongoing debate about the relative merits of presidentialism and parliamentarism.