Suchergebnisse

How do Americans decide whether their country should use military force abroad? We argue they combine dispositional preferences and ideas about the geopolitical situation. This article reports the results of a representative national survey that incorporated five experiments. Findings include the following: (1) Respondent dispositions, especially isolationism versus internationalism and assertiveness versus accommodativeness, consistently constrained policy preferences, whereas liberalism-conservatism did not; (2) features of the geopolitical context—the presence of U.S. interests, relative power, the images of the adversary's motivations, and judgments about cultural status—also influenced support for military intervention; and (3) systematic interactions emerged between dispositions and geopolitical context that shed light on when and why ideological disagreements about the use of force are likely to be amplified and attenuated by situational factors. Our results are consistent with a cognitive-interactionist perspective, in which people adapt broad predispositions in relatively thoughtful ways to specific foreign policy problems.

How do Americans decide whether their country should use military force abroad? We argue they combine dispositional preferences and ideas about the geopolitical situation. This article reports the results of a representative national survey that incorporated five experiments. Findings include the following: (1) Respondent dispositions, especially isolationism versus internationalism and assertiveness versus accommodativeness, consistently constrained policy preferences, whereas liberalism-conservatism did not; (2) features of the geopolitical context - the presence of U.S. interests, relative power, the images of the adversary's motivations, and judgements about cultural status - also influenced support for military intervention; and (3) systematic interactions emerged between dispositions and geopolitical context that shed light on when and why ideological disagreements about the use of force are likely to be amplified and attenuated by situational factors. Our results are consistent with a cognitive-interactionist perspective, in which people adapt broad predispositions in relatively thoughtful ways to specific foreign policy problems. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Tetlock und sein Koautor haben herausgefunden, dass es "Superforecaster" gibt, Menschen, denen erstaunlich gute Vorhersagen in allen Bereichen gelingen. Sie beschreiben, was diese Superprognostiker auszeichnet, und erklären, wie auch jeder andere bessere Prognosen für sein Leben machen kann

Covert & symbolic racism are investigated using a two-part experimental design to ascertain: (1) the conditions under which blacks are penalized because they are black; (2) the extent to which covert racism is concealed; & (3) the extent to which conservative values encourage a racial double standard in judging who is & who is not entitled to government assistance. Here, the results of the Race & Politics Survey conducted by the Survey Research Center at Stanford U (Calif) in 1985, which employed computer-assisted interviewing & sampling, are reported for whites only (N not provided). Findings show that political conservatism was correlated with opposition to policies to assist blacks & with support for negative images of blacks as lazy & irresponsible. The experimental results, however, pose fundamental challenges to symbolic & modern racism theories, which contend that there is a new kind of racism in the US that takes the form of racial prejudice plus traditional, conservative values. The experimental results demonstrate, on the one hand, that conservatives are not more likely to refuse government help to blacks who have violated traditional values; on the other hand, results demonstrate that conservatives are more likely to favor government help for blacks who have acted in accord with traditional values. The experimental results, moreover, identify a key condition for the expression of discrimination -- a focus on group rather than individual claimants -- & demonstrate that discrimination is not encouraged by a particular ideological outlook, conservative or liberal, but rather is most common in the absence of any ideological stance. 9 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 31 References. Adapted from the source document.

Conway, Conway, Gornick, and Houck (2014) report a major effort to automate integrative complexity coding. Judging this effort requires researchers to be more explicit in articulating key methodological assumptions about the coding process and theoretical assumptions about the construct. Unresolved issues include: (1) when, and on what basis, we should attribute divergences between human coders and algorithms to overestimations or underestimations by one or the other approach; and (2) to what extent second‐generation algorithms can yield Pareto improvements that reduce errors of both underestimation and overestimation. Further progress in developing natural language processing measures of this cognitive style will require sharper definitions of target constructs: in particular, different types of differentiation (dialectical and elaborative) and integration (hierarchical and flexible) and clearer guidelines for factoring context into assessments.