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Campaign contribution limits have become a common feature of campaign finance reform efforts in most states. The use of contribution limits has been seen as an important mechanism by which to lessen the influence of so-called `special interests' and to encourage citizen participation. Contribution limits could `democratize' the system of contributions by forcing candidates to rely on a larger number of smaller contributions, thereby reducing the value of any single contribution. In this article, we focus on the alleged `democratization' effects of campaign contribution limits. We examine 58 gubernatorial elections in 42 states during the period 1990 to 2000. Analyses of the number of contributors, the total dollar amount of contributions and the average amount given by contributors suggest that contribution limits do have a democratization effect. The nature of the effect, however, depends upon whether one examines all contributors, just particularistic contributors or just individualistic contributors.

As state judicial campaigns become progressively more expensive and political, judicial candidates have turned more frequently to lawyers and law firms for campaign contributions. Given that lawyers who contribute to judges' campaigns frequently appear before them in court, the potential for a conflict of interest arises. I ask whether judges are more likely to rule in favor of attorneys who provide financial support to their campaigns. Looking at cases decided in the Supreme Court of Georgia's 2003 term, I show that campaign contributions are indeed correlated with judges' decisions. Furthermore, I use a two-stage probit least squares estimator to show that these campaign contributions directly affect judicial decisionmaking. Adapted from the source document.

Objectives Contributions to candidates from the parties' congressional campaign committees are thought to have a 'multiplier effect' in terms of generating contributions from political action committees. Method Using structural equation modeling and timed direct contribution data from the 1992 to 2012 general election cycles, I uncover a complex system of relationships within each party network. Results After controlling for the competitiveness of the race, I find party contributions to challengers and open-seat contestants early in the election cycle positively and significantly predict political action committee contributions to those candidates in the period after Labor Day, both in the era preceding the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act and the era after reform; however, the strength of the relationship declines in the postreform era and differences between the party networks also arise. Conclusions I attribute these developments to changes in campaign finance law that created new hurdles for parties and increased the influence of interest groups. Adapted from the source document.

As state judicial campaigns become progressively more expensive and political, judicial candidates have turned more frequently to lawyers and law firms for campaign contributions. Given that lawyers who contribute to judges' campaigns frequently appear before them in court, the potential for a conflict of interest arises. I ask whether judges are more likely to rule in favor of attorneys who provide financial support to their campaigns. Looking at cases decided in the Supreme Court of Georgia's 2003 term, I show that campaign contributions are indeed correlated with judges' decisions. Furthermore, I use a two-stage probit least squares estimator to show that these campaign contributions directly affect judicial decisionmaking.

The recent US presidential elections saw unprecedented levels of campaign funds raised and spent. Filipe Campante, public policy professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, presented a paper on "Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions", as part of a seminar series at the Singapore Management University's School of Economics.

In this article the authors test for the influence of campaign contributions from economic interest groups on legislative voting in the California Assembly. California does not restrict the size of contributions that special interests may provide to candidates for state office. Consequently, if the purpose of campaign contributions is to secure favorable voting on legislation, this should be evident in an unregulated setting. However, for both business and labor interests, neither the number nor the monetary amount of campaign contributions to incumbents are found to have a major influence on legislative roll call voting.

Why do some 30 million people in the United States give money to political candidates and causes—even though most individual contributions are irrational from the perspective of a strict cost-benefit analysis? How do campaign fundraisers tap into potential donors' motivations? Exploring three decades of historical data and also drawing extensively on the insights of contemporary campaign directors and consultants, Bertram Johnson makes sense of why people give and considers what this means for the campaign finance system, and the quality of representation, in the United States