Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- Foreword by Stephen Macedo -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Purpose, Scope, Method -- Part I. The Work of the Convention -- 1. Creating a Republican Executive -- 2. Debate Begins on the Presidency -- 3. Election and Removal -- 4. The Audacious Innovations of the Committee of Detail -- 5. Completing the Executive -- 6. Ratification Debates -- Part II. Allocating Royal Powers -- 7. The Framers' General Theory of Allocating Powers -- 8. The Core Legislative Powers of Taxing and Lawmaking -- 9. The President's Legislative Powers -- 10. The Power to Control Law Execution -- 11. Foreign Affairs and War -- 12. Other Prerogative Powers -- Part III. The Logical Structure of Article II -- 13. The Executive Power Vesting Clause -- 14. The Logic of the Organization of Article II -- 15. The Three Varieties of Presidential Power -- Part IV. Illustrative Examples -- 16. Two Classic Cases -- 17. Three Presidents, Three Conflicts -- 18. The Administrative State -- Conclusion -- Short-Form Citations -- Notes -- Index.

Does the United States have the right to defend itself by striking first, or must it wait until an attack is in progress? Is the Bush Doctrine of aggressive preventive action a justified and legal recourse against threats posed by terrorists and rogue states? Tackling one of the most controversial policy issues of the post-September 11 world, Michael Doyle argues that neither the Bush Doctrine nor customary international law is capable of adequately responding to the pressing security threats of our times. In Striking First, Doyle shows how the Bush Doctrine has consistently d

Does the United States have the right to defend itself by striking first, or must it wait until an attack is in progress? Is the Bush Doctrine of aggressive preventive action a justified and legal recourse against threats posed by terrorists and rogue states? Tackling one of the most controversial policy issues of the post-September 11 world, Michael Doyle argues that neither the Bush Doctrine nor customary international law is capable of adequately responding to the pressing security threats of our times. In Striking First, Doyle shows how the Bush Doctrine has consistently disregarded a vita

The United States is in the midst of historic experiments with publicly funded choice in K-12 education, experiments that recently received a 'green light' from the Supreme Court. Other countries have long experience with the funding and regulation of nonpublic schools. What is the US hoping to learn from these experiences?

The many questions that surround movements for secession and self-determination are both practically urgent and theoretically perplexing. The United States settled its secession crisis in the 1860s. But the trauma and unfinished business of those events are still with us. Around the world secession and self-determination are the key issues that cause strife and instability. This volume provides an unusually comprehensive consideration of the many challenges of law and political philosophy that accompany them, and offers theoretical insights that provide guidance for policy. Among the questi.

Abstract
Why is it important for people to agree on and articulate shared reasons for just laws, rather than whatever reasons they personally find compelling? What, if any, practical role does public reason play in liberal democratic politics? We argue that the practical role of public reason can be better appreciated by examining the confluence of normative and positive political theory; the former represented here by liberal social contract theory of John Rawls and others, and the latter by rational choice or game theory. Citizens in a diverse society face a practical as well as a moral problem. How can they have confidence that others will reciprocate their commitment to supporting governing principles that depart from their own ideal conceptions of truth and value in order to be reasonable to all? Citizens face a practical problem of mutual assurance that public reason helps them solve, and solve as a matter of common knowledge. The solution, on both views, requires citizens' reciprocal commitment to basing law on a system of shared reasons. Both views place public reason at the core of liberal democratic politics in conditions of diversity, and for quite similar reasons. Our argument illustrates the (often) complementary roles of positive and values-based analysis in constitutional design.

resume Avec la montée des revendications féministes et culturelles, on a reproché au libéralisme politique de ne pas prendre au sérieux la diversité en faisant la promotion d'une neutralité publique qui marginalise les minorités sexuelles, religieuses et culturelles. Aussi la « politique de la différence » s'est-elle présentée comme une alternative démocratique crédible à un libéralisme hostile à la diversité. Stephen Macedo entend montrer que le libéralisme politique respecte au contraire une large gamme de conceptions du bien et de modes de vie, mais ne saurait accommoder des minorités qui refusent le pluralisme afin de maintenir leur identité collective et dont les revendications et les pratiques entravent l'éducation publique à la citoyenneté démocratique, en particulier à la vertu de tolérance.

With the rise of feminist and cultural protests, political liberalism has been criticized for promoting a version of public neutrality that does not take diversity seriously and marginalizes sexual, religious and cultural minorities. Thus, the "politics of difference" has been seen as a legitimate democratic alternative to a kind of liberalism hostile to diversity. Stephen Macedo aims to show that political liberalism respects a broad range of conceptions of the good and of ways of life, but cannot accommodate minorities who reject pluralism itself in order to maintain their group identity and whose claims and practises impede civic education and undermine toleration. Adapted from the source document.

We agree with the Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy
that not only the quality but the very legitimacy of American
democracy is threatened by persistent and rising inequalities of
political power and influence. Class conflict is as old as democracy
itself, and there is an intrinsic tension between the inequalities
generated by free markets and the political equality that is at the
core of democracy. No institutional fixes or policy remedies will
fully overcome this tension, and in some respects it may be a useful
tension. But current institutional and policy
arrangements—especially at the local level—are exacerbating
inequalities and political divisions in ways that are toxic for
democracy. Because our discussion
here draws heavily on our book Democracy at
Risk, we wish to fully acknowledge and thank each
of the book's co-authors, including Yvette Alex-Assensoh,
Jeffrey M. Berry, Michael Brintnall, David E. Campbell, Luis
Ricardo Fraga, Archon Fung, William A. Galston, Margaret Levi,
Meira Levinson, Keena Lipsitz, Richard G. Niemi, Robert D.
Putnam, Wendy M. Rahn, Rob Reich, Robert R. Rodgers, Todd
Swanstrom, and Katherine Cramer Walsh. Our co-authors in that
effort have contributed significantly to our understanding of
the issues we discuss here, including by offering prose that we
have relied on and put to use in this article. While we
acknowledge our deep debt to our colleagues, any errors
remaining are, of course, ours alone.