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Abstract
Globalization is frequently linked to populism in advanced industrial societies, yet scholars have found little evidence for a direct connection between citizens' personal economic fortunes and populist beliefs. We draw on the sociotropic tradition to argue that beliefs about how the global economy differently affects groups in society link globalization to populism and its component elements—anti-elitism, people-centrism, and demand for popular sovereignty. Data from an original survey of US residents support our argument that beliefs about whether wealthy Americans have gained from globalization—the rich getting richer—correlate with populist attitudes. This pattern holds while adjusting for a broad range of pocketbook measures and the nativist attitudes associated with right-wing populism. Results from a pre-registered experiment further show that exposure to an article about globalization enriching Davos billionaires increases two of three populist beliefs, lending causal leverage to our empirical tests. Our results emphasize the class dynamics created by outside financial forces, rather than the effects on the country as a whole, suggesting that international relations (IR) scholars gain important insights by accounting for globalization's uneven effects. Perceptions about globalization inform attitudes about politics in general, a layer deeper than foreign economic policy preferences.

Globalization is frequently linked to populism in advanced industrial societies, yet scholars have found little evidence for a direct connection between citizens' personal economic fortunes and populist beliefs. We draw on the sociotropic tradition to argue that beliefs about how the global economy differently affects groups in society link globalization to populism and its component elements—anti-elitism, people-centrism, and demand for popular sovereignty. Data from an original survey of US residents support our argument that beliefs about whether wealthy Americans have gained from globalization—the rich getting richer—correlate with populist attitudes. This pattern holds while adjusting for a broad range of pocketbook measures and the nativist attitudes associated with right-wing populism. Results from a pre-registered experiment further show that exposure to an article about globalization enriching Davos billionaires increases two of three populist beliefs, lending causal leverage to our empirical tests. Our results emphasize the class dynamics created by outside financial forces, rather than the effects on the country as a whole, suggesting that international relations (IR) scholars gain important insights by accounting for globalization's uneven effects. Perceptions about globalization inform attitudes about politics in general, a layer deeper than foreign economic policy preferences.

Recent research into the public's attitude toward the use of nuclear weapons repeats long-standing mistakes in how international relations theorists think about morality. Falsely equating consequentialism with state egoism and normative obligations with restrictions on the use of weapons of mass destruction implies that ethically motivated beliefs about foreign affairs must be other-regarding and that other-regarding behavior is not utilitarian in character. Drawing on empirical research into moral psychology, we argue that liberal, other-regarding morality is only one kind of ethical foundation. Alternative moral concerns such as retribution, deference to authority, and in-group loyalty also help to determine foreign policy beliefs. We find that all three are associated with support for the use of nuclear weapons in the American public. Our survey respondents act as moral utilitarians who weigh different ethical considerations in forming their judgments.

ABSTRACT
American higher-education institutions are under increasing pressure to prepare their students with practical skills for the workplace, and the social sciences—including political science—are not immune. Political figures have suggested—sometimes seconded by academics themselves—that research distracts academics from imparting practical skills to undergraduate students. Using a survey of international relations (IR) scholars, this article shows that this is not the case. Those who spend more time on research actually devote more time to policy-relevant research in their courses than more abstract and theoretical work, and they incorporate more contemporary issues. Research seems to encourage academics to teach their students to fish.

Behavioral economics has shown that people often diverge from classical assumptions about self-interested behavior: they have social preferences and are concerned about issues of fairness and reciprocity. Social psychologists show that these preferences vary across actors, with some displaying more prosocial value orientations than others. Integrating a laboratory bargaining experiment with original archival research on Anglo-French and Franco-German diplomacy during the interwar period, the authors show how fairness and reciprocity matter in social interactions. That prosocials do not exploit their bargaining leverage to the degree that proselfs do helps explain why some pairs of actors are better able to avoid bargaining failure than others. In the face of consistent egoism on the part of negotiating partners, however, prosocials engage in negative reciprocity and adopt the same behaviors as proselfs.

Status-seeking behavior, the pursuit of a higher position on an international social hierarchy as perceived and defined by members of a community, has received considerable attention in recent years. Yet, much of what this recent literature calls status-seeking is difficult to distinguish from something else: the pursuit of fairness. We disentangle status-seeking from fairness-seeking by identifying where a pure status-seeking and a fairness-seeking argument diverge—in the degree to which state actors demand exclusive rights and privileges. Survey experiments of the Russian public concerning the country's membership in the G8 as well as a case study of Germany's behavior in the first Moroccan crisis provide strong support for our "biased fairness" account. Derived from the behavioral economics and psychology literature, it maintains that leaders demand entitlements that match their status and find any such denial as less fair than an equivalent discrepancy for other countries. However, once assured of what they deserve, they do not demonstrate any tendency to exclude others, the hallmark of the status motivation. Convergent evidence at multiple levels of analysis, country contexts, and widely different time periods gives strong indications that fairness concerns are driving much of what is attributed to status-seeking.